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ABSTRACT
Patient safety is founded on continuous learning because there is an urgent need to report and learn
from errors, accidents, near misses, and adverse events. The traditional approach to patient safety,
based on forming mortality committees and investigating accidents, will no longer be effective.
Frameworks, surveys, and assessment tools have been developed over the last decade to assist
organizations in measuring and understanding their culture. This a retrospective cross-sectional
study included 67,010 respondents from Agency for Health care Research and Quality (AHRQ)
2018 comparative database was analyzed using partial least squares structural equation modeling
(PLS-SEM). This research explored whether the dominant patient safety culture would impact the
frequency of reported events and overall perceptions of patient safety. Furthermore, the study amid
to examine whether respondents and hospital characteristics influence the perception of patient
safety culture and the impact on healthcare staff. The results in this study showed that the
perception of PSC positively influenced the overall perception of patient safety and frequency of
event reporting. Moreover, the results revealed that hospital and respondents' characteristics (Staff
Position, Teaching Status and Geographic Region) had varying influence on patient safety culture,
overall perception of patient safety and frequency of event reporting.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background
In the United States (U.S.), the field of health care has always been referred to as one
hazardous area due to its unhealthy, erroneous environment, with high mortality rates and
unnecessary loss of valuable lives and valuable assets (Zeidel, 2011). The inconsistency between
the very advanced technology and the very retarded medical practices results in the U. S. leads to
much disappointment among those who expect to receive high-quality health services. They
realize how frequently the patients have been vulnerable to medical errors or susceptible to
adverse events (AEs) (Zeidel, 2011). Being not associated with certain diseases, AEs are simply
unfavorable results of faulty diagnoses or irrelevant treatments, rather than medical errors,
carelessness or low level of care (Berwick et al., 2015).
Studies have proven that the level of safety in health care institutions in the U. S. lacks
many renovations to eliminate the prevalent risks (Sorra & Dyer, 2010; James, 2013; Berwick et
al., 2015; Hopkins, 2016; Nanji et al., 2016). The Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) announcement
of the report “To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System.” has brought patients’ safety
into international focus and awareness. By stressing the actual amount of harm, IOM encourages
health care institutions to realize the importance of improving the quality of their health care
practices which, in turn, lead to more patient safety. Creating awareness of safety will develop
into a culture that ensures the patients encounter fewer risks while receiving health care (Institute
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of Medicine, 1999). The attention worldwide has shifted to spreading safety culture in health
care systems as a cornerstone in any effective health care policy.
Patient safety has frequently been defined as “Freedom from accidental or preventable
injuries produced by medical care” (Hines et al., 2008). With this being the notion, increasing
attention has been directed to evaluating the safety level in each health care organization. (Colla
et al., 2005, Singer et al., 2009; Haynes et al., 2011). The increase in safety culture awareness
has added positively to the level of health care services provided and improved the favorable
outcomes. However, studies and reviews (Brennan et al.,1991; Wilson et al.,1995; Thomas et al.,
2000; Vincent et al., 2001; Davis et al., 2002; Baker et al., 2004) show that considerable numbers
of patients around the world are still vulnerable to avoidable risks as well as being subject to less
than average level of health care (Dixon‐Woods et al., 2011). The rate of adverse events
occurrence is between 3% and 17%. For example, a report by Sir Robert Francis about the health
care services of Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust shows several points of weaknesses in
patient care safety (Francis, 2013). There is ample evidence worldwide that countless errors and
failures (Tingle, 2011).
Consequently, there are considerable losses in health care assets finances (US$ 19 billion
a year) as a result of overstay in hospital, unnecessary stay off work, and involvement in legal
actions (World Health Organization, 2014). So, it is needless to say that any improvement in
patient safety is an investment in the field of health care provision. Policymakers could be
assured that the gains far surpass the losses if they calculated the expenses of patient safety (Jha
et al., 2013).
2

For any health care organization to establish a long-term safety culture, the foundation
stone should be a careful estimation of how successful its current safety culture has been
(Hellings et al., 2010). The most popular and holistic definition of safety culture is that it is the
“product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies and patterns of
behavior that determine the commitment to and the style of proficiency of an organization’s
health and safety management” (Health and Safety Commission, 1993; Berwick et al., 2015).
The safety climate and safety conditions are obvious criteria to foresee the future safety culture
in any health care organization (Colla et al., 2005). In other words, the current safety culture in
an organization can be considered a mirror of the safety culture in the collective mind, effort, and
practice of the manpower of that organization at any point in time (Mearns and Flin, 1999).
Throughout this study, the terms safety culture and safety climate are used as having the same
sense and concept. Furthermore, the implemented tools of study use the term safety culture in its
name; Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSPSC).
As one of the most common evaluation methods, safety culture questionnaires are used to
assess workforce awareness of the safety culture in the health care institution (Singer et al.,
2007). These safety culture questionnaires are recognized and extensively utilized as they are
effective and time-saving (Wreathall, 1995; Guldenmund, 2000). The survey results can create a
better understanding of the safety climate in health care organizations and, thus, highlight the
aspects of strengths to be enforced and the others of weaknesses to be dealt with adequately. This
will help health care policy makers recognize the obstacles that hinder optimizing the patients’
safety culture in their organizations (Smits et al., 2009). The findings of the survey can be
3

utilized to comparatively standardize similar results of surveys in the area of assessing and
developing safety culture efficiency, both nationally and internationally (Blegen et al., 2009).
The questionnaire tools used for evaluating the safety culture in hospital settings are
diverse, and therefore, may not be equally and scientifically sound (Colla et al., 2005, Flin et al.,
2006, Singla et al., 2006). Consequently, the validity and reliability of survey scores obtained in
safety climate questionnaires may be challenging to be confirmed. Proper validation may be
required before the full adoption and implementation of these questionnaires in other health care
settings (Manser et al., 2016). It is equally vital and pragmatic to assess the health care
professionals’ perception of patient safety culture as they are the core of the whole process of
turning the health care area into a risk-free environment.

1.2 Statement of the Problem
All health care organizations have patient safety as their top priority, and big budgets are
allocated by governments to achieve this goal, even though it is a developed or developing
country (Bodur & Filiz, 2010). Safe health care practices and procedures are being viewed as
fundamental. Moreover, safety care culture is the source of concern for patient safety due to the
Institute of Medicine (IOM, 2000) recommendations that all health care organizations should
develop, improve, and strictly adhere to a sound patient safety culture.
In response to the report by the Institute of Medicine, the U. S. Congress instructed the
Agency for Health care Research and Quality (AHRQ) to supervise the process of establishing
patient health care to minimize the occurrence of medical errors (MEs). A target can be achieved
4

through research and joint efforts exerted by healthcare organizations around the country (Kohn
et al., 1999; Erickson et al., 2003; Berwick et al., 2015; Larrison et al., 2017). An ME is “an act
of commission (doing something wrong) or omission (not doing the right thing) that leads to an
undesirable outcome or potential for such an outcome” (Berwick et al., 2015). Although the
problem has been underestimated statistics show that about 98,000 (3.7%) death cases occurred
due to poor patient safety regarding medical therapy in the New York cohort (Kohn et al., 1999;
Berwick et al., 2015).
James (2013) reviewed literature published from 2008 to 2011 about AEs in hospitals.
The revision revealed that more than 440,000 cases of preventable AEs occurred and led to the
death of the patients (James, 2013). In the U. S, research findings indicate that MEs come third
in ranking death causes (Hopkins, 2016). The AHRQ (2015) estimated that about 10% of
patients were prone to some kind of dangerous AE that can lead to health complications such as
adverse drug effects, bed ulcers, or infections that require additional health care or further
medication procedures which could be avoidable (Berwick et al., 2015; AHRQ, 2015). Despite
the exerted efforts to improve hospital conditions, the U.S. lags behind many developed
countries regarding matters like efficiency and quality assurance related to patient care
procedures and practices (Davis et al., 2014; Sutcliffe et al., 2017).
Compared with several countries covered by studies, health care in the U. S. is still far
from being as safe as it should be (Zeidel, 2011; Berwick et al., 2015; Schneider et al., 2017).
The exact data are lacking, but inpatients and outpatients departments are hazardous and have
very high risks. Revering the prevailing negative safety culture could reduce the low-quality
5

levels of practices and, in turn, increase the positive results of patient care (Mardon et al., 2010;
Sorra & Dyer, 2010; Hansen et al., 2011; Sorra et al., 2012; DiCuccio, 2015).
Full awareness of safety culture among all health care practitioners in a hospital can
enhance their safety performance and avail high levels of safety. The outcomes would be low
disease and death cases due to poor hospitalization and health care.
1.3 Research Objectives
This study highlights the possibilities of establishing organizational health care where
patient safety is a topmost priority. In such safe and well-established health care systems, any
defects or drawbacks would be detected and dealt with in real-time. Continuous upgrading and
improvement of safe health care services would ensure successful patient safety advancements
(Smits et al., 2009). The study findings can assist in standardizing medical safety practices that
would yield effective and efficient health care systems (Blegen et al., 2009).
The study's primary objective is to conduct a patient safety culture evaluation by probing
the 12 areas assessed by the SOPS Hospital Survey. The research would depend on a specially
developed model to relate the effects of hospital settings to those of the predominant respondent.
The health care workers’ perception of patient safety culture and the impact of such awareness
would thoroughly be evaluated.

1.4 Research Contributions
Measuring patient safety culture has been a concern throughout some latest studies.
According to this research, the level of patient safety can be predicted and diagnosed using
6

investigation outcomes in the area of patient safety culture. In addition to the available level,
many literature reviews have been done. One of the main concerns has been probing the issues
related to human and organizational concepts and tendencies in envisaging the safety of health
care and the conceivable ways to achieve the desired goals of preventing medical errors.
This research aims at analyzing and measuring the relationships between both unit and
hospital dimensions on the one hand and the characteristics of hospitals and workers on the other
in the context of reported events concerning patient safety in health care. The role of
organizational administration in spreading patient safety culture among staff has been
highlighted. The more commitment from the side of management, the better effective safety
attitudes have been ensured (Fogarty & Shaw, 2010).
The participating bodies in this research include health care workers from different
positions, different hospitals areas, and different geographical regions of the United States. One
main purpose of the study is to evaluate the present level of patient safety culture among workers
who are in direct and indirect contact with the patients in U. S. health organizations. Another
study's main purpose is to examine the factors and perceptions influencing the patient safety
culture and their role in the frequency of reported events. The study aims to present patient safety
culture as the key factor to interpret and consequently eliminate plenty of medical errors and
adverse events in health care.
The study intends to offer health care organizations scopes to better understanding and
advice to more effective improvements of patient safety culture. Managers will benefit from the
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research findings, and health care workers will be provided with insights that will improve the
quality of medical procedures. Therefore, erroneous practices can ultimately be diminished.
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CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction
Common beliefs and values in health care shape specific behaviors among health
organizations and health care practitioners, which add up to form patient safety culture (Cooper,
2000; Nieva & Sorra, 2003; Xuanyue et al., 2013). By considering patient safety culture as a
priority in all health care practices and procedures, the environment of health care organizations
will become much more medical error-free. The safety culture will become the gear behind all
innocuous behaviors of health care professionals. This leads to viewing how health care safety
culture has been defined. After that, the following areas will be examined in the chapter: 1)
Safety in health care organizations and patient safety .2) Organizational safety culture and
climate.3) History and analysis of safety culture concept and climate; the theoretical basis of the
concept; its relevant dimensions; assessing safety culture and its outcomes.
Relevant literature on patient safety culture will be reviewed in the second half of the
chapter. Special highlighting will be directed to initiatives and research in patient safety culture
in hospitals and other health care organizations’ settings. Careful assessment and thorough
analysis will be made regarding the factors underlying the patient safety culture in these hospitals
and health care organizations’ settings. The problems associated with poor safety culture have
been identified and the concept of patient safety is discussed concerning safety culture in
9

general. Future research thoughts have been discussed, highlighting future opportunities for the
researchers interested in safety culture.

2.2 Safety in Organizations
From giant industrial plants to small businesses, the issue of safety has become a
significant concern. Sometimes minor errors cause death and even more catastrophic effects
(Feng et al., 2008, Weick and Sutcliffe, 2011). The ultimate goal of safety procedures in any
organization should simply be the prevention of accidents and any form of injury, not only to the
customers but also to the employees and practitioners (Grote, 2000). As a result of the critical
need, numerous studies on safety culture and climate in various industrial and service settings
have been conducted. Some researchers may argue that the field of health care has its unique
characteristics, and therefore it is quite different from those organizations where the idea of
safety culture has initially been introduced (Pizzi et al., 2001; Colla et al., 2005). One significant
difference is that in health care, “accidents” often happen one person at a time, unlike in other
industries where accidents happen as “sweeping disasters” (Pizzi et al., 2001).
At present times, there is an international move to view single human determinations as
to the basis of substantial potential impacts on the environment. The same can be said about the
human role in safety if it can be turned into error preventing factor instead of risk causing factor.
The North Sea Piper Alpha oil platform explosion can be an obvious example to prove this
hypothesis (Flin et al., 2006). The same conclusion has been reached by Hutchinson (2014).
When it comes to preventing error and avoiding adverse events, rather than being the cause, in a
10

working environment context, the individual role of the worker is vital (Hutchinson, 2014).
Various theoretical approaches in the area support such a concept. The concept of “Normal
Accident” (Hopkins, 1999), the approach of “Organizational Accidents” (Reason, 1997), and the
attitude of “High-Reliability Organizations” (Weick, 2001) are just three examples.
Reason (2000) introduces the “person approach” and the “system approach” as two main
pathways to deal with human errors and human-based accidents. Dealing with these potential
risk causes should be through an appropriate management philosophy. The “person approach”
segregates the individual’s erroneous practices from those related to the system. These erroneous
practices can be in the form of inattention, carelessness, forgetfulness, poor managerial skills, or
low motivation. The approach throws the error responsibility upon the health care practitioners’
shoulders, whether consultants, surgeons, physicians, anesthetists, or nurses. In this model, errors
are tackled through sets of corrective actions and litigations, while in the “system approach”
these errors are related to the contexts and circumstances in which the individuals work. The
errors are considered as consequences to the system’s causational settings. Human workers are
seen as normally susceptible to error, and they naturally need to safeguard, protect, and fortify
against this natural susceptibility (Reason, 2000).
The mainstream of 95 researches reviewed to detect the causal factors in hospital patient
safety revealed that personal factors are dominant(Lawton et al., 2012). Thus, it has been
highlighted that human behaviors need to be given more focus, without justification, by referring
to the reasons and causal factors underlying these erroneous behaviors (Lawton et al.,2012).
Although still widely used, the person approach has been accused of hindering the effort of
11

establishing institutionalized safer health care (Reason, 2000). On the other hand, HighReliability Organizations (HRO) have been named to represent the system’s approach to learn
more about the systematic attitude in dealing with failures and errors (Ruchlin et al., 2004).
Consequently, the system’s approach started to be used more in the medical field (Currie, 2012).
In medicine, a prevailing argument is that hospital systems assume workers' performances are
free from mistake (Leape et al., 1998). Whereas, in industry, it is assumed that human errors are
inevitable (Flin, 2007). These two opposing directions lead to some perplexes in patient safety
health care.
Reason (1997) introduced the “Swiss Cheese Model” to represent the manifestations of
system failures. The model was originally intended to be applied in industrial sceneries. Later,
the model was redesigned to identify medical errors in health care organizations (Vincent et al.,
1998). The model identifies several mechanisms that can be followed for keeping the victims
safe from hazards. According to the World Health Organization, a hazard is “any threat to safety,
e.g., unsafe practices, conduct, equipment” (World Health Organization, 2009). However, in any
protective mechanism, there are areas of weaknesses that harbor factors leading to errors and
failures (Reason, 1997) or, in other words, actions and situations whose combined results give
rise to adverse events (World Health Organization, 2009). Collectively, areas of weaknesses
cause the hazards to turn into actual harm to the patients (Reason, 2000).
Actual health care failures are those “the unsafe acts committed by people who are in
direct contact with the patient or system” which directly and negatively affect efforts to keep the
patient safe (Reason, 2000, p.769). Such failure can be in the form of inappropriate handling,
12

lack of relevant knowledge, negligence of safety precautions, and mistaken interventions
(Vincent et al., 1998). In contrast to latent safety, conditions are the hidden unfavorable
conditions that function as “resident pathogens” inside the system (Reason, 1997). These
conditions wait silently until some operational failures take place. Then, an accident emerges
from under the long-time residing adversities (Reason, 2000).
The latent safety failures are most often the result of poor plans and administrative
assessments made by not properly educated personnel in the field of health care safety (Vincent
et al., 1998; Reason, 2000). Hazardous performances most often result from accumulations of
failure and unfavorable conditions such as ignorance, inexperience, poor preparations, overwork,
stress, miscommunication, poor administration and many more adverse situations (Vincent et al.,
1998). In most cases, adverse events occur due to an individual’s failures associated with the
system’s drawbacks (Reason, 1997; Reason, 2000).
Based on Reason’s model of organizational accidents (Reason, 1997, Reason, 2000),
Vincent and colleagues (Vincent et al., 1998) introduced what is called the “Organizational
Accident Model”. This model considers safety failures and adverse events inevitable outcomes
of operational failures caused by unfavorable administrative conditions. These conditions include
wrong decisions and other organizational factors that lead to accidents and adverse events
(Carayon, 2010). These organizational factors, according to Vincent’s model, are (1) institutional
context, (2) organizational and managerial, (3) work environment, (4) team factors, (5)
individual (staff) factors, (6) task factors, and (7) patient characteristics. These factors are closely
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related to one another and more related to the organizational level than the individual level
(Carayon, 2010).
In the nuclear power and aviation industries, safety procedures concentrated on
organizational factors instead of the workers’ accidents and injuries. Such sift of attention
permits overall observation of the holistic organization’s safety culture (Reason, 1995, Reason,
1997, Weick et al., 2008). Three main examples of such a holistic organization’s safety culture
are establishing a safe environment, risk recognition and safe behavior monitoring (Cooper and
Phillips, 2004).
Health care errors and adverse events are two prominent issues in health care. These two
proactive and leading indicators have affected almost all the approaches to assess safety
performance (Lawton et al., 2012; Choudhery et al., 2014). The reactive approach tends to use
indicators before events to avoid future errors. The approach utilizes incident reporting systems,
analysis of serious accidents causation, and incident reviews. On the other hand, the proactive
approach tends to rely more on detecting potential organizational latent conditions to tackle them
before accidents happen (Lawton et al., 2012). An excellent example of the proactive approach is
safety climate assessment, in which the focus is on the system’s successes rather than its failures
(Flin et al., 2000; Cooper and Phillips, 2004). A successful combination of the two approaches
can serve health care organizations to monitor their safety activities and see their actual effects
(Cooper and Phillips, 2004).
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2.3 Patient Safety
The growing costs of healthcare, due to the use of expensive technology and opting to
provide competitive health care services. Other additional expenses rise from establishing,
furnishing, and staffing costly health care premises and administrations. Obviously, amid all of
this scenario, the safety of health care services would acquire relevant considerations formally
and informally. Health care organizations started to borrow, adapt, and apply many ideas and
techniques from other industries to meet the rising challenges posed by safety lacking procedures
in the field (Institute of Medicine, 1999). The occurrence of too many errors and adverse events
has necessitated efficient error management systems and administrations (McFadden et al.,
2004). To understand how dire the situation has been, consider that in the U.S., despite all
advancements in the field, between 44,000 and 98,000 lives are lost each year, with a total cost
of approximately US$29 billion as a result of AEs (Kohn et al., 1999).
Another study in the U.S. claimed that annually between 210,000 and 400,000 deaths that
could be prevented occur in US hospitals (James, 2013). Worldwide, it has been estimated in a
study that about 9% of the total number of patients has been exposed to avoidable adverse events
while being admitted to hospital (de Vries et al., 2008). Hudson suggests that safety culture
authorities in health care are usually reactive (Hudson, 2003). As these authorities are not safety
well-oriented, they do not take adequate initiatives towards their (systematic knowledge and
approaches about the operation of the system and the management of risks (Hudson 2003)).
Thus, they become serious and take safety actions after accidents occur, but not before.
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2.3.1 Evolution of Patient Safety
The subject of patient safety in health care settings has become a general issue of concern
for health organizations worldwide. The Institute of Medicine made some outstanding reports
under the titles: “To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System” and “Crossing the Quality
Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century” (Institute of Medicine, 1999). The IOM
published these reports in 1999 and 2001 to highlight the estimated vast numbers of deaths as
direct results of preventable errors in health care (Institute of Medicine, 1999). The IOM also
tried to encourage each organization concerned with health care to have its system of “a culture
of safety” with a specific focus on improving the safety of patient care (Institute of Medicine,
1999). Additionally, the IOM advised health care organizations to implement “the experiences of
other industries” as these make available some “valuable insight about how to begin the process
of improving the safety of health care by learning how to prevent, detect, recover and learn from
accidents” (Institute of Medicine, 1999).
Similar outstanding improvements of patient health care safety in the United Kingdom
(UK) followed the publication of the inspirational report, “An organization with a memory”, by
the Department of Health (DOH, 2001). The influential report highlighted that “Safety cultures
can have a positive and quantifiable impact on the performance of organizations” (DOH, 2001,
p.46). The direct outcome was that patient safety culture became a principle element on the
National Health Service’s (NHS) program for change for the better (Scott et al., 2003). These
reports lead to worldwide considerations toward the role of organizational safety culture in the
occurrence of adverse events in health care (Nieva and Sorra, 2003). The highlights of the
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reports were also proved by the findings of studies on health care errors in countries Australia
(Wilson et al., 1995), UK (Vincent et al., 2001), New Zealand (Davis et al., 2002, Canada (Baker
et al., 2004), Scotland (Williams et al., 2008) and Palestine (Najjar et al., 2013). These studies, in
turn, highlighted the reported rates (3–17% of admissions) of the could be prevented adverse
events and the unnecessary death cases and financial loss (Brennan et al., 1991; Leape et al.,
1991; Andrews et al., 1997).
Due to these reports, the shortages in the safety of patient care and the poor quality of
services were all made visible to health care practitioners and the public and caught the attention
of politicians (Pronovost et al., 2006). In 2004, due to the reports mentioned above, the WHO
made the world alliance for patient safety in collaboration with numerous world organizations.
The common cause was to highlight the need for worldwide cooperation to improve patient
safety (WHO, 2009). Moreover, the issues of patient safety and safety culture have been popped
up to the top of the health care agenda by such worrying failures in health care as the most
prominent recent case of Mid Staffordshire NHS trust in England (Francis, 2013).
2.3.2 The Concept of Patient Safety
Patient safety has been defined as “the avoidance, prevention and amelioration of adverse
outcomes or injuries stemming from the process of health care” (Vincent, 2006). In effect to this
notion, it has become the most important worldwide and became a significant factor of highquality health care service. The IOM considered patient safety as “freedom from accidental
injury; ensuring patient safety involves establishing operational systems and processes that
minimize the likelihood of errors and maximize the likelihood of intercepting them when they
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occur” (IOM, 1999). Researchers agree that patient safety culture is subsequent to general
organizational culture and that it is related to the individuals’ values and beliefs about patient
safety (Feng et al., 2008). This concept is precisely replicated in Mustard's (2002) definition of
patient safety as: “…a product of social learning; ways of thinking and behaving that are shared
and that work to meet the primary objective of patient safety.” Still, the concept tends to remain
not fully and satisfactorily defined (Feng et al., 2008).
In order to improve and build safer health care systems, some countries like the UK,
Canada, Australia and the U.S. have started their safety initiatives of establishing patient safety
actions, activating adverse event reporting and defining performance indicators related to safety.
However, the outcomes of such efforts are vague and uncertain (Arah and Klazinga, 2004).
According to Vincent et al. (2008), safer patient care is still an unreached goal. In addition to the
significant challenges of improving efficient health care systems and processes of safe health
care (Leape and Berwick, 2005), Reasons would add the shortages in patient safety information
at both the organizational and the national levels. Furthermore, the task of involving the
concerned staff in these patient safety improvement initiatives poses another hurdle (Vincent et
al., 2008).
For example, in the Netherlands, a longitudinal retrospective review of patient records
found adverse events rates among inpatients to have risen from 4.1% in 2004 to 6.2% in 2008. In
North Carolina, USA, a random sample of 10 hospitals has been subject to another retrospective
study on patient safety activities. The study showed only a little evidence of improvement
(Landrigan et al., 2010). Again, a second U.S. study showed that about 33% of patients at three
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tertiary care hospitals suffered from their medical care, despite these three hospitals being
recognized for their efforts in improving patient safety (Classen et al., 2011). All these findings
indicate that more efforts are still needed. So far, there has been a total failure in reducing the
rates of risky, and in many cases harmful, medical care (Shojania and Thomas, 2013).
Several organizational factors have been designated as contributors to unsafe care
throughout patient safety literature. These factors include apparent inefficiency of teamwork,
communication, leadership, planning and decision making (Flin and Yule, 2005, Yule et al.,
2006). Johnson and Hudson (2004) earlier listed poor communication, loose supervision,
excessive workload, negligence of safety procedures and understaffing as patient safety
threatening factors. Most of these organizational factors emerge from improper safety culture
(Singer et al., 2003). McFadden et al. (2006) researched that further necessitated a
comprehensive system approach to safety in which all hospital partners participate in
establishing a common safety culture. In conclusion, it has been emphasized that a safety culture
is a basis for any improvement in the quality and safety of patient care (Alonazi, 2011).
2.4 Organizational Culture and Climate
Organizational culture and climate have been studied as early as the 1970s and 1980s,
with health care organizations being the core of concern (Harrison et al., 1992, Mackenzie, 1995,
Sureshchandar et al., 2001). The concept of “organizational climate” appeared about a decade
before the concept of “organizational culture” (Reichers and Schneider, 1990). The 1970s
witnessed much research on organizational climate. Later in the 1980s, the term “culture” started
to be replaced by the term “climate” in most research works (Guldenmund, 2000). The result was
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an overlap in the definition and conceptualization of both terms. This overlap, in turn, led to long
debates and discussions and of course, differences over the two concepts (Olsen, 2009). Different
authors have introduced varying definitions of organizational behavior in the field (Verbeke et
al., 1998).
Organizational culture is defined as a set “of commonly held beliefs and values about
work life” that are shared between colleagues in an organization (Gaucher et al., 1993) while
according to Schein (1992), organizational culture is defined as follows:
“A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group has learned as it solved its problems
of external adaptation and internal integration; that has worked well enough to be
considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive,
think, and feel in relation to those problems” (p. 12).
Cultural researchers have also described organizational culture as a three-level model. It
starts from the lowest level of primary assumptions based on the unconscious beliefs that form
the individual behavior and ends at the highest and most physical and behavioral reflections of
culture (Davies et al., 2000, Glendon and Stanton, 2000). Schein (1992) positions basic
assumptions at the most profound and least accessible level. The beliefs and embraced values are
positioned at the intermediate level. The behaviors are at the highest and most consciously
perceived level. Schein (1992) assumes that the variation between the levels of organizational
culture is essential in health care as the more visible elements of culture are easier to control
while the deep-rooted beliefs and values show more resistance to external influence. Figure 1
below shows three interrelated aspects of an organization’s safety culture: psychological,
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behavioral, and situational aspects. The arrows show how the three sub-concepts are interrelated
so that nothing stands on its own (Cooper, 2000; Health and Safety Executive, 2005). The
psychological, behavioral and situational aspects of safety culture are discussed to show what
each category represents in the health care environment.

Figure 1 Safety Culture Abstraction (Developed by the United Kingdom’s Health and Safety
Executive, 2005)
The block of psychological aspects represents “the way people feel” about the safety
environment and management systems. These aspects include people’s beliefs, attitudes, values
and perceptions at different organizational levels. This sub-concept is referred to as the
organization’s safety climate (Health and Safety Commission, 1993; Cooper, 2000; Health and
Safety Executive, 2005).
A safety climate reflects how individuals identify their social environment within the
organization. This perception influences their individual psychological well-being (James &
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James, 1989). An organizational climate comes into existence when members of an organization
share the same perceptions of an event or an environment. These perceptions are the actual
characterization of how all employees in the organization see their roles as individuals, relate to
one another as members of a group, and the feeling of objectivity within this organization
(Glisson et al., 2008). The developments of positive safety cultures tend to be much impeded in
such organizational climates where there are high role conflicts and low perception of role
objectivity and clarity (Jordan et al., 2009).
Behavioral aspects of the safety culture reflect “what people do” within the organization
(Health and Safety Commission, 1993; Cooper, 2000; Health and Safety Executive, 2005). This
sub-concept includes all the actions, behaviors, and activities related to safety. Numerous staff
activities directly affect the organizational overall safety culture. For example, certain behavioral
aspects in a hospital environment can be related to handwashing as safety procedures before and
after patient care. The correct documentation of when medications are administered to the patient
can be another example of a safety-related activity.
The third block in an organization’s culture consists of situational aspects. These subconcepts include the organizational structures, policies, procedures, management communication
and workflow that are prevalent and related to the patient care system in the health organization
(Health and Safety Commission, 1993; Cooper, 2000; Health and Safety Executive, 2005). These
aspects are sometimes known as corporate factors. Adhering to these corporate factors in a
manner that ensures they are current, accessible and followed by all the health care teams would
eventually prevent errors in all health care domains of management, a hospital’s policies,
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operating procedures, management communication and workflow systems. An outdated policy
on medication administration can be taken as an example of a situational aspect. In this case, if a
nurse followed the outdated policy, the current medication administration process would be
inaccurate and could cause harm to the patient. The reporting hierarchy for a critical lab value
can be another example. In most hospitals, the policies of a critical lab value delivery mandate
that lab results are to be reported to licensed independent practitioners (LIP) who are physicians
or nurse practitioners permitted by laws and regulations in their organizations to provide care to
patients without direction or supervision (The Joint Commission, 2008). If these delivery policies
are not followed, information could be passed to unauthorized employees, resulting in serious
violations, treatment delays and harm to the patients.
Each author visualizes organizational climate from his or her perspective. Campbell et al.
(1970) define organizational climate as “a set of attributes specific to a particular organization
that may be induced from the way the organization deals with its members and its environment”
(p.390). Schein (1992) considers climate “a reflection and manifestation of cultural assumptions”
(p. 230). Glendon and Stanton (2000) describe organizational climate as “the perceived quality
of an organization’s internal environment” (p.198). The author goes further to define climate as
culture in being constructed.
Organizational climate, unlike organizational culture, has been described as a broader
concept that reflects the status of an organization at present (Glendon and Stanton, 2000). Ekvall
(1983) sets an apparent differentiation between the two concepts. The author considers
organizational climate and organizational culture reflecting different components of the social
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system governing an organization. Culture is based on shared beliefs and values, whereas climate
is a reflection of set behaviors. While organizational climate is concerned with individuals’
attitudes and perceptions of specific aspects of an organization, culture, on the other hand,
concentrates on pan-organization shared beliefs (Reichers and Schneider, 1990). Organizational
climate has been described by Furnham and Gunter (2015) as an index of organizational health.
Moran and Volkwein (1992) believe that climate incorporates “behaviors and artifacts” and
“beliefs and values” and these are the cultural elements in the two outer layers of organizational
culture.
Generally speaking, organizational climate is viewed as being less stable and as a result,
is thought to be more subject to change (Denison, 1996). Whereas organizational culture is
considered by Guldenmund (2000) as “relatively stable, multidimensional, and holistic in
nature”. Despite these attempts of distinction, Glick (1985) and Reichers and Schneider (1990)
consider climate and culture as simply two interchangeable terms.
Hofstede et al. (2005) considered the distinction between organizational climate and
organizational culture is only due to the level of concern. While climate is considered the
concern of lower and middle-level management, culture is considered the concern of top-level
management (Hofstede et al., 2005). Moreover, Glick (1985) explains that the two concepts are
devised from two different disciplines. Organizational climate research is based mainly on social
psychological disciplines, whereas organizational culture is mainly on anthropology.
Consequently, the two terms reflect different research hypotheses and the distinction between
them is in terms of the methodology applied.
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Often, quantitative approaches are followed by organizational climate studies, while in
the case of organizational culture, qualitative approaches are applied to study the research
objectives. Organizational culture is evaluated qualitatively through observation and interviews
(Wreathall, 1995). Glendon and Stanton (2000) explain that organizational climate tools, like
climate survey questionnaires, may measure attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions when the
measurement is undertaken with a slight touch on specific aspects of organizational culture.
However, the results of climate surveys may not be ready to infer without further confirmation.
Zohar and Hofmann (2012) advocate that culture and climate are multi-level paradigms upon
which staff build perceptions of the organizational level climate and perceptions of the group
level climate. According to Zohar and Luria (2005), whether consistent or discrepant, staff
perceptions contain significant interpretations of safety behaviors.
2.5 Safety Culture and Climate
Safety culture and safety climate are derived from organizational culture and climate
(Cooper, 2000, Guldenmund, 2000). The concept of safety culture is suggested to be studied in
organizational culture (Guldenmund, 2000; Frazier et al., 2013). According to Neal et al. (2000),
“Safety climate is a specific form of organizational climate which describes individual
perceptions of the value of safety in the work environment” (p.100). Olsen (2008) asserts that the
same perspectives used in understanding organizational culture can be utilized to understand
organizations' safety culture. Naturally, safety culture studies focus on safety-related issues on
organizational culture research. Again, and as explained earlier, there is a dire need for consistent
definitions and conceptualizations of the terms organizational culture and organizational climate.
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Otherwise, the lack of clarity in safety culture and climate concepts shall remain prevalent (Flin,
2007).
2.5.1 History of Safety Culture
The concept of safety culture was first introduced in the International Nuclear Safety
Advisory Group's (INSAG) investigation report following the Chernobyl disaster in 1986
(WHO, 1986). The concept has since been discussed in various public inquiry reports about other
high-profile incidents such as the nuclear accidents at Three Mile Island, the Piper Alpha oil rig,
the King's Cross station fire, and the Clapham Junction train crash. Poor safety culture has been
identified as a significant factor contributing to those accidents in such investigations (Cox and
Flin, 1998; Fleming and Lardner, 1999; Reason, 2002; Perrow, 2004). As a result, safety culture
has become a fundamental and top priority requirement in many high-risk industries like
aviation, nuclear power, and chemical engineering (Pronovost et al., 2006).
Following the release of the IOM's reports in 1999 and 2001, there was a lot of interest in
patient safety culture in the healthcare field (IOM, 1999, IOM, 2001). Creating a positive safety
culture has become a key component of healthcare organizations' efforts to improve patient
safety (Hughes and Lapane, 2006). According to Zhan and Miller (2003), creating a positive
safety culture is critical to reducing the number of preventable medical errors and their costs to
patients and society.
Recent advances in the health care field have indicated the advantages of adopting
recognized organizational models and error management methodologies from other industries to
minimize medical errors and protect patients from harm (Institute of Medicine, 1999). The main
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concern is whether it is relevant to develop a safety culture in health care settings by transferring
it from high-risk industries. The following section explores theoretical approaches and
definitions across the published literature.

2.5.2 The Concept of Safety Culture
Since the Chernobyl accident in 1986, an increasing amount of literature has been issued
to examine the safety culture concept. Several definitions for safety culture have been proposed,
but most of them are general and not explicit enough (Carroll, 1998; Cox and Flin, 1998;
Pidgeon, 1998; Cooper, 2000; Boughaba et al., 2014). The Health and Safety Commission has
developed one of the most widely cited definitions of safety culture, and it states that:

“The safety culture of an organization is the product of individual and
group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies to, and the style and
proficiency of, an organization’s safety management. Organizations with
a positive safety culture are characterized by communications founded
on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the importance of safety and by
the efficacy of preventive measures” (HSC, 1993, p.23).

The above definition states that organizations with a positive safety culture are
characterized by high levels of trust and shared views about the importance of safety. These
organizations are built on the efficiency of safety management systems (HSC, 1993). Leape et al.
(2009) stress that positive structures of safety culture include leadership, communication and
preventive safety measures. Choudhry et al. (2007) state that a positive safety culture includes
five fundamental components: commitment and support of management to safety; management
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concerns for the staff; shared trust between management and employees; empowerment of staff;
and continuous monitoring and improvements.
According to Cooper (2000), individual performance and organizational aspects that
influence health and safety are reflected in safety culture. Zohar (2010) states that safety culture
reflects one aspect of an organization’s overall culture. Edwards and Armstrong (2013) portray
safety culture as “the assembly of underlying assumptions, beliefs, values and attitudes shared by
members of an organization, which interact with an organization’s structures and systems and the
broader contextual setting to result in those external, readily-visible, practices that influence
safety” (p. 77).
Pidgeon (1998) has criticized earlier research in the field for being “unsystematic,
fragmented and in particular, underspecified in theoretical terms.” Guldenmund (2000) sees that
safety culture as a concept is still poorly defined. Therefore, It is more logical to believe that
developing a universal model or definition of safety culture has not yet been completed (Cooper,
2000). In contrast, a group of researchers such as Wilpert and Itoigawa (2001) argue that such a
complex concept as safety culture requires theoretical and practical clarification. Another group
of researchers such as Ginsburg et al. (2013) argue for the lack of clarity in defining the construct
of safety culture and safety climate and the construct of patient safety culture. Nevertheless, a
consensus of most researchers indicates that organizational and contextual factors are essential to
define safety culture.
Most safety culture definitions from various industries share common elements, such as
focusing on workers' attitudes and behaviors regarding health and safety practices (Cooper,
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2000). These shared elements also indicate the importance of the psychological feature of safety
culture, which is closely bound to the concept of safety climate (Choudhry et al., 2007). Cooper
(2000) points out the situational and the behavioral constituents as two other essential elements
of safety culture.
Sammer et al. (2010) carried out a comprehensive review of the culture of safety
literature in the U.S. hospital settings. They documented the following seven patient safety subcultures: (a) leadership, (b) teamwork, (c) evidence-based patient care practices, (d)
communication, (e) learning, (f) just culture, and (g) patient-centered care. According to Collins
and Gadd (2002), sub-cultures of safety tend to develop when workers in the same organization
experience different working conditions. Glendon and Stanton (2000) state that identifying safety
sub-cultures as a basis to improve our understanding of the construct under study could be
significant progress. Reason and Hobbs (2017) suggest considering safety culture based on three
essential constituents: (1) a just culture, (2) a reporting culture and (3) a learning culture.
Theoretically speaking, any basic assumptions of organizational cultures tend to be
influenced by national cultures. For example, the importance of rules and the acceptance of
hierarchy may vary from one national culture to another (Hofstede, 1991). Some clear cases
indicate that safety culture varies according to national cultures' differences (Cheyne et al.,
2003). Lardner (2003) argues that a robust local safety culture created on a solid basis can override the influence of national culture. However, this proposition needs some more research in its
support.
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2.5.3 The Concept of Safety Climate
Zohar (1980) appears to be the first researcher to use the term "safety climate" in a study
on safety perceptions among industry workers. The author (1980, p.96) defined safety climate as
a “summary of molar perceptions that employees share about their work environment” thus
providing a “snapshot” of the perceptions that health care workers could hold about the visible
features of safety culture during a particular time (Mearns and Flin, 1999, 5). Flin et al. (2000,
p.178) defined safety climate “as the surface features of the underlying safety culture.” It
“assesses workforce perceptions of procedures and behaviors in their work environment that
indicate the priority given to safety relative to other organizational goals” (Flin et al., 2006,
p.109).
Safety climate is made up of attitudes and perceptions instead of safety culture. It
excludes values, competencies, and behaviors (Lardner, 2003). Safety climate differs from safety
culture because it is specific to a single point in time and a single location. Reichers and
Schneider (1990, 23) traced the progression of the two concepts, who concluded that "culture
exists at a higher level of abstraction than climate, and climate is a manifestation of culture."
Alternatively, safety culture is a broader organizational feature, whereas safety climate is a
subset of it. Alternatively, safety culture is a broader organizational feature, whereas safety
climate is a subset of it. As the actual disposition of the organization, Cox and Flin (1998) define
safety culture as the relative stability of systems, procedures, and behaviors.
On the other hand, safety climate was described as a transitory mood that changes
according to external events and factors. Guldenmund (2000) states that safety climate can be
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regarded as another safety performance indicator. The Health Foundation held a discussion event
in February 2013 to decide what is meant by ‘safety culture’ and how it can be assessed and
monitored. The meeting concluded that culture, on the one hand, is described as more
informational and concerns “the values, beliefs and assumptions that staff infer through story,
myth and socialization, and the behaviors they observe that promote success” while, on the other
hand, climate “emerges through a social process, where staff attach meaning to the policy and
practice they experience and the behaviors they observe” (The Health Foundation, 2013, p.3).
To identify common features in the definitions of the concepts of safety culture and
safety climate, Kaczur (2017) conducted a conceptual analysis and comparison of these concepts
at the level of theoretical and operational definitions and concluded that both concepts appear to
be distinct constructs, in which safety climate is a sub-component of safety culture. The
definitions of both terms significantly vary in the published research. The evident lack of unified
definitions for both constructs leads to the prevailing lack of conceptual clarity. Kaczur (2017)
concludes that safety culture may lose its potential as a crucial feature in organizational activities
without a clear understanding of its nature.
On the other hand, Denison (1996) draws attention to the distinctive differences between
research studies that have measured safety culture and those that have measured safety climate.
Guldenmund (2000) adds that according to the Schein (1992) model, safety culture is of three
levels labeled as basic assumptions, espoused values, and artifacts. The level of basic
assumptions is the core layer of culture. The other two levels of espoused values and artifacts
formulate a safety climate. Basic assumptions cover beliefs, unconscious thoughts and feelings
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considered true and are more readily accessible by qualitative methods. The innermost, subconscious basic assumptions can only be inferred rather than assessed (Schein, 1990).
Meanwhile, the two outer aspects of culture are the more visible and conscious values, attitudes
and perceptions that can be quantitatively measured using questionnaires. Schein (1990) suggests
ethnographic methods to assess basic assumptions held by the members of an organization as an
indication of safety culture.
Safety climate questionnaires are commonly used to assess safety climate because they
measure employees' attitudes and perceptions of safety in their work environments (Collins and
Gadd, 2002; Choudhery et al., 2014). According to Denison (1996), questionnaire surveys are
useful in reflecting employee perceptions of the current state of safety in their specific
organization location at a specific time. On the other hand, these questionnaire surveys cannot
accurately reflect the underlying safety culture.
To conclude, the definitions of safety culture and safety climate are equally numerous
and different. Denison (1996) states that the two terms may represent different approaches to the
same incident. Nonetheless, despite their distinctive differences, the two terms are often used
interchangeably in literature (Cox and Flin, 1998).
2.5.3.1 Zohar and Luria’s multilevel model of safety climate
Both Zohar and Luria suggest a multi-level model of safety climate at the levels of
organization, sub-unit, or group (Zohar, 2000; Zohar and Luria, 2005). The most significant
assumption of the multi-level model is that staff perceptions related to the safety priority which
are determined by the perceived managerial commitments at different levels of the organization.
These staff perceptions are represented in the organization's policies, procedures, and practices.
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Zohar and Luria (2005) point out that the effect of an organization climate on staff’s safety
behavior is greatly facilitated by group climate level, which indicates that organization-level and
group-level climates are “globally aligned” (p. 625). The authors add that perceptions of
managerial commitment at the unit level, as in the form of supervisors, have been considered a
more “proximal measure and powerful antecedent” of safety performance. The organization
level, represented in the top management, lies as the “distal antecedent” (p. 618). The authors
also reveal that, in some cases, group-level variation can be related to the preference of
supervisors to apply formal procedures. Zohar and Luria’s (2005) multi-level safety climate
model appears to be the most overt framework to demonstrate the effects of staff perceptions on
safety results at different levels of the organization (Saraç, 2011).
In agreement with Zohar’s theoretical suggestions, Colla et al. (2005) report that
management commitment has been evaluated with safety results in patient safety climate studies.
The influence of top management on the level of priority given to safety at the unit level has
been found to reduce adverse consequences, including treatment errors (Naveh et al., 2006). This
can be achieved mainly by establishing well-written safety procedures and policies. However,
specifically in health care, the effect of hospital safety climate on both patient and worker safety
is often not entirely clear (Flin, 2007).
2.5.4 Theoretical basis
Theoretically speaking, both safety culture and safety climate provide a basis to guide the
workers’ safety behavior to acquire perceptions and expectations regarding safety behavior
outcomes (Zohar, 1980). Despite the significant practical improvement of safety culture and
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climate, that progression has not been reflected in theoretical improvement (Clarke, 2000,
Guldenmund, 2000, Zohar, 2010). Groves et al. (2011) add that there is an undisputable lack of a
reliable definition of safety culture and a proper reinforcement of theoretical basis for this
concept. Also, there is an absence of a safety culture theory that describes the process of
protecting patients and, at the same time, includes the interaction between the organizational
structures and the individual activities (Groves et al., 2011).
Clarke (2000) points out the “theoretical roots” of safety culture and argues that no one
has built an independent framework or attempted to make safety culture operate based on
theoretical roots. Guldenmund (2000) carried out a literature review of research on safety culture
and climate and concluded that “All in all, the models of safety culture are unsatisfactory to the
extent that they do not embody a causal chain but rather specify some broad categories of interest
and tentative relationships between those” (p. 243). Likewise, Groves et al. (2011) argue that it is
not unusual for a concept gathered from various disciplines, as in the case of safety culture, to
lack a solid theoretical basis in a profoundly different health care environment.
It is believed that research on patient safety culture has borrowed its theoretical roots
from high-risk industries (Ausserhofer, 2012). According to Halligan and Zecevic (2011), the
five most commonly cited models in health care research include (1) High-Reliability
Organization Theory (HROT) (Ruchlin et al., 2004), (2) Donabedian’s Quality of Care Model
(Donabedian, 2002) and its adaptations including the Systems Engineering Initiative for Patient
Safety (SEIPS) model (Carayon, 2006) and Quality Health Outcomes Model (Mitchell et al.,
1998), (3) The Cultural Maturity Model (Westrum, 2004), (4) Organizational Theory (Ruchlin et
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al., 2004) and (5) System Theory (Nieva and Sorra, 2003). According to Guldenmund (2000), no
single safety culture theory or model has been unanimously recognized as clearly representing
the construct of safety culture and safety climate. Also, no single theory or model can be applied
in all organizations. The most common theories and models adopted in health care research are
HROT, Donabedian’s Quality of Care Model, including its SEIPS variations, and Hospital
Survey on Patient Safety Culture Conceptual Model. A brief overview of these is provided
below.
2.5.4.1 High-reliability organization theory
The early literature on safety was founded on the premise that individual workers more
often caused errors than how safety was administered (Cox and Flin, 1998, Reason, 2002).
However, according to the Institute of Medicine (1999), organizational errors are primarily
caused by poorly planned systems. The systems approach to error, which is gaining popularity in
health care, was first widely employed in various industrial settings (Currie, 2012). HROT, for
example, is based on research into high-reliability companies. These high-reliability firms
operate risky and intricate technology in hazardous environments where the consequences of
errors may be severe, but the likelihood of errors is low (Roberts, 1990). Nuclear aircraft
carriers, navy, and commercial aviation are examples of high-reliability companies (Baker et al.,
2006). The premise underpinning organizational safety in these is that they can work in
dangerous conditions because their components have various functions and complexities. They
also link time-sensitive procedures and highly specialized staff (Roberts, 1990; Perrow, 1999).
Furthermore, it is considered that accidents occur because those in charge of managing
and operating complicated systems cannot anticipate and predict the difficulties that the system
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will produce (Perrow, 1999, Ruchlin et al., 2004, Singer et al., 2007). To handle complicated
tasks, prevent accidents, and improve reliability, such complex yet successful operations require
efficient human organization, relevant processing, and appropriate technology (Ruchlin et al.,
2004).
Only lately has a study indicated that a sense of "collective mindfulness" is a critical part
of HROs' safety culture, allowing them to maintain good performance (Weick and Sutcliffe,
2011). This important feature is built on front-line staff sharing a common goal of detecting and
correcting errors before they cause negative consequences. As simple as it may appear, this
shared motivation is made up of five interconnected behavioral principles: fear of failure,
unwillingness to simplify interpretations, sensitivity to operations, dedication to resilience, and
deference to expertise (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007). According to Weick and Sutcliffe (2011), these
five principles help front-line workers stay mindful and function safely even in dangerous
situations.
Another critical component in the success of HROs is the ability of the organization's
employees and teams to communicate consistently and effectively. Despite operating under high
stress in complex circumstances, long-term synergistic behaviors and staff constancy supplement
these (Wilson et al., 1995). Contrary to popular belief, the health care sector has its own set of
complications that distinguish it from tightly managed industrial HRO environments (Dekker et
al., 2010). HROT was used to develop several patient safety climate measures, including the
patient safety climate in healthcare organizations and the safety organizing scale.
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2.5.4.2 Donabedian’s quality of care model and SEIPS model

Donabedian (2002) proposed a framework for understanding the structures, processes,
and outcomes that influence the quality of healthcare services. According to Donabedian (2002),
structure refers to the conditions under which care is provided. This structure considers all of the
physical and organizational characteristics of healthcare facilities. All of the activities involved
in providing care are included in the process. In terms of all relevant collective structures,
process components, and impacts, the outcomes are the final results or induced changes related
to the provision of care. Bonner et al. (2009) asserted that each component in Donabedian’s
framework is not only active but transactional and liable to influence the safety outcomes.
However, the model has some limitations in identifying the scope of interactions and the extent
of relationships among the system's constituents (Carayon, 2006).
Human Factors and Ergonomics (HFE) came to existence as a scientific discipline
promoted as being useful for redesigning health care systems and processes, as well as
improving the quality of patient safety and care (Pronovost and Goeschel, 2011; Pronovost and
Weisfeldt, 2012; Carayon et al., 2014). Following the IOM’s report “To Err is Human: Building
a Safer Health System” in 1999 (Institute of Medicine, 1999), the HFE approach to research,
design, and policy making became fundamental for patient safety in various health care settings.
Nevertheless, Carayon et al. (2014) argue that HFE systems approaches should incorporate all
the comprehensive organizational concerns and external impacts to have a significant and
sustainable influence on patient safety and health care quality.
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Donabedian's Structure-Process Outcome model of health care quality is incorporated into
the SEIPS model (Donabedian, 1978; Donabedian, 1988; Carayon, 2006). Furthermore, the work
system replaces the "Structure" component to create a more systematic approach to analyzing and
improving patient safety and health care quality (Carayon et al., 2014). In terms of incidents, errors,
adverse events, satisfaction, and experience, the SEIPS model describes the system components
and their relationships and their impacts on patients. It also explains the components, their
relationships, and how they affect employee outcomes such as incidents, stress, burnout, joy,
satisfaction, and organizational outcomes such as productivity, efficiency, and staff injuries. It
improves on Donabedian's model by including a more detailed description of organizational
structure in a working system. Furthermore, the SEIPS model details the interacting components,
whether persons, tasks, tools and technologies, physical environments, or organizations. Likewise,
it incorporates employee/organizational outcomes with all possible mutual relationships between
patient outcomes and employee/organizational outcomes.
2.5.4.3 Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture Conceptual Model
The AHRQ created a survey to pinpoint the underlying conditions that lead to AEs in
patient care, which led to the AHRQ HSPSC conceptual model. Appendix A contains a sample of
this survey. The literature review, tool development, and psychometric analyses components of
the AHRQ are discussed later in this chapter. The HSPSC conceptual model is based on individual
hospital employees' perceptions of safety culture. Figure 2 shows the same thing (Sorra & Nieva,
2004; Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Dyer, 2010). Using factor analysis, the researchers grouped
individual employees’ perceptions of safety culture into four main categories: (1) “Your Work
Area,” (2) “Supervisor/Manager,” (3) “Communication” and (4) “Your Hospital.” There were ten
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dimensions within these four structures to describe the employees’ perception of safety culture.
There were also two more dimensions representing outcome measures: “Frequency of Event
Reporting” and “Overall Perceptions of Safety” (Sorra & Nieva, 2004) (Appendix B). The tool
consists of 42 items that help operate each dimension. Detailed descriptions and examples of
dimensions will follow.

Figure 2 HSPSC Conceptual Model
Through factor analyses, researchers identified the dimensions that measure an employee’s
perceptions of safety culture on the work area (Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra &
Dyer, 2010). Work areas are defined as units of the organization that provide specialized patient
care, although they are not considered departments. Examples include the intensive care unit, the
surgical unit, and the neonatal intensive care unit. The dimensions' definitions and examples of
hospital scenarios are provided below to clarify the functioning perceptions.
1. Teamwork within Hospital Units
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Within this dimension, all levels of staff in specific units respect and support one another,
and they all work together as one team (Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Dyer,
2010). When caring for a neonate, for example, the nursing staff may develop clear care goals in
line with treatment options, and these objectives would need to be communicated to other staff
shifts to maintain safe care. In such situations, the nursing staff must respect and support one
another and work as a cohesive unit to ensure the neonate's safety.
2. Staffing
This dimension looks into the institution's staffing practices to see if enough staff can
handle the workload. This dimension's items also test whether people believe their unit's work
hours are appropriate and support high-quality patient care (Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Blegen et al.,
2009; Sorra & Dyer, 2010). Furthermore, the staffing dimension determines whether the working
teams are made up entirely of temporary employees and, if so, whether such ad hoc staffing is best
for patient care. When nurse-to-patient ratios are reasonable, care is proven to be safer
(Siarkowski-Amer, 2013). When nursing staff realizes that the organization's management
understands the importance of adequate staffing to address the safety needs involved in providing
quality patient care, a safe work environment prevails (Siarkowski-Amer, 2013).
3. Organizational Learning-Continuous Improvement
In this dimension, researchers tried to find out if hospital employees believed their
organization learns from the occurrence of error and if it is likely that such errors lead to
improvements that can elevate the efficiency of safe care provision (Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Blegen
et al., 2009; Sorra & Dyer, 2010). Medication administration could be an example of
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Organizational Learning-Continuous Improvement. A root cause analysis of the event could detect
the source of the error if a medication was delivered to the wrong patient. Then consequently,
relevant modifications could be introduced to improve the process and avoid such error
occurrence. While learning from mistakes helps to avoid mistakes in the future, it can only happen
in environments that value and promote safe patient care.
4. Non-punitive Response to Error
This dimension investigates the extent to which employees believe they will not be
punished for unintentional errors. In other words, their mistakes would not be held against them
and would not be recorded in their performance files (Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Blegen et al., 2009;
Sorra & Dyer, 2010). As in medication errors, employees would report their errors if they felt
secure from punitive actions. The assumption is that there might be a flaw in the system for such
an error to have occurred. To get keenly involved in improving a flawed system, employees need
to feel secure and believe there will be no negative consequences if they report work deficiencies
(Reason, 2000). Such transparency in the work environment tremendously enhances patient
safety culture.
5. Hospital Management Support for Patient Safety
This dimension assesses whether hospital management maintains a work environment
that promotes patient safety. The dimension also confirms that the hospital's management
prioritizes patient safety (Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Dyer, 2010). An
organization's climate is a specific component concerned with how hospital employees identify
the social setting in the organization, as mentioned earlier in this chapter (, 1996; Jordan et al.,
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2009). The ideal environment for a safety culture is when the hospital management's actions and
activities demonstrate to the staff that safety is a top priority. These safety-enhancing actions
may be visible if management actively supports appropriate nurse-to-staff ratios or implements a
fair pay scale to all employees.
6. Supervisor/Manager category of safety culture
Through the use of factor analyses, researchers acknowledged this category as having a
single dimension to evaluate employees’ perceptions of their supervisors’ or managers’
expectations, actions and willingness to promote patient safety and safe health care (Blegen et
al., 2009; Sorra & Nieva, 2004). This category was defined through the perceptions of hospital
supervisors and managers when they listened to their staff proposals on enhancements of patient
safety. This dimension also explores whether employees believe these proposals are taken
seriously and eventually incorporated in the organization guidelines for actual practices (Figure
2). Supervisors and managers who enthusiastically compliment their employees for
implementing patient safety procedures and reward those who endorse safe care create strong
safety cultures in their work environments (Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra &
Dyer, 2010). A monetary gratuity to employees who speak up when a breach in safety
procedures occurs could be a simple example of such a reward. Employees need to feel secure
when they report such adverse events with their actions praised and encouraged by their
supervisors and managers.
7. Communication Openness
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In this dimension, staff members speak up freely if they see something negatively
affecting patient care. They also have the freedom of questioning the authority about a safety
violation (Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Sorra & Dyer, 2010). Errors are readily
fostered in work environments with threatening and punitive behaviors which prevent mutual
communication (The Joint Commission, 2008). An example of Communication Openness might
involve a nurse enquiring about an aspect of a physician’s decision, and the physician would not
be offended by this questioning in an open communication environment. Moreover, through an
inter-professional exchange of ideas, the physician would clarify the reason for the decision,
consequently improving the nurse’s level of understanding and satisfaction with the course of
treatment (Sorra et al., 2016; The Joint Commission, 2008).
8. Feedback and Communication about Error
In this dimension, staff are informed of errors and how they can be prevented. In
addition, staff are informed of relevant changes that have been induced to prevent future adverse
events (Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Sorra & Dyer, 2010). An example of this
dimension could encompass a hospital manager non-punitively discussing the occurrence of an
error with a practitioner or all members of the team involved in that error. If any changes were
necessary, the newly introduced procedures would be communicated throughout the hospital to
prevent similar occurrences in the future.
9. Teamwork across Hospital Units.
In this dimension, hospital units cooperate and coordinate to provide the best patient care.
This dimension explores whether hospital systems foster a sense of synergy between multiple
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hospital units or between specialized groups (Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Sorra &
Dyer, 2010). For the patient's well-being, the variations between individual issues and system
issues are disregarded. To achieve such a spirit of solidarity, patient care teams must effectively
collaborate with relevant teams in other units. The multiple teams should unanimously and
explicitly agree upon the set goals, objectives, roles, processes and outcomes (Siarkowski-Amer,
2013). In order to surpass the sometimes unavoidable ideological differences between team
members across units, explicitly defined and deliberate strategies and systems must be
established in advance. Such ideological differences, if neglected, can create an undesired subsafety culture. For example, if a practitioner in hematology does not clearly express a patient’s
vital clinical diagnosis to a surgeon prior to surgery, the fact that the patient is hemophilic might
be unnoticed. The lack of solidarity among health care teams indeed renders the patient
vulnerable to an increased risk, such as experiencing unnecessary bleeding during surgery in the
case of this hemophilic patient. In conclusion, effective communication across hospital units is
essential to assure patient care is safe from one specialty to another.
10. Hospital Handoffs and Transitions
This dimension is pertaining to whether practitioners believe necessary information about
the patient is circulated in the forms of handoffs among care providers across hospital units and
during the change of work shifts (Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Dyer, 2010).
A handoff is defined as the process of transferring care responsibility from one practitioner to
another or from one unit within the hospital to another (Arora et al., 2009). Similar processes
closely related to handoffs are transitions, which are defined as moving the patients between
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health care practitioners and settings, such as hospital units and across medical specialties,
according to the requirements of their condition and care change (Arora et al., 2009). For
instance, patients might receive care from physicians in outpatient settings. Then they are
transitioned to hospital nurses, physicians or specialists for inpatient care before once again
being transitioned to skilled care facilities (The Joint Commission, 2008). If a patient has an
adverse reaction to medication during these transitions or handoffs, this event should be
communicated to all medical care teams on the following shifts or across hospital units if the
patient is transferred. If the patient’s information is not adequately circulated, the transition or
handoff could jeopardize the patient’s safety. Ineffective transitions and handoffs are usually
encountered in poor hospital cultures and lead to preventable errors, prolonged hospital stay, and
additional expenses of health care (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 2008; The Joint
Commission, 2008).
As discussed, a hospital’s safety culture influences the quality of services and outcomes.
Consequently, errors are reported (Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Mardon et al., 2010; Hansen et al.,
2011; Sorra et al., 2012; DiCuccio, 2015). As discussed, quality outcomes are often associated
with the occurrence of SREs. Examples of such events would be a patient’s serious injury or
death because of unsafe blood product infusion and severe injury or death associated with a
medication error (National Quality Forum, 2011). Two HSPSC dimensions that address
outcomes are discussed below.
11. Frequency of Event Reporting
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This dimension measures staff’s perception of the frequency of reporting adverse events.
According to this dimension, errors are measured from three perspectives: the frequency of
catching mistakes and reporting them before they affect the patient; the frequency of reporting
mistakes that have no potential harm to the patient; the frequency of reporting mistakes that
could have harmed the patient, but did not (Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Sorra &
Dyer, 2010). For example, a physical therapist may have provided therapy to the wrong patient.
This therapy caused no harm to the patient. The incident may not have been reported, as the
patient was not harmed. Nonetheless, not reporting such an error pauses potential risks for other
patients who may have encountered an analogous accident or may have been harmed when
similar wrong care was provided. Understanding why this care was provided to the wrong patient
would be of real concern to health care staff and the whole organization.
12. Overall Perceptions of Safety
This outcome dimension is defined as individuals' perceptions of their organization's errorprevention strategies and system procedures widely shared (Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Nieva,
2004; Sorra & Dyer, 2010). Patient safety is defined by the National Patient Safety Foundation
(2015) as "the freedom from accidental or preventable injuries caused by medical care". As a
result, this dimension investigates professional individuals' perceptions of the care they provide
and whether procedures and systems that fail to support their care endanger the patient's safety.
Employees' perceptions that their hospital management is unconcerned about patient safety
become problematic, resulting in low job satisfaction and a high rate of patient harm (Sarac et
al., 2011; Siarkowski-Amer, 2013).
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2.6 Literature Review

2.6.1 Introduction
The main content of the literature review is adapted from the systematic review paper by
(Azyabi, Karwowski and Davahl,2021), which has been published in the MDPI access journal.
According to the World Health Organization, patient safety (PS) is about preventing
medical errors and their adverse effects on patients during healthcare delivery (Colla et al., 2005;
World Health Organization, 2009; Gaal et al., 2011). Unsafe medical practices can lead to patient
injury, death, or disability (Nieva and Sorra, 2003.)The proliferation of such incidents has led to
the recognition of the need to improve patient safety culture (PSC) in the healthcare industry
worldwide. Furthermore, patient safety has been considered as one of the strategic components
of healthcare management (Ramil Hermida et al., 2011). Kohn et al. (1990) argued that safety is
a crucial and fundamental aspect of patient care research. Kohn et al. (1990), in a landmark of PS
publications, advocate for error prevention and mitigation using a systematic approach to PS
management. Therefore, to ensure the highest level of safety culture in the healthcare industry, it
is also essential to understand the beliefs, attitudes, norms, and values of PS and its thresholds
(Ghobashi et al., 2014).
The present study focuses on patient safety culture (PSC) in hospitals. This article’s main
objective is to discuss the research tools used to assess PSC and identify its essential
components. The preferred reporting items for systematic reviews and meta-analyses (PRISMA)
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were used for this review to ensure reliable results. The PRISMA protocol contains 27 items that
aim to analyze and report scientific evidence reliably (Moher et al., 2009).
This paper is structured as follows: the methodology section explains research questions
and research strategy; the results section represents the primary outcomes; the discussion section
answers research questions.
2.6.2 Materials and Methods
This review aimed to evaluate current research on PSC in the healthcare setting. The
following two research questions have been posed:
1. What research instruments are used to study patient safety culture?
2. What are the essential dimensions of patient safety culture assessment?
The study follows the guidelines of PRISMA, as discussed by Moher et al. (2009). First,
the protocol was used to specify the search strategy and research questions. Next, the Hawker
Assessment Tool was used to assess the quality of the articles identified (Hawker et al., 2002).
Sources for the systematic review included peer-reviewed articles, proceedings, textbooks,
conference presentations, and reference books within the scope of PSC. At the exploration stage,
the bibliography search focused on academic databases, including CINAHL, MEDLINE,
Embase, ProQuest, Google Scholar, PsycINFO, and PubMed. Each of these databases provided
adequate information regarding PSC in hospitals.
Eligibility criteria for the search space were applied to articles published after 2006.
Articles were identified based on the combination of keywords 1-4, as illustrated in Table 1.
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Table 1 Keywords Used in the Present Review
Row

Step

Keywords 1

“safety culture” OR “safety climate” OR “patient safety culture” OR “patient
safety climate” OR “patient safety”

Keywords 2

“perception” OR “measure” OR “evaluate” or “assess” OR “survey” OR
“instrument” OR “tool”

Keywords 3

“hospital” OR “teaching” OR “tertiary”

Keywords 4

“nurse” OR “doctor” OR “physician” OR “staff” OR “health professional”

Search

#1 AND #2 AND #3 AND #4

The eligibility criteria allowed us to narrow down the subject literature and to identify
publications that were relevant to the stated research questions. The articles selected for this
study met specific inclusion criteria; namely, these papers (a) were written in English; (b) had
been peer-reviewed; (c) identified or described PSC; (d) applied to hospital settings; (e) utilized a
survey tool to measure dimensions of PSC among acute care hospital personnel; and (f) applied
to general, secondary, tertiary, teaching, or university hospitals. Exclusion criteria included (a)
book chapters; (b) papers that, upon review, were found to not be related to the research
questions; (c) opinions, viewpoints, anecdotes, letters, and editorials; (d) studies with small
sample sizes; and (e) case studies that focused on only one specific hospital unit or sector. Paper
titles and abstracts were analyzed based on the stated inclusion and exclusion criteria. Any
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discrepancies that arose during this phase were resolved through a process of discussion and
consensus.
Hawker et al. (2002) noted that the quality of any given paper must be assessed against a
set of predefined criteria to determine whether it is appropriate for further study. They also
proposed that such an appraisal should be performed through the use of appropriate appraising
tools. The present study applied the Hawker Assessment Tool, which enables the user to score
the quality of papers reviewed. This tool has a uniform assessment form for all types of papers,
thereby providing consistency in the evaluation process. One of the assessment factors is the
consideration of whether the abstract offers a description of the study. Other factors include the
introduction of the paper under review, the paper’s aims, background study, and findings. This
tool also enables the user to analyze the study’s implications concerning the topic under review
and indicates how the findings can be converted into policies. A maximum score of 36 (Hawker
et al., 2002) was used to assess the quality of potential papers to be included in the present study.
The range of the reviewed studies’ quality score ranges from a minimum of 9 points to a
maximum of 36 points. To create the overall quality grades, we used the following definitions:
high quality (A), 30–36 points; medium quality (B), 24–29 points; and low quality (C), 9–24
points.
A data extraction template from the Hawker Assessment Tool was used to collect data
regarding the properties of the adopted studies. This template allows for a literature analysis with
a minimal selection bias (Elamin et al., 2009; Tacconelli, 2010).
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Through a search of all relevant databases, a total of 1339 publications were initially
identified. The databases searched included CINAHL, MEDLINE, Embase, ProQuest, Google
Scholar, PsycINFO, and PubMed. Further analysis was required to eliminate duplicate titles,
which resulted in 601 duplicates being discarded. This step was followed by the application of
exclusion criteria, as previously described. The abstracts for the remaining 261 titles were read,
which led to the selection of 137 relevant articles whose entire texts were analyzed. It should be
noted that no additional articles were added after the references from the initially selected papers
were examined. Figure 3 provides a flowchart illustrating the article selection process. A total of
66 articles that met all eligibility criteria and that had been published between 2006 and 2020
were selected for the study.
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Figure 3 Flow diagram of the methodology and selection process (Moher et al., 2009).
To identify research instruments used to study patient safety culture, two researchers
(authors) independently read the selected articles’ full texts to identify research instruments and
their aspects. Subsequently, the two authors compared their findings to develop unified results.
Disagreements between the two researchers concerning research instruments and their identified
aspects were discussed and resolved in sessions with the third researcher.
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2.6.3 Results
All included records were categorized according to objective, strength, limitation, finding
and quality score as it is represented in APPENDIX C.
A total of 1,690,225 participants took part in the reviewed studies. The response rate
ranged from 17% (Turunen et al., 2013; Zaheer et al., 2015) to 100% (Chakravarty et al., 2015).
However, some studies did not report the response rate (Abdelhai et al, 2012; Feng et al., 2012;
Amarapathy et al.,2013; Ammouri et al., 2015; Kiaei et al., 2016; Boughaba et al., 2019). The
study participants included nurses, doctors, and administrators. Figure 4 shows the distribution of
participants. Seventeen papers focused on nurses, 38 studies included clinical and non-clinical
staff, and 11 studies included clinical staff only.

Figure 4 Focus of each study according to participants.
The reviewed articles reported several limitations concerning the applied methodology
and results. First, articles mainly used quantitative approaches to measure PSC, where these
methods are not efficient for measuring complex and dynamic attributes such as culture. Second,
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cross-sectional designs were commonly used among included articles with data collected at one
point at a time. Therefore, it is not possible to determine the causal relationships between PSC
and the explanatory variables. Third, self-reported questionnaires were applied to collect data,
which introduced social desirability biases to the reported research results. Fourth, seven articles
did not report their participants’ response rate, and 26 articles reported a relatively low response
rate (less than 60%). The majority of the reviewed papers concluded that their results could not
be generalized because their studies represented unique cultures, the large variations of the
applied research instruments, variation in sample sizes, differences in the type of healthcare
facilities, and the diversity of study participants.
The global distribution of the included articles is represented in Figure 5. Several studies
targeted more than one country.
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Figure 5 Global distribution of the articles included in this analysis.
The map of the co-occurrence of terms in included papers is depicted in Figure 6. The
nodes represent specific terms, their sizes indicate their frequency, and links show the cooccurrence of the terms. In the title and abstract of included papers, frequently co-occurring
terms created a cluster that appeared with the same color (green, blue, and red color). The three
core nodes of these clusters are safety climate, safety culture, and survey. Furthermore, the
relationship between the core node of “safety culture” and other high-frequency terms is shown
in Figure 7. The thickness of links between nodes represents the strength of the co-occurrence
relationships.
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Figure 6 The map of the co-occurrence of terms in the title and abstract.

Figure 7 The map of the co-occurrence between safety culture and other high-frequency terms.
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2.6.4 Discussion
In this section, two research questions are answered in two subsections of PSC
instruments and PSC dimensions.
2.6.4.1 PSC Instruments
This review identified five primary instruments that have been used to assess PSC in
hospital settings. The first instrument, the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSPSC),
was used in 54 studies. By contrast, the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ) tool was used in
five studies, and the Patient Safety Climate in Health Care Organizations (PSCHO) was used in
five studies. The Scottish Hospital Safety Questionnaire (SHSQ) and the Modified Stanford
Instrument-2006 (MSI-2006) were used by one study each as shown in APPENDIX C.
Table 2 Five Measurements of PSC Dimensions
Survey

HSPSC

SAQ

PSC Dimensions
Management support for PS
Teamwork within units
Teamwork across units
Communication openness
Frequency of events reported
Feedback and communication about errors
Organizational learning—continuous improvement
Nonpunitive responses to errors
Handoffs and transitions
Staffing
Supervisor/manager expectations and actions that promote PS
Overall perceptions of PS
Teamwork climate
Safety climate
Job satisfaction
Stress recognition
Perceptions of management
Working conditions
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Survey

PSCHO

MSI

SHSQ

PSC Dimensions
Engagement of senior managers
Organizational resources
Overall emphasis on PS
Unit safety norms
Unit support and recognition for safety efforts
Fear of blame
Fear of shame
Organization leadership for safety
Unit leadership for safety
Perceived state of safety
Shame and repercussions of reporting
Safety learning behaviors
Supervisors’ expectations and actions
Organizational learning/improvement
Teamwork within hospital units
Communication openness
Feedback and communication about error
Non-punitive responses to errors
Staffing
Hospital management support for PS
Teamwork across hospital units
Hospital handoffs
Frequency of incident reporting
Overall perceptions of safety

2.6.4.1.1 Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSPSC)
In 2004, the AHRQ developed the HSPSC within the United States (U. S.) Department of
Health and Human Services, which became a widely used survey. This survey allows for an
assessment of staff opinions concerning medical errors, adverse event reporting, and other issues
relevant to PS (Aljabri, 2012; Alshammari et al., 2019). Although the original survey was
primarily intended for use by hospitals, it has been enhanced with various versions. This survey
currently measures the safety culture of patients in ambulatory settings, outpatient health offices
(such as primary care), nursing homes, and public pharmacies. The HSPSC is available in
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different languages, including Arabic, Spanish, French, and Dutch. The hospital questionnaire
version contains 42 items and assesses 12 composites that are treated as subscales.
2.6.4.1.2 Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ)
The SAQ was developed by Sexton and colleagues at the University of Texas in the U.S.
The SAQ comprises six main components (Table 2). The primary advantage of the SAQ is that it
can be applied to different healthcare settings. The complete version of the SAQ uses a total of
60 components or items, with 30 items considered as standard across all environments. The
survey utilizes a five-point Likert scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. In
addition to the 30 standard items, this survey can incorporate another 6 items, with 3 additional
items that focus on demographic studies. The statements utilized by the short-form SAQ can also
be addressed using the five-point Likert scale. The short form is easily accessible and available
in different languages, including English, Swedish, Dutch, Norwegian, German, Arabic, and
Chinese (Sexton et al., 2006).
2.6.4.1.3 Patient Safety Climate in Health Care Organizations (PSCHO)
According to Singer et al. (2007), PSCHO was designed with the aid of the Stanford
Safety Instrument. The PSCHO tool includes 38 items that are used to assess work units,
interpersonal factors, and inter-related organizational topics (Singer et al., 2007). Using a Likert
scale, items are rated via a two-page form. PSCHO is considered to be the first tool that analyzed
safety constituents and provided information by measuring the safety climate in corporations
outside hospitals. Information from this survey regarding management and clinical personnel can
be applied to a wide range of healthcare organizations. PSCHO has undergone psychometrical
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tests and can be used to compare the performance of several types of hospital units. The earlier
form of this tool has been modified with respect to its length (Singer et al., 2009) and has been
adapted for use in multiple languages (Zhou et al., 2015).
2.6.4.1.4 Scottish Hospital Safety Questionnaire (SHSQ)
The SHSQ was designed for the Scottish NHS clinical staff, with the main aim of
gauging the safety outcomes and climate for both patients and staff. The SHSQ includes 4
primary components: 44 items related to the hospital survey (HSPSC), 10 worker safety behavior
aspects, 2 items concerned with self-reported patient and worker injuries (see Table 2), and 7
items that focus on demographics (Agnew et al., 2013).
2.6.4.1.5 Modified Stanford Instrument-2006
The MSI-2006 Patient Safety Culture in Healthcare Organizations Survey (Zaheer et al.,
2015) was designed to evaluate 32 unique items encompassing five aspects. These aspects
include, but are not limited to, issues associated with seeking help, shame, and self-awareness
(Table 2). Modification of the MSI-2006 tool has facilitated the assessment of perceptions of a
wide range of hospital staff, including direct care workers, technicians, health practitioners,
managers, and nurses. This tool also includes assessments of other aspects, such as support
service personnel, as these workers are an essential part of the hospital and healthcare setting.
MSI-2006 was developed for a wide range of hospital settings with the aim of generating
relevant and accurate data over the long term.
2.6.4.2 PSC Dimensions
To understand the effect of PS on healthcare organizations and their staff, the process and
structure of each system needs to be broken into subsystems. The type of instruments and their
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varying dimensions, as well as the groups targeted in each study, were among the most
interesting points to be considered when attempting to understand PS.
Five instruments were used in the reviewed studies to measure PSC within the healthcare
facilities examined. As indicated in APPENDIX C, teamwork, organizational and behavioral
learning, reporting of errors and safety awareness, gender and demographics, work experience,
and staffing levels were perceived as factors that significantly impacted patient safety. Personal
variables, such as the age and experience of medical professionals, were also related to PS
perceptions. By examining results from individual hospitals or groups of hospitals, we identified
the aspects of safety culture that need improvement, including considerations of working
conditions and management support.
The reviewed studies differ in their focus on relevant PS variables across different
hospitals in various geographical regions. However, many standard components of safety culture
indicators and risk factors have been identified (Abdelhai et al., 2012; Moussavi et al., 2013;
Güneş et al., 2015).
2.6.4.2.1 Teamwork
Teamwork and mutual help provided by team members in task performance within
specific hospital units were the factors that represented PS through the use of different
instruments (Singer et al., 2008). A high score of positive teamwork within units indicates the
existence of healthy work relationships and respect among members within a unit (Boughaba et
al., 2019). Moreover, vertical hierarchy, horizontal hierarchy, and years of working within a unit
influenced the level of teamwork within units. The level of skill competency also affected
61

teamwork within units (Cho et al., 2018). However, teamwork across units was reported to have
low positive scores (Abdelhai et al., 2012; El-Sayed Desouky et al., 2019). Besides, attitudes
towards colleagues from different units and managers’ or supervisors’ actions and expectations
towards PS affected teamwork performance across units (Moussavi et al., 2013). According to
Hamdan and Saleem (2013), skills and organizational learning were significantly related to
knowledge teamwork across units. However, supportive managers or supervisors increased the
level of teamwork across units. Moreover, colleagues who worked closely together and
supported each other in their work duties often resulted in mutual respect (Hamdan and Saleem,
2013). Therefore, while it could be concluded that teamwork is one of the important factors that
impact PS, there are always opportunities for improvement.
After reviewing the studies, the HSPSC and SAQ instruments are the only two that are
focused on the teamwork dimension. Among the studies that used the SAQ, the pronounced
difference in PSC was notable among the front-line healthcare staff, supervisors, and managers
(Kristensen et al., 2015). Furthermore, a great variance in PS perception was observed within
specific hospital units compared with differences between units. Chakravarty et al. (2015)
reported low variations in scores between hospitals based on the PS index. However, their study
also revealed significant differences in individual measures of PS, including the perception of
management, teamwork, and stress recognition, when using the PS index score (Chakravarty et
al., 2015).
The HSPSC provides more details about teamwork performance within and between
units of hospitals. Additionally, teamwork is the most factor that has a relationship with the other
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characteristics of PS. Among studies using the HSPSC, high scores were obtained for teamwork
within units, especially in different developing countries (Bagnasco et al., 2011; Ito et al., 2011;
Ugurluoglu et al., 2012; Amarapathy et al., 2013; Davoodi et al., 2013; Moussavi et al., 2013;
Nie et al., 2013; Boughaba et al.,2019). These results confirm that the healthcare industry greatly
relies on interdisciplinary teams of specialists with the skill sets needed to perform specialized
tasks. Such teams also collaborate to achieve common safety goals (Danielsson et al., 2017).
Different teams use shared resources and rely on communication to adapt to ever-changing
healthcare environments. The behavior of these teams was analyzed through observational
studies. The results indicated that the teams’ clinical performance was influenced by how they
communicated, coordinated, and practiced effective leadership (Danielsson et al., 2017).
2.6.4.2.2 Organizational and Behavioral Learning
Organizational learning is also a critical factor that affects the PS. In most of the survey
studies examined, positive responses were given for organizational learning/continuous
improvement as a composite for PS (Bahrami et al., 2013; Al-Mandhari et al., 2014; Kiaei et al.,
2016; Alshammari et al., 2019). Continuous improvement can be gained from daily work
routines and incidents. PS can also improve by enhancing relevant personnel’s skills and
knowledge based on incident analysis. Additionally, the junior staff can learn from more
experienced staff as they worked together (Singer et al., 2007).
Although organizational and behavioral learning had positive responses, the outcome
dimension, frequency of events reported, did not have positive responses in all the studies
included in this review. Therefore, the learning process in PSC should be enhanced by
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establishing formal methods instead of informal practices to avoid harming patients. In the U. S.,
as a result of the IOM’s report, the U. S. Congress passed the Patient Safety and Quality
Improvement Act in 2005, which aimed to improve quality and safety via the collection and
analysis of data on patient events. This shows that PS has to be enhanced by the participation of
healthcare providers and patients.
In 28 of the studies examined, 55% of the participants agreed that these factors were
important components of organizational learning and continuous improvement processes at the
examined healthcare facilities. These processes are also responsible for communicating and
conveying information that is essential for PS and healthcare. Such processes occur in both
formal and informal learning environments within healthcare systems that perform complex and
interconnected operations, which should be considered to enhance the PSC.
2.6.4.2.3 Reporting of Errors and Safety Awareness
Two of the dimensions that received low positive scores were non-punitive responses to
errors and the frequency of event reporting (El-Jardali et al.,2014). That is because a large
percentage of respondents indicated that they do not report incidents to their managers or
supervisors. The reason behind this could be that staff members fear being reprimanded for an
error and the lack of safety awareness. Such a culture might cause the staff to hide issues that
could later influence the efficacy of PS. A culture that includes non-punitive responses to errors
could arise from managers, supervisors, and colleagues (Feng et al., 2012). Another reason
behind this finding could be the risks of patients complaining; patient demands for compensation
might have also reduced the frequency of event reporting (Sorra et al., 2010).
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Moreover, another study that was conducted in Saudi Arabia illustrated that one of the
dimensions that indicated a high positive response was feedback and communication about errors
(Alswat et al., 2017). The factors requiring improvement included non-punitive responses to
error reporting and adequate personnel staffing (Alswat et al., 2017). The survey showed that the
overall perception of PS was 59.9%, while the reporting frequency was 68.8% (Alswat et al.,
2017). Another study that was conducted in Scotland by Agnew et al. (2013) found that the
overall perception of PS was judged at 56%; the reported frequency of incident reporting was
also 56%. Another study in Saudi Arabia showed that the frequency of reporting adverse safety
events was 57% (Al-Awa et al., 2012). Additionally, A study conducted by Khater et al. (2015)
among senior nurses in Jordan showed a positive correlation between non-punitive responses to
medical errors and the frequency of medical error reporting. The result was a reduction in
adverse events regarding PS and risks of complaints from patients. The overall perception of
senior nurses was 51.5% before education and 60.6% after educational sessions. The frequency
of event reporting increased from 54.2% to 64.3% after implementing suitable educational
training (Khater et al.,2015).
In a related study, Hellings et al. (2010) described a PSC improvement approach
implemented in five Belgian hospitals. The results showed that management support for PS
increased along with supervisor expectations and actions that promoted safety practices. Medical
personnel from Dutch-speaking hospitals had a higher positive perception of PS compared with
French-speaking hospitals (Hellings et al.,2010). The survey also showed that respondents
working in pediatrics, rehabilitation, and psychiatry departments (units) provided more positive
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feedback about perceived PSC. By contrast, medical professionals working in emergency
departments (units) provided lower positive feedback (Hellings et al.,2010). These differences in
the hospitals’ departments and languages are some of the reasons for reporting low scores in the
non-punitive responses to errors (Hellings et al.,2010).
A positive perception of PS was observed among medical personnel in China and U.S.
managers. In both countries, these individuals expressed a higher level of perceived PS
compared with front-line personnel. However, Chinese staff had higher scores for work-related
fear of shame and blame compared with their American counterparts (Zhou et al., 2015). The
U.S. hospitals have fewer cases of “fear of blame” compared to Chinese hospitals (Zhou et al.,
2015).
As noted earlier, a reduction in avoidable incidents with potential or actual medical harm
is a key objective in developing a robust PSC (El-Jardali et al., 2010; Bahrami et al., 2013; Kiaei
et al., 2016). Harm can be measured by the frequency of reported events. Effective reporting of
safety incidents is essential for identifying the causes of failures in a healthcare work
environment. The present analysis indicates a need to implement more effective reporting
systems. Reporting provides relevant information about the frequency of events that can
adversely affect PS.
A culture of blame was evident in 22 studies, representing 43% of those examined. In
these studies, punitive responses to medical errors were prevalent and created a culture that
discouraged personnel from reporting safety incidents and occurrences (Jafree et al., 2017). Such
a culture impeded the hospitals’ ability to determine the causes of errors and, consequently, to
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learn from previous mistakes (Abdelhai et al., 2012; Aboul-Fotouh et al., 2012; Aljabri et al.,
2014). In instances in which an influential safety culture exists, workers can highlight potential
risk factors and also identify failures when they occur with a focus on PS (Fujita et al., 2013).
Additionally, adverse events arise from multiple unintentional causes. Blame was judged to be
appropriate when addressing individuals who consistently commit frequent and careless errors or
who ignore established safety standards and policies. Competent institutions should maintain a
culture of accountability to ensure that patient care is maintained at the highest levels.
A study conducted in Canada by Zaheer et al. (2015) focused on supervisory and senior
leadership support for PS. The survey noted that ease in reporting provided the hospital with a
platform for learning and improving through reported incidents. Among the supervisory and
senior leadership, ease in reporting was recorded at 11% and 12%, respectively. These findings
suggest that hospitals should ensure that front-line staff are aware of and contribute to their
organization’s reporting systems. Ease in reporting should provide organizations with an
opportunity to improve strategy, commitment, and the overall efficacy of PSC in sample
facilities (Zaheer et al., 2015).
2.6.4.2.4 Gender and Demographics
PSC is a multidimensional concept that requires a strict analysis to identify its vital
elements. The perception of PSC is always measured through the dimensions of the tools used.
However, gender and demographic characteristics can be used to analyze participants’ responses
to a survey (Aboshaiqah and Baker, 2013). Many of the studies analyzed herein demonstrate the
correlation between PSC perception with gender and demographics.
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Numerous differences in nurses’ perceptions of PSC arose due to demographic
characteristics, including gender, age, level of education, years of experience, the language used,
and length of work shift (Elsous et al., 2017). In general, female nurses had a more positive view
of the prevalent PSC than did their male counterparts. Moreover, nurses between the ages of 40
and 60 years had a more positive view of the PSC than nurses between 20 and 40 years of age
(Zaheer et al., 2015). As 85.4% of the nurses had a Bachelor of Science in nursing, it is plausible
that their education levels did not affect their perception of PS (Aboshaiqah and Baker, 2013).
However, as Hamdan and Saleem (2013) observed, education is generally one of the most
critical aspects of healthcare delivery to patients worldwide.
Elsous et al. (2017) evaluated nurses’ perception regarding PSC and investigated the
influence of age, hierarchal position, working hours, and experience. Job satisfaction and
perception by management concerning PS had a strong influence on these variables. Front-line
clinicians had a less positive attitude toward PS than did nurse managers. Moreover, positive
attitudes increased with years of experience. Work shift hours and ages of the nurses had a direct
effect on the perception of PS. Nurses working within the normal hours allocated per week and
aged 35 years or older showed a better PS perception (Elsous et al., 2017). The study also
reported no differences in safety attitude scores between nurses and doctors due to gender, age,
and work experience (Elsous et al., 2017). The studies of the potential effects of gender and
demographics on the perception of PSC should be expanded in the future.
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2.6.4.2.5. Work Experience
Relevant work experience was strongly related to the perception of the PSC. Work
experience was also associated with the perceived quality of care among nurses (Hamdan and
Saleem, 2013). Furthermore, more experienced healthcare providers had a better understanding
of patient care needs than did less experienced nurses (Zaheer et al., 2015). A study conducted in
the U. S. by Hansen et al. (2011) investigated the relationship between hospital PSC and
rehospitalization rates within 30 days of discharge. A survey done in 67 hospitals discovered that
higher readmission rates of acute myocardial infarction and heart failure patients were directly
related to a lower safety climate (Hansen et al., 2011). Additionally, frontline staff workers
reported a lower level of perceived safety climate with the readmissions, which were the
management’s responsibility (Hansen et al., 2011). In another study, a survey was conducted in
97 hospitals in the U. S. that revealed that frontline workers perceived a climate of safety more
frequently than did the managers and the supervisors (Singer et al., 2008). Furthermore, among
the clinicians, nurses perceived a safety climate more than physicians (Singer et al., 2008). Based
on that, it could be concluded that the work environment plays a key role in perceiving the PSC.
Moreover, another study illustrated that language also has effects on perceiving the PSC
(Aboshaiqah and Baker, 2013). Non-Arabic-speaking nurses had more positive views of PSC
than did Arabic-speaking nurses (Aboshaiqah and Baker, 2013). This finding was unanticipated
as the Arabic-speaking nurses and their patients spoke the same language. The low PSC scores
might have been due to disparities in educational systems affecting PS perceptions. Furthermore,
nurses working on day shifts had more positive PSC perceptions than nurses working night shifts
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or alternating shifts (Aboshaiqah and Baker, 2013). It was noted that day-shift nurses were more
time engaging with and involved in their patients’ progress, which resulted in a positive PSC
(Aboshaiqah and Baker, 2013). Day-shift nurses also interacted with their managers and became
more familiar with relevant aspects of the PSC (Aboshaiqah and Baker, 2013). Therefore, it
could be concluded that work experience and the possibility of knowledge exchange had a
measurable impact on perceptions related to the PSC.
2.6.4.2.6. Staffing
The availability of human resources also impacts the perceptions of the PSC. A study
conducted in Scotland by Agnew et al. (2013) aimed to analyze the relationship between the
medical personnel safety behavior and reported injury measures for patients and healthcare
providers. At the hospital level, the authors found a strong correlation between overall PS scores
and patient and personnel injury measures and behavior (Agnew et al., 2013). Therefore, the
level of hospital staffing, coupled with management support for PS, also influenced the
perception of PS within the studied facilities (Agnew et al., 2013). Generic safety climate factors
and patient-specific items showed a strong correlation with perceived safety outcomes (Agnew et
al., 2013). To summarize, a total of 24 studies reported on the issue of healthcare personnel
understaffing. The staff reported feelings of being overburdened and overloaded with their daily
responsibilities in approximately half of the hospitals (Moussavi et al., 2013; Nie et al., 2013;
Wu et al., 2013; Saleh et al., 2015; Vlayen et al., 2015; Zhao et al., 2017). Consequently, this
issue had a negative impact on the quality of care provided by the staff (Amarapathy et al.,
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2013). Therefore, the availability of adequate staffing plays a critical role in perceiving the PSC
because employees’ focuses might be harmed due to overload.
2.6.5. Study Limitations
The present study has some important limitations. This systematic review focused only
on articles written in English; moreover, a meta-analysis was not performed. The results of the
reviewed studies are difficult to generalize due to the application of a diverse set of PSC
measures with different dimensions. Furthermore, the reviewed studies also varied in the type of
participants included (doctors, nurses, and administrators), the periods over which the
measurements were conducted, the sampling strategies used, and the cultural settings. For
example, the results that focused primarily on results from nurses were obtained from
convenience samples of participants and as such cannot be generalized to the entire nursing staff.
Finally, this study did not account for language and cultural disparities prevalent in the specific
countries in which the reported studies were conducted.
2.6.6. Conclusions
Enhancing the perception of the PSC in health sectors plays a key role in improving their
overall quality, efficiency, and productivity. This paper contributes to the body of knowledge
related to PSCs by identifying important critical factors and illustrating the instruments that have
been developed and used to generate data. A comprehensive review of perceiving the PSC in
hospital settings was provided. A systematic literature review was conducted using the PRISMA
protocol for the period of 2006 to 2020. The paper reviewed 66 studies that were identified based
on carefully selected keywords. The Hawker Assessment Tool was also implemented in this
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paper to enable the researcher to score the quality of the papers reviewed. The paper analyzed
PSC perception in the hospital setting, determined available instruments, and identified the most
critical factors that have an impact on the PSC. Our findings revealed that teamwork and
organizational and behavioral learning are some of the factors that have a significant impact on
the PSC. This paper also illustrated that reporting errors and safety awareness, gender and
demographics, work experience, and staffing are additional critical factors that need to be
considered further to improve perceptions of PSCs.
In the future, the impact of culture on PS might be analyzed in greater depth. PS,
particularly in hospitals, is a dynamic and complex phenomenon. Therefore, it is recommended
that research and surveys be performed every two to three years to ensure the best practices for
PS. Such an approach could also enhance the quality of healthcare delivery. A large number of
hospitals in many different countries have been studied and the specific characteristics of the
healthcare management systems in these countries greatly vary. Consequently, for future studies,
a broader study population crossing the national boundaries would help to ensure that the
findings can have an impact on the development of high-quality, affordable healthcare
worldwide.
Finally, it should be pointed out that although the reported survey questionnaires
described in the reviewed studies were anonymous, some respondents might not have been
candid in providing their answers. Some of the questionnaires were long and some of the
respondents may have become distracted during the process, lost interest, or answered some
questions inaccurately. Additionally, some inconsistencies in using different survey tools due to
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cultural and language diversities were noted. For future, investigations including qualitative
evaluations of these relationships should be conducted. Finally, the long-term effects of safety
incidents on patients’ health and their long-term impact on families have not been investigated.
Future studies should evaluate the effects of such experiences in hospital settings.
2.7 Gaps in Research

This literature review has uncovered gaps in the current research. Over 16 years, 66
studies evaluating patient safety culture in hospital settings were found internationally, with most
research occurring from 2006 to 2020. From this review, it is clear that research concerned with
the hospital safety culture is in the early stages of development. Continued research on the
effectiveness of improving the safety culture of hospitals and how the safety culture impacts
patient outcomes is crucial.
The literature indicated that the Psychometric properties of the HSPSC tool had been
considered reliable and valid in the U.S. (Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Dyer,
2010) and internationally (Bodur & Filiz, 2010; Eiras et al., 2014; Hedskold et al., 2013; Ito et al.,
2011; Moghri et al., 2012; Nie et al., 2013; Nordin et al., 2013; Occelli et al., 2013; Olson, 2008;
Sarac et al., 2011; Smits et al., 2008; Vlayen et al., 2015). However, no study examines the secondorder factor of the HSPSC factors. This study will address this gap.
The respondent characteristics such as staff positions (El- Jardali, 2014; Vlayen et al.,
2015; Zhao et al., 2017), and the hospitals characteristics such as teaching status (Mardon, 2010;
Güneş, 2015; Ammouri, 2015; Khater, 2015) and geographic region (Wu, 2013; Fujita, 2013;
Wagner, 2013; Eiras, 2014) have significant influences on the perception of patient safety culture
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and its outcome. No study examines the combination between Personal and Hospital
Characteristics. This study will address this gap.
2.8 Choosing an Appropriate PSC Questionnaire
In several comprehensive reviews of patient safety culture tools in health care, the
HSPSC and SAQ have repeatedly come up as suggested tools (Flin, 2007, Halligan and Zecevic,
2011, Jackson et al., 2010, Singla et al., 2006). The HSPSC and the SAQ were identified as the
only tools detailing the scale development process and meeting most of the set psychometric
criteria in Flin et al. (2006) review. The four tools of HSPSC, SAQ, PSCHO, and Hospital Safety
Climate Scale (HSCS), according to Jackson et al. (2010), are the most frequently and
extensively used in the U.S. and internationally across various clinical settings. According to the
researchers, the four tools have adequate psychometric characteristics. The HSPSC and SAQ
were also shown to list perceptions at the dominant unit level for accumulating responses.
Meanwhile, studies using PSCHO have provided evidence for hospital-level variance.
Fleming (2005) recognized the HSPSC and SAQ as freely available tools which were
extensively and largely tested. Both tools were equipped with reported psychometric properties
and obtainable benchmarking data. However, they both have the disadvantage of being
comparatively prolonged. The author adds that the HSPSC features more comprehensive
coverage of safety culture components, together with acceptable psychometric properties and
subsidiary documentation. These findings appear to match those reached by Singla et al. (2006).
The choice of the HSPSC as the most suitable tool for this study was based on various
reasons. Since it evaluates critical aspects of patient safety at multiple levels of analysis, the
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HSPSC is largely a comprehensive measure of safety culture in health care settings. This tool is
equally workable across all individuals, units, and hospital levels. Its features as a multidimensional approach help establish a reference line to inspire and lead further initiatives for
patient safety improvement (Madsen, 2001).
The survey was originally formulated for hospital use. Later, it has been adapted to fit in
patient safety climate evaluation in diverse health care settings, including community
pharmacies, ambulatory surgeries, nursing homes, and outpatient medical offices (Agency for
Health care Research and Quality, 2016). Jackson et al. (2010) note that the HSPSC and the
majority of safety climate studies have been conducted on a large scale, and all focus on
exploring perceptions of several unit staffs across hospitals in one health care organization. The
effectiveness of quality enhancement initiatives and interferences have been tested by the
HSPSC use (Blegen et al., 2010; Jackson et al., 2010). The process includes determining the
impact of a multi-disciplinary collaboration of pharmacy, nursing, medicine teams, and
communication interventions to enhance a unit-based safety culture (Blegen et al., 2010).
Significant improvement was revealed by five out of eleven safety culture sub-scales. The
associations between different aspects of safety culture and incident reporting behaviors were
thoroughly scrutinized (Patterson and Pace, 2016, Richter et al., 2015).
Furthermore, the HSPSC is applicable for benchmarking the strengths of safety cultures
over time and across organizations on both national and international levels (Blegen et al., 2009).
A cross-sectional retrospective and prospective study was conducted using the HSPSC to assess
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the impact of accreditation in a university hospital in Saudi Arabia (AlAwa et al., 2012) and
Lebanon (El-Jardali et al., 2011).
So far, the HSPSC is the sole freely available survey with a national database
acknowledged worldwide and has reliable and valid psychometric findings (Smits et al., 2008;
Hellings, 2010; Waterson et al., 2010; Occelli et al., 2013; Vlayen et al., 2015;). Additionally,
the available national database is regularly and readily cleaned and managed by Westat®, an
independent contractor that provides a national source for this tool (Westat®, 2020).
The HSPSC is a self-administered tool supported by the AHRQ. The tool takes about 10–
15 minutes to complete and is available in electronic or paper format to facilitate administration
with minimal disruption to an employee's daily routine (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). For this study,
these fundamental characteristics were important in deciding on the HSPSC to survey hospital
administrators and practitioners across the U.S. A discussion of the instrument's development
will provide additional evidence of the tool's beneficial psychometric properties.
2.8.1 Review of the Development of the HSPSC: Pilot Study
The latent variables of the culture of patient safety in hospital settings were the
fundamental phenomenal construct the HSPSC was basically designed to measure (Waltz et al.,
2010). The tool was created to estimate the true extent of this unobservable paradigm at a given
point in time (Waltz et al., 2010). The study aimed to create a short survey instrument that
measured meaningful, independent, and reliable safety culture dimensions (Sorra & Nieva,
2004). The tool was also intended to measure appropriate and inappropriate attitudes and actions
of a facility and illuminate the rewarded, or otherwise, punished processes and procedures
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regarding patient safety (Sorra & Dyer, 2010). The funding and supervision of his task were by
AHRQ and the sponsor was the Medical Errors Workgroup of the Quality Interagency
Coordination Task Force (QuIC) (Sorra & Nieva, 2004).
Using diverse aspects such as literature reviews, examination results of published safety
culture instruments, and psychometric analysis findings, critical dimensions of hospital safety
culture were specified and included in the draft version of the tool (Sorra & Nieva, 2004).
Researchers, hospital administrators, and employees from various fields and units reviewed and
revised the draft based on their own experiences with hospital safety culture (Sorra & Nieva,
2004).
Finally, a patient safety pilot survey was created, with two single-item outcome measures
and 14 multiple-item dimensions (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). The survey included items and
questions that used a five-point Likert scale for agreement, ranging from strongly disagree to
strongly agree, as well as a frequency range of never to always (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). The tool
was eventually pilot-tested in 21 hospitals across six states, with varying teaching status and bed
sizes (Sorra & Nieva, 2004).
4,983 surveys were sent out, with 1,437 (29%) being filled out. The majority of the
people who took part in this survey were females (81 percent). The average age of the
participants was 43, and they had direct contact with patients. They worked in the intensive care
unit (18%), surgical unit (15%), general medicine (12%), or other hospital units (14%) at the
time and had spent an average of ten years at their respective hospital (Sorra & Nieva, 2004).
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The researchers wanted three to five items, or questions, to measure each aspect of safety
culture. For the 12 safety culture dimensions identified in the confirmatory factor model, the
researchers used exploratory factor analysis (EFA), confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), fit
indices, composite scores with inter-correlations, and an internal consistency reliability
coefficient (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). The dimensionality of the survey was evaluated in the EFA
(Sorra & Nieva, 2004). Principal component analysis (PCA) and varimax rotation were applied
to maximize the independence of the dimensions within the survey (DeVellis, 2021). The EFA
and PCA discovered the tool's multiple dimensions and proposed many basic item groupings
found in the literature review. There were 14 distinct factors identified, with acceptable values
greater than or equal to 1.0. These 14 factors accounted for 64.5 percent of the total variance.
The factor-loading of most items was greater than or equal to 0.40). (Sorra & Nieva, 2004;
DeVellis, 2021).
Researchers were interested in the model's fit they proposed during the confirmatory
factor analysis stage. They were interested in seeing how the specific number of factors and
items loaded onto each factor affected the final result (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). A number of
indices, including the goodness-of-fit index (GFI), the adjusted GFI (AGFI), the normalized fit
index (NFI), and the non-normalized fit index (NNFI), confirmed the data's fit (NNFI). All of the
indices were at or near 0.90. (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). The root mean square of approximation
(RMSEA) was 0.4, which was a good fit because the lower the RMSEA, the better the fit (Sorra
& Nieva, 2004). Researchers arrived at a final confirmatory factor model with 12 dimensions
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(two outcome dimensions and ten safety culture dimensions) and three to four items, or
questions, per dimension, for a total of 42 questions in the survey (Sorra & Nieva, 2004).
Any instrument's validity is determined by its best approximation of the truth (Trochim &
Donnelly, 2008). The mean of the various responses to each item was used to create composite
scores for the 12 dimensions (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). All of the items were expressed positively
and negatively, with all negatively worded items being reverse coded first, resulting in a higher
score indicating a more positive response in all cases (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). All the questions
used 5-point Likert scales, with composite scores ranging from 1.0 to 5.0. After calculating these
composite scores, the safety culture dimensions were correlated with one another. The intercorrelations were within the expected moderate to high range of 0.23- 0.60, indicating parsimony
and construct validity of the tool (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). Weakly related dimensions were
defined as those with correlations of less than 0.20. Dimensions with high correlations of 0.85 or
higher, on the other hand, indicate that the items should be combined or removed because they
were measuring the same concept (Sorra & Nieva, 2004).
The twelve dimensions of the pilot tool proved to have acceptable reliability, with
coefficients ranging from 0.6–0.84 (see Table 3) (defined as a Cronbach's alpha greater than or
equal to 0.60). (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). With a Cronbach's alpha of 0.63, the Staffing dimension
had the lowest reliability (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). Appropriate staffing levels were identified as a
significant theme for improving patient safety during hospital stays (Page, 2004). Because of the
report's emphasis on staffing, this low composite was kept.
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Table 3 Pilot Study Reliability Findings (Sorra & Nieva, 2004)
Patient Safety Culture Dimension
1. Communication Openness
2. Feedback and Communication about
Error
3. Frequency of Event Reporting
4. Hospital Handoffs and Transitions
5. Hospital Management Support for
Patient Safety
6. Non-punitive Response to Error
7. Organizational Learning-Continuous
Improvement
8. Overall Perceptions of Safety
9. Staffing
10. Supervisor/Manager Expectations
and Actions Promoting Safety
11. Teamwork Across Hospital Units
12. Teamwork Within Hospital Units

Cronbach’s
∝
0.72

Items or Questions per
Dimension
3

0.78

3

0.84
0.80

3
4

0.83

3

0.79

3

0.76

3

0.74
0.63

4
4

0.75

4

0.80
0.83

4
4

In conclusion, along with additional demographic questions, the final HSPSC includes 12
dimensions and 42 items, with sound psychometric properties constituting a valid and reliable
instrument. The construct validity of individual dimensions was reflected in correlations in the
moderate to high range of 0.23–0.60, with reliability coefficients ranging from 0.63–0.84. This
testing proved that using this specific tool for this research study was a good idea (Sorra &
Nieva, 2004).
2.8.2 Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture: A Review of Psychometric Analyses
On the AHRQ's HSPSC Research Reference List, there were a total of 26 psychometric
studies (AHRQ, 2019). Five of these studies were excluded because of specific criteria related to
the study's research objectives or modified the original HSPSC. As a result, 21 psychometric
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studies were chosen and carried out for this evaluation. Three of them were national, while the
other 18 were international.

2.8.2.1 U.S. Psychometric Testing Post-Pilot Study
The AHRQ funded a comparative database in 2006 to serve as a central repository for
HSPSC hospital data (Sorra & Dyer, 2010). The database was created due to a public call for
data submission. Data from 382 hospitals, representing over 100,000 hospital survey
respondents, created the first comparative database (Sorra & Dyer, 2010). In 2007, the database
was made public, along with the results of the survey's items and composite scores (Sorra &
Dyer, 2010).
To evaluate the factors indicating the dimensions of this tool, Sorra and Dyer (2010)
conducted a psychometric analysis of secondary data from the 2007 database. They looked at the
tool's multi-level psychometric properties to see if the survey constructs could be used to assess
patient safety culture at the individual, unit, and hospital levels (Sorra & Dyer, 2010). The
database included responses from 331 hospitals in the United States, 2,267 hospital units, and
50,513 people. The psychometric analysis examined the six areas of "psychometric properties of
the survey's items and composites, item factor loadings, intra-class correlations (ICCs), design
effects, internal consistency reliabilities, and multi-level confirmatory factor analyses" in
addition to the inter-correlations among hospitals (Sorra & Dyer, 2010, p. 1). The analysis
confirmed the multi-level nature of the data supporting the claim.

81

All levels of analysis had acceptable psychometric properties, which were defined as
Cronbach's alpha equal to or greater than.60 (Sorra & Nieva, 2004, p. 62). Furthermore, one
hospital-level model dimension for "Supervisor/Manager Expectations and Actions Promoting
Patient Safety" had a composite fit index of 0.82. All of the other dimensions of this scale had
acceptable psychometrics (Sorra & Dyer, 2010). At the individual level, the average dimension
inter-correlations were 0.42, 0.50 at the unit level, and 0.56 at the hospital level (Sorra & Dyer,
2010). The tool's overall psychometric properties well support the tool's items and dimensions.
The HSPSC is regarded as reliable and valid both nationally and internationally.
2.8.2.2 International Review of Psychometric Performance
The HSPSC is one of the most commonly used surveys to evaluate safety culture in
health care settings (Vlayen et al., 2015). There is enough evidence that even after alterations for
international use, the tool retains its high psychometric properties reliability (Bodur & Filiz,
2010; Eiras et al., 2014; Hedskold et al., 2013; Ito et al., 2011; Moghri et al., 2012; Nie et al.,
2013; Nordin et al., 2013; Occelli et al., 2013; Olson, 2008; Sarac et al., 2011; Smits et al., 2008;
Vlayen et al., 2015).
2.8.3 Reliability of survey

The survey demonstrated overall high reliability (Cronbach's alpha > 0.70) both
nationally and internationally, with only one dimension (Staffing) falling below the acceptable
level of a Cronbach's alpha (Blegen et al., 2010; Eiras et al., 2014; Hedskold et al., 2013; Nie et
al., 2013; Nordin et al., 2013; Occelli et al., 2013; Sarac et al., 2011; Vlayen et al., 2015). As a
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result, Blegen et al. (2010) advised users to consider using alternative methods to evaluate the
Staffing dimension in the future.
Even when the French and Dutch translations were used in psychiatric hospitals, the
study revealed that the tool's psychometrics were still acceptable and valuable in this unique
setting (Vlayen et al., 2015). The HSPSC was used in both hospital and primary care settings in
Sweden, with acceptable reliability composites ranging between 0.66 and 0.87. (Hedskold et al.,
2013). Hedskold et al. (2013) believed that having a single tool to assess patient safety culture
across various care settings would benefit Sweden because it would allow for comparisons
within the country's national safety care system (Hedskold et al., 2013).
2.8.4 Validity of survey
The international HSPSC surveys demonstrated good validity, with factor analyses
supporting between 10–12 dimensions at the individual, unit, and hospital levels. In addition, the
published reliabilities were consistently acceptable (Ito et al., 2011; Robida, 2013; Sorra & Dyer,
2010). A study conducted in Iran that was translated into Farsi had factor structures identical to
those of the original study (Moghri et al., 2012). Furthermore, researchers discovered that the 12dimensional structures addressed the unique characteristics of each population in the majority of
studies. Although, in the original HSPSC model, it was suggested that these be adjusted in
translated versions.
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2.8.5 Poorly performing translations of survey
Three international studies found that translated versions of the survey performed poorly
(Haugen et al., 2010; Perneger et al., 2014; Pfeiffer & Manser, 2010). According to Perneger et
al. (2014), such inefficiencies could be caused by inaccuracy in the translation process or more
general instrument complications. Many of the survey items were not applicable to non-clinical
staff such as clerks and housekeepers, according to Pfeiffer and Manser (2010) in a German
study. As a result, it was suggested that a more detailed survey be created to assess the patient
safety culture within this sector of the healthcare team. Before using the Norwegian version in
research, Haugen et al. (2010) found that the psychometric properties needed to be revised.
Waterson et al. (2010) discovered that the questionnaire may have measured different
constructs of patient safety culture, which is particularly interesting in the United Kingdom.
Although the researchers used the original HSPSC (Waterson et al., 2010), they found that the
"Overall Perceptions of Safety" and "Staffing" were unreasonably linked in their model. This
could be due to a greater tendency in the United Kingdom to associate staffing levels with patient
safety when compared to U.S. staffing strategies (Waterson et al., 2010). According to Waterson
et al. (2010), the national health care system may have limited the extent to which the HSPSC is
applicable outside the United States due to specific cultural differences between the United
States and the United Kingdom. A distinct national culture would undoubtedly have an impact
on the economy.
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2.8.6 Considerations for tool development, Psychometric Analyses and Limitations
When comparing data from different national cultures, the researchers warned against
making assumptions (Eiras et al., 2014; Najjar et al., 2013; Nie et al., 2013; Vlayen et al., 2015).
Multiple studies have discovered that there are differences in each society's perceptions of safety
culture due to the differences in each culture's perceptions. When safety culture tools are used in
such diverse settings and health-care systems, these differences must be considered (Najjar et al.,
2013; Nie et al., 2013; Pfeiffer & Manser, 2010; Waterson et al., 2010). Pfeiffer and Manser
(2010) advocated for creating a specific survey to determine whether these differences are
explained by cultural differences or by national differences in healthcare systems.
Sarac et al. (2011) had some interesting comments when they noted that health care
delivery risks could harm the patients and the health care staff. They suggested examining the
impacts of a hospital safety culture on patients with the current tool, Sarac et al. (2011).
Likewise, they added that this tool should be adapted to evaluate the extent of impact the safety
culture of an institution has on the staff of that institution (Sarac et al., 2011). Disruptive
behaviors tend to create adverse cultures in hospitals and cause injury to staff.
The HSPSC has met more psychometric criteria than any other instrument in the field due
to its thorough testing and widespread acceptance (Hellings et al., 2010). The HSPSC's reliability
in the U.S. and international studies has ranged from 0.60–0.88 when equipped with CFAs that
support the 12 dimensions of safety culture determined in the pilot study (Sorra & Nieva, 2004;
Hedskold et al., 2013; Nordin et al., 2013; Occelli et al., 2013). The tool has adequate
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psychometric properties for measuring various factors, including individual attitudes and group
culture (Blegen et al., 2009; Sorra & Dyer, 2010).
Results are found to provide practical evidence that helps concerned stakeholders develop
effective strategies in the health care field. This may assist researchers in improving the quality
of health care and ensure patient safety (Hellings et al., 2010; Robida, 2013; Nie et al., 2013). To
reiterate, the HSPSC has value as a common instrument for measuring health care systems
regarding national patient safety improvement initiatives and, at the same time, enhancing
organizational awareness of patient safety (Bodur & Filiz, 2010; Hedskold et al., 2013). The tool
provides vast abilities to examine safety culture from an individual’s perspective, to enable the
concerned bodies to learn from past events (Sarac et al., 2011; Nordin et al., 2013).
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CHAPTER 3: METHODS AND PROCEDURES

3.1 Introduction

The current study aims to evaluate health care workers’ perceptions of patient safety in
different hospitals around the U.S. The research was directed to health care staffs consisting of
the following included medical staff (Registered Nurses, Physician Assistants/Nurse
Practitioners, LVN/LPN, Patient Care Assistants/Hospital Aides/Care Partners, Attending/Staff
Physicians, Resident Physicians/Physician in Training, Pharmacists, Dieticians, Respiratory
Therapists, Physical, Occupational, or Speech Therapists; and non-medical staff: Technicians
(e.g., EKG, Lab, Radiology) and Administrations/Managements. The research tried to find
whether the current patient safety culture affects the number of reported errors and adverse
events. The research also endeavors to determine the general insights about patient safety
concepts. Additionally, the research aims to test the extent of the influence of hospital
characteristics in defining the concept of patient safety culture and the impact on all staff
involved with providing health care. The frequency of reported errors and the general
perceptions of patient safety are critical issues in evaluating the impacts of patient safety culture.
Hence, the implementation of this study is mainly centered on answers to the following
questions:
Q1: What is the effect of PSC dimensions on (ERFREQ) and (OVERALL) in
U.S hospital settings?
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Q2: What is the effect of each hospital characteristic (Teaching Status and
Geographic Region) on perceived PSC?
Q3: What is the effect of each hospital characteristic (Teaching Status and
Geographic Region) on the Frequency of events reported (ERFREQ) and
Overall perceptions of patient safety (OVERALL)?
Q4: What is the relationship between (OVERALL) and (ERFREQ)?
The generated study hypotheses are exemplified by a proposed patient safety culture
assessment model in order to assess a multitude of factors under study. These include the
anticipated associations between the patient safety culture dimensions, Frequency of events
reported (ERFREQ) and Overall perceptions of patient safety (OVERALL), and hospital
characteristics (Teaching Status and Geographic Region). Figure 5 below shows the proposed
study model of assessing patient safety culture in U.S hospital settings. The proposed model also
tests the effects of hospital characteristics on patient safety culture dimensions and Frequency of
events reported (ERFREQ) and Overall perceptions of patient safety (OVERALL), as illustrated
in Figure 8.
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Figure 8 Conceptual Proposed Study Model of Patient Safety Culture Assessment
All the variables in this quantitative study were assessed by the use of the secondary data
source (i.e., the 2018 Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s (AHRQ) Hospital Survey
on Patient Safety Culture (HSPSC) comparative database). Through this chapter, detailed
descriptions of the study design will be provided, the research sample will be illustrated, the
precautions taken to guarantee the protection of human rights will be exemplified, and a
description of the secondary data source will be presented (i.e., the 2018 Agency for Healthcare
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Research and Quality’s (AHRQ) Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSPSC)
comparative database). Besides, the chapter will conclude with descriptions of the various
variables assessed and all the necessary particulars regarding the procedures implemented for
data collection, data cleaning and eventually data analyses. Partial least squares structural
equation modeling (PLS-SEM) is used to validate and analyze the scrutinized latent factors and
the relationships between the research constructs.
3.2 Research Design and Study Sample
This is a cross-sectional clustered design retrospective study. The study uses a
convenience sample from the AHRQ's HSPSC 2018 comparative database, a nonprobability
sample (Famolaro et al., 2018; Hulley et al., 2014; Trzesniewski et al., 2011). Each hospital was
in charge of administering and cleaning the surveys, and strict instructions were followed. The
data was then sent to a Westat®-managed central location, where the second level of cleaning
was completed. The final dataset included all U.S. hospitals that volunteered to participate in the
HSPSC comparative database.
3.2.1 Obtaining the HSPSC Database
Westat®, an independent contractor, provided a national repository (Westat, 2017).
Westat® required a formal written request to obtain the database for the study, which was
approved (APPENDIX D). In August 2020, the 2018 U.S. HSPSC dataset was finalized,
officially accepted, and electronically received from Westat®.
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3.2.2 Human Subjects Protection
The issues surrounding survey participation have been handled with care. The population
asked to participate in the HSPSC was chosen at the hospital's discretion. As a result, everyone's
participation was entirely voluntary. The organizations had complete autonomy over whether or
not they wanted to participate in the comparative database. All participating hospitals voluntarily
provided their survey data at the individual level. Furthermore, all hospitals that submitted data
for the 2018 comparative database signed a data use agreement, which was kept at Westat®,
allowing their de-identified data to be easily accessible for legal and ethical health care research
purposes (Sorra et al., 2018).
Even though designated humans were involved in data collection, this study only used
de-identified data. Westat® was the sole source of these de-identified data (Sorra et al., 2018).
The Internal Review Board at the University of Central Florida determined that this study was
exempt after thorough reviews (APPENDIX E).
3.3 Description of the HSPSC Comparative Database
AHRQ began making the HSPSC available to the public in November 2004. (Sorra &
Nieva, 2004). In 2006, an open letter was sent to all hospitals in the United States, requesting
voluntary submission of all available hospital survey data. Leaderships of various U.S. hospitals
eagerly submitted data from over 100,000 respondents for the initial 2007 comparative HSPSC
database in a positive response to the request (Famolaro et al., 2018). The AHRQ also
established a central repository for comparative databases, which Westat® was tasked with
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maintaining. HSPSC data were collected on an annual basis from 2007 to 2014. The call for data
collection was extended to every two years starting in 2014 (Famolaro et al., 2018).
Before submitting their data for the comparative database, it was critical that all hospitals
strictly followed AHRQ's guidelines (Famolaro et al., 2018). It is also worth noting that all
hospital researchers were required to follow the survey implementation guidelines. Nonetheless,
there was no way to verify that hospitals followed the guidelines to the letter. The procedures for
all of the surveys were described below, as well as how the study populations were chosen, how
the survey data was analyzed, and how comparative datasets were created (Famolaro et al.,
2018).
3.3.1 Hospital Guidelines in Implementing the Survey
The surveys were distributed via the internet, paper, or a combination of both at each
hospital. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the HSPSC included items and questions that used a
five-point Likert scale for agreement (starting with strongly disagree and ending with strongly
agree) or frequency (from never to always) (Sorra & Nieva, 2004). At staff meetings, paper
surveys were distributed, emphasizing hospital leadership's support for the project. Electronically
distributed surveys took advantage of the respondents' email addresses through web-based
distributions. They introduced each respondent to the project, reminded staff to participate in the
study, and encouraged them to complete the survey by sending out scheduled notifications (Sorra
et al., 2018). All web-based surveys were tested before the administration on the same types of
computers that hospital staff used, ensuring convenience and efficiency. The survey's
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administration was also tested ahead of time with various Internet browsers (Explorer, Safari,
Firefox, Chrome, Mozilla, and Opera) and display settings (Sorra et al., 2018).

Although most hospitals preferred web-based survey administration, AHRQ reported that
paper-based survey administration had slightly higher average response rates (Sorra et al., 2018).
Individually and anonymously, the surveys were completed. If more than one hospital was
surveyed, a hospital-level identifier was assigned to track the surveys from each facility and
produce feedback reports for each (Sorra et al., 2018). Hospitals were allowed to use outside
vendors to collect data if necessary, and they were given a time limit of up to 10 weeks to
complete their survey projects (Sorra et al., 2018).
3.3.2 Survey population selection
The survey queries targeted all hospital staff. The project directors determined the survey’s
sample, and the survey questions were directed at all hospital employees. The project directors
chose the survey sample from the facility's population. A great deal of care was taken to ensure
that the sample chosen accurately reflected the population at that facility (Sorra et al., 2018).
AHRQ recommended that for hospitals with physician and staff populations of 500 or less, a
consensus survey be conducted in which information is gathered from all employees in that
hospital (Sorra et al., 2018). AHRQ requested a minimum of 500 respondents from hospitals with
physicians and staff ranging from 501 to 999. A minimum of 600 respondents was recommended
for institutions with physicians and staff ranging from 1,000 to 2,999. (Sorra et al., 2018). These
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sample sizes were calculated using the assumptions that the sample was simple random or
systematic random, with a 50% response rate and a +/- 5% confidence interval (Sorra et al., 2018).

Staff in specific professional categories, such as nursing, or staff in specific units, such as
the operating room or the pediatric unit, were included in the samples (Sorra et al., 2018). When
research teams decided on the sample, they made a list with the participants' first and last names,
internal addresses, hospital areas or units, and staffing category or job title. These lists were kept
in their respective facilities in a secure location. In addition, researchers who used email
correspondence to send pre-notification or conducted web-based surveys kept records of
participants' email addresses in a similarly secure location (Sorra et al., 2018). Employees who no
longer worked at the facility were on administrative or sick leave or had already left the facility
were filtered from the list by the hospital researchers in charge prior to administering the survey
(Sorra et al., 2018).
3.3.3 Analysis and first level of data cleaning by hospitals
At the hospital level, the first phase of data cleaning processes for the comparative database
took place. Researchers at hospitals and hospital organizations either did their data entry, data
analysis and report preparation or hired someone to do it for them. Researchers excluded surveys
with blank areas or the same answer for all questions when they received the paper surveys back.
In addition, illegible, mismarked, or double-response survey papers were excluded and properly
discarded (Sorra et al., 2018).
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3.3.4 Creating datasets
A response rate was calculated and a dataset was created after the first process of
cleaning the surveys was completed. The data from the paper survey administration was entered
into a data file using SAS®, SPSS®, Microsoft Excel®, or by sending the data to Westat® via
the electronic address databasesonsafetyculture@westat.com in an easily imported file format.
All information was safely stored on a Westat®-protected server (Sorra et al., 2018).
Surveys were de-identified and serial numbers were assigned to all surveys for paper
survey administration. All information linking the numbers to the names of the respondents was
obliterated (Sorra et al., 2018). Participants in web surveys were assured that all surveys were
anonymously administered and that all responses were strongly coded and accurately captured in
authentic computer-based data files by hospital personnel involved in survey administration
(Sorra et al., 2018). Although space for free text comments was provided at the end of the
survey, these comments were not captured in the AHRQ dataset, and those were not included in
this study.
3.3.5 Second level of data cleaning by Westat®.
Westat® completed the second round of data cleaning procedures. Westat® used
response frequencies to look for breaches, outliers, missing variables, and other anomalies in
each hospital's data (Sorra et al., 2018). If any data errors were discovered, the hospitals were
asked to correct them and resubmit their information (Sorra et al., 2018). To ensure that the
dataset Westat® received was accurate, each participating hospital received a copy of its data
frequencies (Sorra et al., 2018). All respondents who gave the same answers in or across survey
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sections with no variations in ratings, or those who only answered demographic questions, were
deleted prior to data analysis (Sorra et al., 2018). Hospitals that did not administer the entire
survey did not specify which unit the respondent worked in or had only one unit respond to the
survey were also excluded by Westat® (Sorra et al., 2018; Sorra & Dyer, 2010). If there were
fewer than three respondents, or if the unit was identified as "other" or "many different work
units," the unit was dropped. The basic assumption in all of these cases was that the individuals
did not belong to the same unit and, as a result, should not be grouped for statistical purposes.
3.3.6 Justification of Sample Size
The 2018 HSPSC dataset had been found to have an adequate sample size for this study,
with data collected between 2016 and 2018. The dataset included data from 382,834 respondents
from 630 hospitals across the United States (Famolaro et al., 2018). The statistical power to test
complex multi-variable analyses for this study was fully supported by the available 2018 U.S.
database (Trzesniewski et al., 2011).
3.4 Study Variables
The following three independent variables were extracted from hospital and respondent
characteristics: (Teaching Status, Geographic Region and Staff Positions). The 12 dependent
variables were (Teamwork Within Hospital Units, Organizational Learning-Continuous
Improvement, Staffing, Non-punitive Response to Error, Communication Openness,
Supervisor/Manager Expectations and Actions Promoting Safety, Feedback and Communication
About Error, Management Support for Patient Safety, Teamwork Across Hospital Units,
Handoffs and Transitions). The final two outcome dimensions were as follows: (Frequency of
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reported events and Overall perceptions of patient safety). The description of all the variables in
the study is summarized in Table 5. These variables included exogenous, endogenous, and
control or demographic variables, all listed in the last section of Table 5. Below are the
conceptual and operational definitions for each item.
3.4.1 Independent Variables
The independent variables were categorized into three groups: (Teaching Status,
Geographic Region and Staff Positions). These variables will be investigated to determine how
they affect the dependent variables, which are the 12 safety culture dimensions.
Within the United States, the independent variables were demographic characteristics of
the participants, which were also extracted from the original dataset. The independent variables
were chosen to see if practitioners' perceptions differed depending on their positions, location,
and hospital teaching status.
3.4.2 Dependent Variables
The 10 safety culture dimensions and the two outcome dimensions were the dependent
variables, as described in Chapter Two (Figure 2). Table 4 lists each dimension and the
terminology that identifies the survey items or questions pertaining to that dimension. The four
items or questions pertaining to the dimension of Staffing, for example, can be found in section
A, items 2, 5, 7, and 14, of the HSPSC (Table 4 and APPENDIX B).
As described in Chapter Two, the dependent variables were the 10 PSC dimensions and
two outcome dimensions (Figure 2). Each dimension is shown in Table 4, and the items or
questions in the survey refer to that dimension. The four items or questions that refer to the
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dimension of Staffing, for example, can be found in section A, items 2, 5, 7, and 14 of the
HSPSC (Table 4 and APPENDIX B).

Table 4 HSPSC Categories, Culture Categories, Dimensions and Items
Patient Safety Culture Dimension

Items or Questions per Dimension

Teamwork Within Hospital Units
Organizational LearningContinuous Improvement
Staffing
Non-punitive Response to Error
Hospital Management Support for
Patient Safety
Supervisor/Manager Expectations
and Actions Promoting Safety
Feedback and Communication
About Error
Communication Openness
Teamwork Across Hospital Units
Hospital Handoffs and Transitions
Frequency of Event Reporting
Overall Perceptions of Safety

A1, A3, A4, A11
A6, A9, A13
A2, A5, A7, A14
A8, A12, A16
F1, F8, F9
B1, B2, B3, B4
C1, C3, C5
C2, C4, C6
F2, F4, F6 F10
F3, F5, F7, F11
D1, D2, D3
A10, A15, A17, A18

A five-point Likert scale was used to rate the items and questions in the HSPSC for
agreement (from strongly disagree to strongly agree) and frequency (from never to always)
(Sorra & Nieva, 2004). The survey's (APPENDIX B) items were both positively and negatively
phrased, such as "Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of those with more
authority," and "Staff are afraid to ask questions when something does not seem right" (Famolaro

98

et al., 2018). Prior to the 2018 HSPSC dataset release, Westat® converted negative responses to
a positive Likert scale (Famolaro et al., 2018).
In the following section, the dependent variables, the patient safety culture dimensions, are
conceptually and operationally defined. The survey's corresponding items and questions for these
dimensions are also listed below (Sorra et al., 2018; Sorra & Nieva, 2004).
1. "Teamwork within hospital units" is defined as the support and respect shown by hospital staff
within a unit to one another. The survey items A1, A3, A4, and A11 were used to operationalize
this.
2. "Staffing" is defined as the number of employees who are believed to be adequate to meet the
workload in order to provide high-quality patient care. The survey items A2, A5, A7, and A14
operationalized this.
3. "Organizational Learning-Continuous Improvement" is defined as the belief that employees
can learn from their mistakes and use that knowledge to make positive changes in the workplace.
The survey items A6, A9, and A13 operationalized this.
4. A "non-punitive response to error" is defined as the staff's understanding that any previous
mistakes they made would not be held against them and that written reports of such events would
not be kept in their personnel file. The survey's items A8, A12, and A16 were used to
operationalize this.
5. "Supervisor/Manager Expectations and Safety-Promoting Actions" refers to hospital
employees' perceptions of their supervisors' and managers' involvement in activities that improve
patient safety. The survey items B1, B2, B3, and B4 were used to operationalize this.
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6. "Feedback and Communication about Error" refers to how employees feel about being
informed about recent errors and receiving feedback on how to avoid them. Furthermore,
employees believed they were informed of changes to prevent future adverse events. The survey
items C1, C3, and C5 were used to operationalize this.
7. "Communication Openness" is defined as employees' perception that they have the freedom to
speak up if they see something that harms patient care. They also had the option of questioning
the authorities. The survey's items C2, C4, and C6 were used to operationalize this.
8. "Teamwork across hospital units" is defined as hospital units working together to collaborate
and coordinate patient care activities in the best interests of their patients. This dimension also
considers whether hospital systems encourage hospital unit synergies. The survey's items or
questions F2, F4, F6, and F10 were used to operationalize this.
9. The dimension "Hospital Handoffs and Transitions" is defined as whether practitioners believe
important patient information has been transferred from one care provider to another, across
hospital units, and during shift changes. The survey's items or questions F3, F5, F7, and F11
were used to operationalize this.
10. "Hospital Management Support for Patient Safety" is defined as employees' perceptions that
their hospital management created a work environment that promoted patient safety and assured
employees that patient safety was a top priority. The survey items F1, F8, and F9 were used to
operationalize this.
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11. "Frequency of Event Reporting" is defined as the staff's perceptions of how often errors
occur and the frequency with which they are reported. The survey items D1, D2, and D3 were
used to operationalize this outcome dimension.
12. "Overall Perceptions of Safety" refers to employees' overall impressions of their company's
error-prevention procedures and systems. The survey's items or questions A8, A10, A15, and
A17 were used to operationalize this outcome dimension.
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Table 5 Summary of the Study Variables
Study variables
Patient Safety
Culture
Endogenous
Variables

Dimensions
Teamwork Within Hospital Units

Variables Descriptions
Staff support each other, treat each other with respect, and
work together as a team.

Organizational Learning- Continuous Improvement Mistakes have led to positive changes and changes are
evaluated for effectiveness.
Staffing
There are enough staff to handle the workload and work
hours are appropriate to provide the best care for patients.
Non-punitive Response to Error
Staff feel that their mistakes and event reports are not held
against them and that mistakes are not kept in their
personnel file.
Communication Openness
Staff freely speak up if they see something that may
negatively affect a patient and feel free to question those
with more authority.
Supervisor/Manager Expectations and Actions
Supervisors/managers consider staff suggestions for
Promoting Safety
improving patient safety, praise staff for following patient
safety procedures, and do not overlook patient safety
problems.
Feedback and Communication About Error
Staff are informed about errors that happen, are given
feedback about changes implemented, and discuss ways to
prevent errors.
Management support for patient safety
Hospital management provides a work climate that
promotes patient safety and shows that patient safety is a
top priority
Teamwork Across Hospital Units
Hospital units cooperate and coordinate with one another
to provide the best care for patients.
Handoffs and Transitions
Important patient care information is transferred across
hospital units and during shift changes.
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Endogenous
Variable

Dimensions
Frequency of events reported

Variables Descriptions
Mistakes caught and corrected before affecting the patient
Mistakes with no potential to harm the patient.
Mistakes that could harm the patient but do not.
Procedures and systems are good at preventing errors and
there is a lack of patient safety problems.
1 = 'Northeast'
2 = 'South Atlantic / Associated Territories'
3 = 'E. Central'
4 = 'W. Central'
5 = 'West'
Teaching, Nonteaching hospital
Medical, Non-Medical

Overall perceptions of patient safety
Hospital and
Respondent
Characteristics

Geographic Region

Teaching Status
Staff Positions
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3.5 Statistical Analysis

The statistical procedures in this study contained descriptive statistics and partial least
squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) for model validation for analyzing the
relationships between model factors and testing the study hypotheses. The statistical analysis
methods used in this study are detailed in the following sections.
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics analyze the hospital participant information and determine
normality based on the provided data. The reviewed statistics include range, mean, standard
deviation, skewness and kurtosis. As the survey format is a Likert scale, it is expected the range
for all variables, excluding categorical demographic data, will be between 1-5. IBM SPSS®
Version 28 is used to perform these tests.
The means and standard deviation identify the average response and extent of deviation
of the responses assuming a normally distributed response. Skewness is a measure of symmetry
or the distortion of the data set with a value of 0, indicating the data matches a normal curve
exactly. High kurtosis indicates that the data has heavy tails, with the extreme case being a
uniform distribution. The data is not normally distributed if there is significant skewness and
kurtosis. When using SEM, acceptable skewness values are between 3 and + 3, and acceptable
kurtosis values are between 10 and + 10. (Brown, 2006). Although normality is preferred, it is
not required for PLS-SEM (Hair et al., 2014).
Excessive collinearity is another issue to consider. Pearson's coefficient determines
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whether two values with normally distributed variables have a linear relationship (Akoglu,2018).
Collinearity issues are more likely if the value is greater than 0.85.
3.5.2 PLS-SEM Model

The final model is identified and tested using SmartPLS 3 and PLS-SEM with the
consistent PLS model. The factor weighting scheme is used to calculate the outer model,
followed by the path weighting scheme for evaluation of the final model. To determine statistical
significance and p-values, bootstrapping is used. The option of complete bootstrapping with
5000 samples was chosen.
The first set of targets is related to the outer measurement model. The outer loadings in
the model are used to assess indicator reliability. To add value to the model, the loadings must be
sufficient. Loadings above 0.7 are preferred, and loadings above 0.5 are appropriate for use in
the model, according to Hair et al. (2019).
The outer loadings (indicator loadings) represent the simple correlations between
measured variables and the associated latent variable, are used to assess indicator reliability. The
preferred minimum of 0.7 is based on a loading of 0.708 representing 50% of an item's
variance.(Hair et al., 2019). In a measurement model, however, it is common to find a few outer
loadings less than 0.7. Indicators with loadings less than 0.4 should be removed from the
equation (Hulland, 1999).
Internal consistency is commonly measured using three different methods (Hair et al.,
2019). Each of these is related and has a target between 0.7 and 0.9, with values greater than 0.95
indicating redundant items. Cronbach's alpha is regarded as a conservative measure of reliability,
whereas composite reliability (Jöreskog, 1971) is regarded as liberal. The difference is that
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composite reliability is weighted based on the indicator’s loadings. As a compromise between
Cronbach's alpha and composite reliability, the ρA measure is used (Joseph F Hair et al., 2019).
Convergent validity is measured using the average variance extracted (AVE). An acceptable
AVE is considered 0.5, indicating that at least half of the variance in the items is explained
(Joseph F Hair et al., 2019). These assessments are summarized in Table 6.
Collinearity, model fit, effect size, and the statistical significance of the path coefficients
are among the second set of assessments related to the structural model.
Table 6 Summary of the Measurement Model Validity Assessments

Indicator
reliability
Internal
consistency

Convergent
validity
Discriminant
validity

Measurement

Target

Supporting
Literature

Outer loadings

> 0.7 Preferred
> 0.5 Acceptable

Hair et al. (2019)

Cronbach’s alpha

0.7 – 0.9

Hair et al. (2019)

ρA
Composite reliability
Average variance
extracted (AVE)
Heterotrait-monotrait
ratio (HTMT)

0.7 – 0.9
0.7 – 0.9

Hair et al. (2019)
Hair et al. (2019)

> 0.5

Hair et al. (2019)

< 0.85 Preferred
0.85 - 0.90 Acceptable

Hair et al. (2019)

For model fit, endogenous variables should have coefficients of determination (R2) of at
least 0.75, 0.50, and 0.25, which are considered substantial, moderate, and weak, respectively
(Hair et al., 2019). R2 greater than 0.9 indicates that the model is overfit and includes noise.
Model fit in covariance-based SEM is often analyzed using the standardized root mean
square error (SRMR), which measures the Euclidean distance between the empirical correlation
matrix and the model implied matrix. Hu and Bentler (1999) defined a cutoff of 0.8 for
covariance-based SEM models. No defined value is widely accepted, though the acceptable
value for PLS-SEM would likely be higher than 0.8. (Hair et al., 2014)
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Another journal article takes the position that a cutoff value of 0.08 is considered reasonable
(Henseler et al., 2016). An SRMR will be reported for this analysis, but no applicable target
value will be applied.
Cohen (1988) identified the f2 statistic to measure effect sizes with at least 0.02 for a
small effect, 0.15 for a medium effect, and 0.35 for a large effect.
The blindfolding procedure can be used to test the model's prediction capability. The Q2
criterion of Stone-Geisser assesses a model's ability to predict endogenous latent variables. Q2
values greater than zero indicate that the model path has a predictive value, while values less
than zero indicate that the path does not.
The assessment parameters for structural model validity assessments are summarized in
Table 7.
Table 7 Summary of the Structural Model Validity Assessments

Measurement

Model fit

Effect size
Path Coefficient for
direct
and
indirect
effects
Model
Prediction
Capability

Target

Supporting
Literature

R2

> 0.90 Overfit
> 0.75 Substantial
> 0.50 Moderate
> 0.25 Weak

Hair et al. (2019)

SRMR

<0.08 Preferred

Henseler,
Hubona,
& Ray (2016)

f2

> 0.02 Small
> 0.15 Medium
> 0.35 Large

Cohen (1988)

p-value

< 0.05

Hair et al. (2019);
Hulland (1999)

Q2

>0
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Hair et al., (2011);
Shanmugapriya &
Subramanian (2016)

CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH FINDINGS

4.1 Introduction
Research findings include the responses, demographics, data, and associated descriptive
statistical results from the survey are reported. Path analysis using partial least squares analysis is
used, which bases estimates on explaining the maximum amount of variance.
4.2 Survey Results and Demographic Variables
With data collected between 2016 and 2018, the 2018 HSPSC dataset was discovered to
have an adequate sample size for this study.. 630 U.S. hospitals submitted data from 382,834
respondents in the dataset (Famolaro et al., 2018). The available 2018 U.S. database fully
supported the statistical power to test complex multi-variable analyses for this study
(Trzesniewski et al., 2011). The average hospital response rate was 54 percent, with an average
of 608 completed surveys per hospital.
Samples were taken from five regions in the U.S Northeast, South Atlantic/ Associated
Territories, East Central, West Central and West (Table 8). To meet the study objectives, the data
was stratified based on geographic region, and the participants were divided into two groups
medical and non-medical staff (Table 10). In order to obtain an adequate representation by
regions and increase the generalizability of the research findings, the data was extracted by
following the confidence interval 99% and margin of error 1% with total sample size 67,010
participants, as shown in Table 10. The participants were working on teaching or non-teaching
hospitals as shown in Table 9, where 56% of participants were from teaching hospitals.
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Table 8 Statistics of participants’ Geographic Regions
Region
Northeast
South Atlantic/
Associated Territories
East Central
West Central
West
Total

Population
70,870
107,584

Sample
13,477
14,412

Percent
20.1
21.5

101,984
64,091
38,305
382,834

14,307
13,212
11,602
67,010

21.4
19.7
17.3
100

Note: Northeast: New England, Mid Atlantic; East Central: East North Central; East South Central; West Central:
West North Central; West South Central; West: Mountain & Pacific

Table 9 Statistics of participants’ Geographic Regions
Teaching Status
Teaching
Nonteaching
Total

Number of Sample
37,548
29,462
67,101

Percent
56
44
100

Table 10 Statistics of participants’ Professionals
Participants
Medical
Non-Medical
Total

Number
52,960
14,050
67,010

Percent
79
21
100

Note: Medical: Attending/Physician/Resident/NP or PA; Dietician; Patient Care assistant/Hospital aide/Care partner;

Pharmacist; LVN/LPN/Registered Nurse; Therapist; Non-Medical: Administration/Management; Technician (e.g.,
EKG, Lab, Radiology; Unit Assistant/Clerk/Secretary

4.3 Descriptive Statistics - Normality and Collinearity
Normality is measured using skewness and kurtosis. All variables are normally
distributed, with values of skewness fall between − 3 and + 3, and kurtosis is appropriate from a
range of − 10 to + 10 (Brown, 2006), as shown in Table 11.
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Table 11 Descriptive Statistics

C2
C4
C6R
C1
C3
C5
A14R
A2
A5R
A7R
F10
F2R
F4
F6R
F1
F8
F9R
A12R
A16R
A8R
A13
A6
A9
B1
B2
B3R
B4R
F11R
F3R
F5R
F7R
A1
A11
A3
A4
A10R
A15
A17R
A18
D1
D2
D3

Range

Mean

1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5
1-5

3.74
3.13
3.51
3.31
3.48
3.64
3.01
3.02
3.02
3.43
3.261
2.84
3.09
3.11
3.63
3.52
3.06
3.13
2.89
3.20
3.57
3.95
3.50
3.63
3.64
3.61
3.66
2.85
2.71
2.95
2.83
4.05
3.55
4.03
3.88
3.43
3.42
3.46
3.65
3.29
3.28
3.54

Standard
deviation
1.395
1.425
1.401
1.483
1.526
1.504
1.326
1.350
1.332
1.459
1.475
1.459
1.464
1.530
1.391
1.497
1.514
1.318
1.289
1.296
1.159
1.081
1.095
1.466
1.476
1.442
1.540
1.488
1.439
1.494
1.432
1.128
1.313
1.125
1.167
1.302
1.335
1.315
1.108
1.590
1.606
1.653

Skewness

Skewness

-1.465
-0.664
-1.138
-0.949
-1.094
-1.291
-0.497
-0.328
-0.564
-0.951
0.245
-0.557
-0.975
-0.916
-1.427
-1.206
-0.670
-0.680
-0.388
-0.657
-1.424
-1.777
-1.299
-1.315
-1.353
-1.332
-1.249
-0.658
-0.490
-0.755
-0.678
-1.834
-1.198
-1.831
-1.563
-0.797
-0.809
-0.884
-1.446
-0.862
-0.844
-1.125

1.572
-0.260
0.698
0.122
0.308
0.796
-0.448
-0.898
-0.358
0.191
-1.063
-0.595
-0.018
-0.193
1.295
0.523
-0.560
-0.027
-0.307
-0.098
2.164
3.854
2.033
0.821
0.903
0.977
0.514
-0.476
-0.587
-0.371
-0.344
3.581
0.900
3.687
2.472
0.076
-0.018
0.234
2.348
-0.252
-0.305
0.089

Pearson’s coefficients for all measured variables in each hypothesized latent variable
have a significant p-value of 0.000, indicating correlation is present. Pearson’s coefficient
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identifies if a linear relationship exists between two values for normally distributed variables
(Akoglu, 2018). The bivariate Pearson’s coefficient for each group of variables is shown in
Tables 12-23, demonstrating that a linear relationship is present for all variables in each latent
variable.
Table 12 Pearson's Correlation for Communication Openness

C2
C4
C6R

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

C2
1

C4

0.677
0.000
0.685
0.000

1

C6R

0.668
0.000

1

Table 13 Pearson's Correlation for Feedback and Communication About Error

C1

C3
C5

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

C1
1

C3

0.731
0.000
0.743
0.000

1

C5

0.763
0.000

1

Table 14 Pearson's Correlation for Staffing
A2
A2
A5R
A7R
A14R

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

A5R

A7R

A14R

1
0.268
0.000
0.264
0.000
0.500
0.000

1
0.455
0.000
0.412
0.000
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1
0.396
0.000

1

Table 15 Pearson's Correlation for Teamwork Across Units
F4
F4
F10
F2R
F6R

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

F10

F2R

F6R

1
0.770
0.000
0.711
0.000
0.698
0.000

1
0.699
0.000
0.703
0.000

1
0.657
0.000

1

Table 16 Pearson's Correlation for Management Support for Patient Safety

F1
F8
F9R

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

F1
1

F8

0.759
0.000
0.624
0.000

1
0.701
0.000

F9R

1

Table 17 Pearson's Correlation for Nonpunitive Response to Error

A8R
A12R
A16R

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

A8R
1

A12R

0.632
0.000
0.609
0.000

1
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0.626
0.000

A16R

1

Table 18 Pearson's Correlation for Organizational Learning and Continuous Improvement

A6
A9
A13

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

A6
1

A9

0.456
0.000
0.560
0.000

1

A13

0.490
0.000

1

Table 19 Pearson's Correlation for Supervisor/manager Expectations and Actions Promoting
Patient Safety
B1
B1
B2
B3R
B4R

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

B2

B3R

B4R

1
0.845
0.000
0.724
0.000
0.680
0.000

1
0.741
0.000
0.713
0.000

1
0.732
0.000

1

Table 20 Pearson's Correlation for Handoffs and Transitions
F3R
F3R
F5R
F7R
F11R

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

F5R

F7R

F11R

1
0.725
0.000
0.731
0.000
0.679
0.000

1
0.753
0.000
0.748
0.000

113

1
0.711
0.000

1

Table 21 Pearson's Correlation for Teamwork within Units
A1
A1
A3
A4
A11

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

A3

A4

A11

1
0.752
0.000
0.769
0.000
0.563
0.000

1
0.713
0.000
0.594
0.000

1
0.541
0.000

1

Table 22 Pearson's Correlation for Overall Perceptions of Patient Safety
A15
A15
A18
A10R
A17R

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

A18

A10R

A17R

1
0.478
0.000
0.396
0.000
0.510
0.000

1
0.428
0.000
0.507
0.000

1
0.495
0.000

1

Table 23 Pearson's Correlation for Frequency of Events Reported

D1
D2
D3

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)

D1
1

D2

0.878
0.000
0.829
0.000

1
0.864
0.000

D3

1

4.4 Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) Model
The hypothesized structural causal path model was identified from the survey data
collected and is shown in Figure 9.
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Figure 9 The hypothesized structural causal path model
The associated hypotheses for the model include:
•

H1: Hospital characteristics have a significant influence on ERFREQ

•

H2: Hospital characteristics have a significant influence on OVERALL.

•

H3: Hospital characteristics have a significant influence on PSC

•

H4: PSC has a relationship with the Frequency of events reported (ERFREQ).

•

H5: PSC has a relationship with OVERALL

•

H6: Respondent characteristics have a significant influence on perceived PSC.

•

H7: Respondent characteristics have a significant influence on ERFREQ.

•

H8: Respondent characteristics have a significant influence on OVERALL.

•

H9: OVERALL and ERFREQ are significantly related.
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The hypothesized identified model represents one exogenous variable representing patient
safety culture (PSC). The model also includes two endogenous variables representing the
frequency of event reporting (ERFREQ) and overall perception of patient safety (OVERALL).
Moreover, three independent variables extracted from the hospital and respondents’
characteristics included the (Staff Position, Teaching Status and Geographic Region). PSC is
conceptualized as a reflective- reflective hierarchical component model (HCM). HCM is
beneficial as it allows a less complex and parsimonious path model, especially for multidimensional constructs (Hair, 2014). PSC is a reflective second-order construct, and its 10
dimensions are first-order reflective measurement constructs. A two-stage (or sequential latent
score) approach is recommended when the path model in PLS-SEM involves a higher-order
construct (Hair, 2014; Sarstedt et al., 2016).
SmartPLS version 3 is used to perform the PLS analysis. The basic PLS algorithm used includes
(SmartPLS):

1. Outer approximation of the latent variable scores,
2. Estimation of the inner weights,
3. Inner approximation of the latent variable scores
4. Estimation of the outer weights

The consistent PLS (PLSc) algorithm adds a correction to address inconsistency in
PLS estimates for reflexive variables by adding a correction for path coefficients, inter-construct
correlations, and indicator loading. The PLSc algorithm extends the base PLS algorithm by
adding additional steps (Dijkstra & Henseler, 2015):
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5. Estimate reliability
6. Correct for attenuation
7. Estimate consistent coefficients
The data is analyzed using the PLSc algorithm. Where needed, bootstrapping with the complete
bootstrapping option with 5000 iterations is used to provide p-values for tests where a p-value is
needed.
4.5 Model Results
Structural equation models include two sub-models, an inner structural model and an
outer measurement model. The measurement identifies the linear relationship between the
measured indicator variables and the associated latent variables. The structural model identifies
the linear relationship between endogenous and exogenous latent variables (Wong, 2013). All
results shown except where noted reflect the final model, including only statistically significant
paths and indicators retained in the final model.
4.5.1 Measurement Model Analysis of Lower Order Construct
As discussed in Chapter 4, the validity and reliability of the measurement model are
evaluated by assessing: (1) indicator reliability; (2) internal consistency reliability; (3)
convergent validity; and (4) discriminant validity. The following sections present the results for
all analyses to evaluate the validity and reliability of the measurement model.
Indicator reliability is assessed using the outer loadings (indicator loadings) that represent
the simple correlations between measured variables and the associated latent variable. The
preferred minimum is 0.7. However, it is common to find a few outer loadings in a measurement
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model to be less than 0.7. Indicators with loadings less than 0.4 should be dropped (Hulland,
1999). Table 24 shows the outer loadings with 40 measured variables having a loading above
0.7, and the remaining two measured variables have a loading above 0.6.
Three related calculations measure internal consistency and reliability, including
Cronbach’s alpha, ρA, and composite reliability, with targets above 0.7 (Hair et al., 2019).
Cronbach’s alpha is considered a conservative measure of reliability, whereas composite
reliability (Jöreskog, 1971) is considered a liberal measure of reliability. The ρA measure used to
adjust results in the consistent PLS algorithm (Dijkstra & Henseler, 2015) compromises
Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability (Hair et al., 2019). All variables have values for each
of these measures above 0.7, as shown in Table 25.
Convergent validity is measured using the average variance extracted (AVE). An
acceptable AVE is considered 0.5, indicating that at least half of the variance in the items is
explained (Hair et al., 2019). The average variance is at or above 0.5 for all variables.
The results for internal consistency and convergent validity are shown in Table 25.
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Table 24 Outer loadings of the Measured Variables on the Latent Variables
Construct
Communication openness (COMMUN)

Feedback and communication about error (FEED)

Staffing (STAFF)

Teamwork across units (TEAMAC)

Management support for patient safety (MGMT)

Nonpunitive response to error (NONPUN)

Organizational learning—Continuous improvement (ORGLRN)

Supervisor/manager expectations and actions promoting patient
safety (SUPV)

Handoffs and transitions (HANDOFF)

Teamwork within units (TEAMIN)

Overall perceptions of patient safety (OVERALL)

Frequency of events reported (ERFREQ)
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Item
C2
C4
C6R
C1
C3
C5
A14R
A2
A5R
A7R
F10
F2R
F4
F6R
F1
F8
F9R
A12R
A16R
A8R
A13
A6
A9
B1
B2
B3R
B4R
F11R
F3R
F5R
F7R
A1
A11
A3
A4
A10R
A15
A17R
A18
D1
D2
D3

Outer Loading
0.899
0.876
0.882
0.904
0.910
0.919
0.841
0.688
0.685
0.703
0.902
0.866
0.901
0.862
0.890
0.922
0.866
0.881
0.859
0.854
0.857
0.825
0.768
0.902
0.920
0.892
0.873
0.880
0.880
0.906
0.897
0.888
0.800
0.885
0.870
0.745
0.759
0.814
0.785
0.949
0.960
0.944

Table 25 Internal Reliability and Convergent Validity Statistics

COMMUN
ERFREQ
FEED
HANDOFF
MGMT
NONPUN
ORGLRN
OVERALL
STAFF
SUPV
TEAMAC
TEAMIN

Cronbach's Alpha

rho_A

Composite Reliability

0.863
0.947
0.898
0.913
0.872
0.832
0.751
0.779
0.713
0.919
0.906
0.884

0.867
0.947
0.899
0.913
0.873
0.836
0.762
0.781
0.747
0.920
0.907
0.884

0.916
0.966
0.936
0.939
0.922
0.899
0.858
0.858
0.821
0.943
0.934
0.920

Average Variance
Extracted (AVE)
0.784
0.905
0.830
0.794
0.797
0.748
0.668
0.602
0.536
0.805
0.780
0.742

Discriminant validity is assessed using the heterotrait-monotrait (HTMT) ratio. Values
above either 0.85 for more distinct measures or 0.90 for less distinct measures are suggested as
limits. As this is a theoretical model using related reflexive factors, 0.9 would be considered a
targeted limit acceptable, and 0.85 is the preferred limit. All values are below 0.85. A summary
of these targeted values and values for the structural model addressed next is shown in Table 26.
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Table 26 Discriminant Validity HTMT Ratios

ERFRE
Q
FEED
HAND
OFF
MGMT
NONPU
N
ORGLR
N
OVERA
LL
STAFF
SUPV
TEAM
AC
TEAMI
N

COMM
UN
0.385

ERFR
EQ

0.856

0.533

0.451

0.454

0.552

0.407

0.451

0.392

0.539

0.393

0.553

0.368

0.377

0.400

0.594

0.305

0.460

0.520

0.363

0.353

FEE
D

0.40
5
0.49
4
0.51
5
0.50
1
0.48
0
0.52
6
0.52
4
0.56
8
0.53
1

HAND
OFF

MG
MT

NONP
UN

ORGL
RN

OVER
ALL

STA
FF

SUP
V

TEAM
AC

0.768
0.319

0.350

0.446

0.538

0.568

0.469

0.560

0.640

0.859

0.360

0.377

0.793

0.561

0.750

0.382

0.497

0.448

0.568

0.569

0.826

0.818

0.472

0.424

0.441

0.222

0.298

0.643

0.561

0.515

0.42
1
0.51
9
0.70
0

0.39
8
0.38
5

0.486

4.5.2 Measurement Model Analysis of Higher Order Construct
The higher-order construct is also validated as part of the measurement model
assessment. The high construct was assessed by: internal consistency reliability, convergent
validity, and discriminant validity. The results for reliability and validity of the higher-order
constructs show that both reliability and validity were established. The reliability and convergent
validity for the constructs are established as the value for Cronbach’s alpha, ρA, and composite
reliability, with targets above 0.7 (Hair et al., 2019), and the Convergent validity is measured
using the average variance extracted where AVE is greater than 0.50 (Table 27). Further to the
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assessment of reliability and validity, discriminant validity of the higher-order constructs with the
lower-order constructs is also assessed using the HTMT where is lower than 0. 90 Table 28.
Table 27 Internal Reliability and Convergent Validity Statistics
rho_A

ERFREQ

Cronbach's
Alpha
0.947

0.947

Composite
Reliability
0.966

Average Variance
Extracted (AVE)
0.905

OVERALL

0.779

0.782

0.858

0.602

PSC

0.885

0.887

0.907

0.493

Table 28 Discriminant Validity HTMT Ratios
ERFREQ
OVERALL

0.368

PSC

0.583

OVERALL
0.815

4.5.3 Structural Model Analysis
Items to assess in the structural model include model fit, effect size, and the statistical
significance of the path coefficients. For model fit, the coefficient of determination or R2 for
endogenous variables should have values of at least 0.75, 0.50, and 0.25, which are considered
substantial, moderate, and weak, while an R2 value (Hair et al., 2019). R2 greater than 0.9
indicates an overfit that includes noise in the model. For this model, the Frequency of events
reported (ERFREQ) and Overall perceptions of patient safety (OVERALL) have weak
determination coefficients, as shown in Table 29. Model fit may also be analyzed using the
standardized root mean square error (SRMR), which measures the Euclidean distance between
the empirical correlation matrix and the model implied matrix model implied. While no cutoff A
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cutoff value of 0.08 is considered reasonable (Henseler et al., 2016). The estimated model had an
SRMR of 0.068.
Table 29 Coefficient of Determination for Endogenous Variables

ERFREQ

R2
0.285

R2 Adjusted
0.285

OVERALL

0.471

0.471

The effect size is measured using the f2 statistic. Cohen (1988) identified effect sizes for
the f2 statistic of at least 0.02 for a small effect, 0.15 for a medium effect, and 0.35 for a large
effect. PSC to the frequency of events reported has a medium effect, and PSC to overall
perceptions of patient safety has a large effect Table 30.
Table 30 Effect Size for Model Paths

PSC

ERFREQ

OVERALL

0.399

0.890

Once the model is developed, model prediction capability can be evaluated using the
blindfolding procedure. Stone-Geisser’s Q2 criterion evaluates the capability of the model to
predict endogenous latent variables. Q2 values greater than zero indicate the model path's
predictive value, while values of less than zero indicate the path does not have a predictive value.
The frequency of events reported (ERFREQ) has a Q2 value of 0.261, and Overall perceptions of
patient safety (OVERALL) has a Q2 value of 0.282, indicating that the exogenous variables have
predictive relevance on the associated endogenous variables. For PLS-SEM, the cross-validated
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redundancy approach to measuring the Q2 value for each endogenous variable is used (Hair et al.,
2011; Shanmugapriya & Subramanian, 2016).
4.4.4 Hypothesis Testing
The selected causal model meets validity assessments for both the measurement and
structural models, as shown in Tables 31-32. All assessments are acceptable.

Table 31 Summary of the Measurement Assessment Results

Indicator
reliability
Internal
consistency
Convergent
validity
Discriminant
validity

Supporting
Literature

Measurement

Target

Model results

Outer loadings

> 0.7 Preferred
> 0.5 Acceptable

40 variables preferred
2 variable acceptable

Hair et al. (2019)

Cronbach’s alpha

> 0.7

All variables > 0.7

Hair et al. (2019)

ρA

> 0.7

All variables > 0.7

Hair et al. (2019)

> 0.7

All variables > 0.7

> 0.5

All variables > 0.5

< 0.85 Preferred
0.85 - 0.90
Acceptable

All variables preferred
except 2 variables
acceptable

Composite
reliability
Average variance
extracted (AVE)
Heterotrait
monotrait ratio
(HTMT)
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Hair et al. (2019)
Hair et al. (2019)
Hair et al. (2019)

Table 32 Summary of the Structural Model Assessment Results

Target

Model results

Supporting
Literature

R

> 0.90 Overfit
> 0.75 Substantial
> 0.50 Moderate
> 0.25 Weak

No variables overfit
No variable substantial
No variable moderate
2 variables weak

Hair et al. (2019)

SRMR

<0.08 Preferred

0.068

Henseler et al.
(2016);
Hair et al. (2019)

Effect size

f2

> 0.02 Small
> 0.15 Medium
> 0.35 Large

Path Coefficient
for direct and
indirect effects

p-value

< 0.05

None
None
2 in range
23 of 24 coefficients in
range
(23 variables ≤ 0.05)

Measurement

Model fit

Model
Prediction
Capability

2

Q

2

All endogenous
variables above 0

>0

Cohen (1988)
Hair et al. (2019);
Hulland (1999)
Hair et al. (2011);
Shanmugapriya &
Subramanian
(2016)

The overall objective of this approach is to identify a significant set of paths in a causal
model that addresses OVERALL and ERFREQ. The structural model with results shown in
Table 33 is significant, with P-values of 0.001 or less for both direct and indirect effects.
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Table 33 Causal Model Path Coefficients and Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesized Path

Sample
Mean
-0.062

Standard
Deviation
0.004

T Statistics

P - Values

RG1 → ERFREQ

Original
Sample
-0.062

14.031

0.000

RG1 → OVERALL

0.068

0.069

0.004

18.016

0.000

RG1 →PSC

-0.090

-0.090

0.005

17.249

0.000

RG2 → ERFREQ

0.054

0.054

0.004

12.575

0.000

RG2 → OVERALL

-0.081

-0.081

0.004

20.893

0.000

RG2 →PSC

0.128

0.128

0.005

24.994

0.000

RG3 → ERFREQ

0.056

0.056

0.004

13.237

0.000

RG3 → OVERALL

-0.053

-0.053

0.004

14.147

0.000

RG3 →PSC

0.152

0.152

0.005

30.491

0.000

RG4 → ERFREQ

0.054

0.054

0.004

12.694

0.000

RG4 → OVERALL

-0.052

-0.052

0.004

13.916

0.000

RG4 → PSC

0.110

0.110

0.005

21.485

0.000

RG5 → ERFREQ

0.063

0.063

0.004

15.188

0.000

RG5 →OVERALL

-0.065

-0.065

0.004

17.830

0.000

RG5 →PSC

0.085

0.085

0.005

17.457

0.000

Teach →ERFREQ

0.008

0.008

0.003

2.312

0.021

Teach →OVERALL

0.004

0.004

0.003

1.587

0.112

Teach →PSC

-0.051

-0.051

0.004

12.945

0.000

PSC → ERFREQ

0.522

0.522

0.004

147.799

0.000

PSC → OVERALL

0.698

0.698

0.003

262.460

0.000

Staff Position → ERFREQ

0.066

0.066

0.003

19.462

0.000

Staff Position → OVERALL

-0.052

-0.052

0.003

17.851

0.000

Staff Position → PSC

0.095

0.095

0.004

24.090

0.000

OVERALL → ERFREQ

-0.079

-0.079

0.005

14.877

0.000

Hypothesis testing for the model is shown in Table 34. The final model is shown in Figure 10.
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Table 34 Hypothesis testing results

Hypotheses

F2

H1a1

RG1 → ERFREQ

0.003

-0.062

H2a1

RG1 → OVERALL

0.005

H3a1

RG1 →PSC

H1a2

Path
Coefficient(β)

P-Value

The result

14.031

0.000

Supported

0.068

18.016

0.000

Supported

0.005

-0.090

17.249

0.000

Supported

RG2 → ERFREQ

0.003

0.054

12.575

0.000

Supported

H2a2

RG2 → OVERALL

0.008

-0.081

20.893

0.000

Supported

H3a2

RG2 →PSC

0.010

0.128

24.994

0.000

Supported

H1a3

RG3 → ERFREQ

0.003

0.056

13.237

0.000

Supported

H2a3

RG3 → OVERALL

0.003

-0.053

14.147

0.000

Supported

H3a3

RG3 →PSC

0.014

0.152

30.491

0.000

Supported

H1a4

RG4 → ERFREQ

0.002

0.054

12.694

0.000

Supported

H2a4

RG4 → OVERALL

0.003

-0.052

13.916

0.000

Supported

H3a4

RG4 → PSC

0.007

0.110

21.485

0.000

Supported

H1a5

RG5 → ERFREQ

0.004

0.063

15.188

0.000

Supported

H2a5

RG5 →OVERALL

0.005

-0.065

17.830

0.000

Supported

H3a5

RG5 →PSC

0.005

0.085

17.457

0.000

Supported

H1b

Teach →ERFREQ

0.000

0.008

2.312

0.021

Supported

H2b

Teach →OVERALL

0.000

0.004

1.587

0.112

Unsupported
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T
Statistic

Path Coefficient(β) T Statistic

Hypotheses

F2

P-Value

The result

H3b

Teach →PSC

0.003

-0.051

12.945

0.000

Supported

H4

PSC → ERFREQ

0.375

0.522

147.799

0.000

Supported

H5

PSC → OVERALL

0.903

0.698

262.460

0.000

Supported

H6

Staff Position →
ERFREQ

0.006

0.066

19.462

0.000

Supported

H7

Staff Position →
OVERALL

0.005

-0.052

17.851

0.000

Supported

H8

Staff Position → PSC 0.009

0.095

24.090

0.000

Supported

H9

OVERALL →
ERFREQ

-0.079

14.877

0.000

Supported

0.005
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Figure 10 Structural Model with t-statistics
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
The main objective of this research is to assess the patient safety culture in U.S. hospitals.
The research has also examined the relationships between patient safety culture, Frequency of
Event Reporting, Overall perceptions of patient safety and the effect of hospital and respondent
characteristics. The discussion of the study outcomes, research implications, limitations,
direction for future research and conclusions will be provided and elaborated on in subsequent
sections.
5.1 Discussion
The overarching purpose of this research was to investigate the extent of the relationships
between the perception of PSC, overall perception of patient safety and frequency on event
reporting, hospital and respondent characteristics among staff and administration in U.S.
hospitals. The results reveal four aspects that underline these relationships.
First, PSC is the shared value among organization members regarding the operations
interaction with work unit and systems, which produce behavioral norms in the organization that
promote safety (Singer et al., 2009). Patient safety culture as a second-order latent factor is
conceptualized by ten main, first-order factors including organizational learning-continuous
improvement, teamwork within hospital units, hospital management support for patient safety,
nonpunitive response to error, staffing, supervisor/manager expectations and actions promoting
safety, teamwork across hospital units, hospital handoffs and transitions, feedback and
communication about error and communication openness.
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The results in this study show that the perception of PSC has a positive influence on
overall perception of patient safety (β = 0.698, t = 262.460, p = 0.000), and frequency of event
reporting (β = 0.522, t = 147.799, p = 0.000). The strong correlations attest to PSC as a higherorder construct is valid and reliable for the model, where HOC has been used to reduce the
number of path model relationships. A hospital with a positive PSC is open and fair with staff
and learn from mistakes rather than blame individuals (Lee et al., 2016; Nieva & Sorra, 2003).
PSC is associated with procedural efficiency, adequate staffing, managerial support for nurses
and good relationships among staff (Olds et al., 2017). In general, successful hospitals and
rapidly transparent health systems will be the ones that apply systematic solutions to enhance
patient safety (Frankel et al., 2008). PSC has a significant impact on safety outcomes, including
reporting frequency and overall perception of patient safety (Dicuccio, 2015; Park & Kim, 2013;
Singer et al., 2009).
Next, as predicted, hospitals characteristics including regions and teaching status both
have a significant influence on PSC, frequency of event reporting and overall perception of
participants. As the results show, they significantly influence the PSC, ERFREQ and overall
perceptions of participants. The staff in U.S. hospitals have high perception in the four of the five
regions except staff in region one (Northeast of U.S.) who have the lowest perception of PSC (β
= -0.090, t = 17.249, p = 0.000), and frequency of event reporting (β = -0.062, t = 14.031, p =
0.000). However, staff hospitals in the Northeast region have a higher perception of overall
perceptions of patient safety than the other regions (β = 0.068, t = 18.016, p = 0.000). These
variations in perception may occur because of the diversity of populations, culture, work
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experience; therefore, each region should be investigated individually. Wagner (2013) found
similar variations in patient safety culture between hospitals in the U.S. and hospitals in the
Netherlands and Taiwan, while Eiras (2014) found differences in perceptions of PSC between
hospitals in northern, central, and southern Portugal.
Furthermore, staff in teaching hospitals have higher perception of frequency of event
reporting than non-teaching staff (β = 0.008, t = 2.312, p = 0.021), and lower perception of PSC
than non-teaching (β = -0.051, t = 12.945, p = 0.000). However, teaching status do not have
influence on staff perception about overall perceptions of patient safety (β = 0.004, t = 1.587, p =
0.112). These variations could appear regarding blaming culture, educational programs and their
availability in health systems. Rather than blaming individuals, a hospital with a positive PSC is
open and fair with staff and learns from it. Güneş et al. (2016) found no relationship between
PSC and hospital type. However, Ammouri et al. (2015) found that nurses who were working in
teaching hospitals had more perception of patient safety culture.
Third, the participants in the research have been divided into medical and non-medical to
get a general understanding of perceiving PSC. The results revealed that medical staff has a
higher perception of frequency of event reporting (β = 0.066, t = 19.462, p = 0.000), and PSC (β
= 0.095, t = 24.090, p = 0.000) than non-medical staff but a lower perception of overall
perceptions of patient safety (β = -0.052, t = 17.851, p = 0.000) than non-medical staff. This
implies that hospital Administrators/Managers differ in their perception of the volume and
efficacy of error reporting as it contributes to the hospital's safety culture. These findings are
consistent with publications that suggest positive safety settings were related to increased
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reporting of medication errors and professionals' willingness to advocate for patient safety
(Dicuccio, 2015; Hansen et al., 2011; Mardon et al., 2010; J. Sorra et al., 2012).
Finally, overall perception of patient safety has a significant negative relationship with
the frequency of event reporting (β = -0.079, t = 14.877, p = 0.000). Many reasons may lead to
this negative relationship, such as self-reported surveys and blaming culture. Therefore, hospital
executives must create cultures where employees learn from their mistakes, which may increase
reporting errors. This finding is consistent with publications that found negative relationships
between overall safety culture and outcomes for patient safety. For example, hospitals with
positive patient safety culture scores had lower rates of in-hospital complications or AE (Mardon
et al., 2010). Also, another study found that a higher level of safety culture was associated with a
lower hospital-acquired pressure ulcer rate (Brown & Wolosin, 2013) and fewer medication or
dislodgement errors (Valentin et al., 2013).
5.2 Study Implications
Findings support those significant differences exist between the perceptions of patient
safety culture within U.S. hospitals. In addition, an understanding of the perception of the patient
safety culture in the U.S. has a wide range of implications for organizational leadership,
healthcare policy and educational systems that support future healthcare professionals.
This study discovered a significant gap between hospital executives' and frontline
workers' perceptions. The safety culture within hospital settings could improve by strengthening
relationships between these professional groups, thereby impacting the quality of care (DiCuccio,
2015).
133

The literature indicated a gap between frontline workers and administration/management.
According to research, organizations with hierarchical managerial systems as their dominant
culture have more negative safety cultures than those with more team-focused governance
systems (Hannah et al., 2008; Prenestini et al., 2015). Risk-taking, innovation, self-awareness,
and ingenuity are essential characteristics of excellent leadership (Burkhart et al., 2008).
Hospital administrators and managers must better understand hospital settings and develop
policies and care practices that support programs such as Team Strategies and Tools to Enhance
Performance and Patient Safety (TeamSTEPPS®) to improve interprofessional practices in order
for hospital safety cultures to improve. TeamSTEPPS® is a set of evidence-based teamwork
tools designed to improve patient outcomes by optimizing interprofessional team functions
(AHRQ, 2017).
According to Townsend (2007), a leader is who " "manifests vision, integrity, and
courage in a consistent pattern of behavior that inspires trust, motivation and responsibility on the
part of followers, who in turn become leaders themselves". Healthcare leaders must create
environments that support effective care while also ensuring the safety of patients, employees,
and visitors (The Joint Commission, 2008). Because certain possible channels may not be
available, a hierarchical structure can reduce communication volume. The exchange of critical
data necessary to improve the safety culture within care facilities is also hampered as the flow of
patient care information is slowed (Hannah et al.,2008; Reason, 2000; Singer et al., 2009; The
Joint Commission, 2008).
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Reason's Swiss Cheese Model/Human Factor Model (1998) assists leaders in improving
care outcomes by identifying latent factors that impede success. Given the disparity between
frontline professionals and hospital leadership, it is necessary to alter how these two groups
interact. Although it is difficult to change the human condition, organizations can change the
conditions under which humans work (Reason, 1990). The emphasis in HROs is on minimizing
variability and its consequences. In order to do so, hospital employees must be given the ability
to speak up and report errors (Reason, 2000).
Leadership must promote just cultures that operate within cultures that value event
reporting to create a culture that learns from its errors (Sorra and Nieva, 2004). Employees who
work in a just culture are rewarded and encouraged to report errors in nonpunitive work
environments with monetary incentives (Reason, 2000). Previous research has found that in
punitive cultures where feedback about change is not addressed, hospital staff are hesitant to
report an error (Alligood and Burhans, 2010; Sorra & Nieva, 2004; The Joint Commission,
2008). Hospitals have a habit of penalizing employees for minor incidents while failing to
implement procedures for those responsible for serious errors (Chassin and Loeb, 2013).
For hospital cultures to improve, the practice of blaming individuals within the care
environment must be abandoned (Landro, 2010; Feldman, 2018; Hicks et al., 2017). Hospital
executives must succeed in creating cultures where employees learn from their mistakes,
explaining why hospital employees lack trust (Chassin and Loeb, 2013). More research is needed
to support leaders in developing nonpunitive learning environments that promote safety cultures.
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Learning cultures in nonpunitive environments were linked to more AEs being reported.
According to the literature, fear of retaliation has been found to deter error reporting and
undermine the safety culture in hospitals around the world (The Joint Commission, 2008; Leape,
2009; World Health Organization, 2010).
The findings of this study back up the idea that event reporting will increase in
nonpunitive cultures where individuals can learn from their mistakes and where communication
within their units is open. In Higher reliability organizations (HROs), feeling safe to report an
error in a nonpunitive work environment is essential. HROs were the first to recognize errors
through effective communication and teamwork, allowing staff at all levels of care to make a
contribution to the identification of factors that may contribute to patient harm (Page, 2004;
Berwick et al., 2015). This research supports the need for continued efforts to improve
communication between professional groups in nonpunitive care settings, using programs such as
TeamSTEPPS®.
The World Health Organization and its partners recognize the need for innovative
educational strategies in interprofessional collaboration (World Health Organization: Health
Workforce, 2010). Healthcare leaders have demonstrated a willingness to contextualize, commit
to, and champion interprofessional education by implementing new learning strategies that
improve attitudes and interpersonal skills related to teamwork and collaboration (Parsell & Bligh,
1999; World Health Organization: Health workforce, 2010; Vandergoot et al., 2017;).
This research has implications for academic institutions in the U.S. According to this
study, the disparities in perceptions of safety culture among medical and non-medical staff in
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hospital settings highlighted the need for interprofessional education to prepare a "collaborative
practiced ready" workforce (World Health Organization, 2010). The health workforce must be
better prepared for collaborative practices to develop. Some of the flaws identified in this study
could be addressed through educational programs that focus on improving collaborative practices
while reducing punitive practices.
The World Health Organization (World Health Organization, 2010) and its partners
recognize that innovative educational strategies are needed in interprofessional collaboration.
Healthcare leaders carry a willingness to contextualize, commit and champion interprofessional
education through new learning strategies that improve attitudes and interpersonal skills
regarding teamwork and collaboration (Parsell and Bligh, 1999; Vandergoot et al., 2018; World
Health Organization, 2010). Interprofessional learning occurs when "two or more professions
learn with, from and about each other to improve collaboration and care quality" (Vandergoot et
al., 2018; Goldman, 2011). Practitioners from various backgrounds who are trained to collaborate
with patients, families, careers, and communities to provide excellent care are needed in the
workforce (Reed et al., 2017; World Health Organization, 2010).
As a result, integrated health and education policies will encourage such effective
educational practices and shape effective health worker culture and attitudes (World Health
Organization, 2010). Evidence-based frameworks, including TeamSTEPPS®, have the potential
to transform organizational cultures within medical and nursing academic institutions through
Interprofessional Learning, increasing their understanding of their specific professional roles for
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team-based care that can be applied in the practice setting (Reilly et al., 2014; Thomas & Galla,
2013; Reed et al., 2017).
5.3 Study Limitations
The study design included several limitations due to the inherent limitations of using
secondary data. This was a cross-sectional study that provided a snapshot of safety culture
perceptions (Hulley et al., 2013). This was a convenience sample of hospitals who chose to
participate in the database on their own initiative (Hulley et al., 2013). According to AHRQ's
requirements, only hospitals that independently administered the survey were included in the
database.
Another limitation was the manner in which the surveys were conducted. There was no way
to verify that each hospital followed AHRQ's data collection procedures because investigators
overseeing survey distribution were not required to undergo any training. Although hospital
officials were required to follow specific administrative guidelines, there was no way of ensuring
compliance.
Moreover, the surveys were administered using various methods, which would be another
limitation. Hospitals used paper surveys, Web-based surveys, and a combination of the two, resulting in
a wide range of responses (Famolaro et al., 2018). Some hospitals conducted a general census, while
others surveyed specific populations within the facility. The Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality required hospitals with fewer than 500 physicians and staff to conduct a census survey, and the
methods used by each hospital are not publicly available (Famolaro et al., 2018). As a result, there is no
way to tell if these data collection methods impacted the study's findings.
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Another weakness is that the AHRQs 2018 database provided by Westat® may have been
incomplete, inaccurate, or measured in ways that were not optimal for addressing the study's
research goals. There were limitations to measuring and recording such important variables
(Hulley et al., 2013). Westat® did provide a detailed description of the data cleaning procedures.
Furthermore, this study was limited to hospitals in the U.S. and may not be applicable to
healthcare systems in other countries. Because hospitals tend to be country-specific, public
policymakers and markets may have different effects and influences in different countries.

The final limitation is the overall perception of patient safety and frequency of event
reporting were only survey items. The overall perception of patient safety and frequency of event
reporting were measured only based on the respondents' perception as an estimate of reporting
rather than actual measures. In addition to the overall perception of patient safety and frequency
of event reporting, the number of events reported was a survey item rather than a true measure.
5.4 Future Research
On a national level, this study investigated the relationships between PSC perception, the
overall perception of patient safety, and frequency of event reporting, hospital and respondent
characteristics among staff and administration in U.S. hospitals. This study revealed that the
perception of PSC had a positive influence on the overall perception of patient safety and the
frequency of event reporting. Furthermore, the findings revealed that hospital and respondent
characteristics had varying effects on patient safety culture, the overall perception of patient
safety, and the frequency of event reporting. Additional research is needed to determine the
nuances surrounding this varying.
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The location of hospitals has a significant influence on PSC, frequency of event reporting
and overall perception of participants. As the results show, the staff in U.S. hospitals had high
perceptions in four of the five regions. Only the staff in hospitals in the Northeast region had low
perception of PSC (β = -0.090, p = 0.000) and ERFREQ (β = -0.062, p = 0.000). However, staff
in the Northeast region had higher overall perceptions of patient safety (β = 0.068, p = 0.000)
than the staff in other U.S. hospitals. The hospitals in the northeast of the U.S. need to be
investigated to discover the differentiate of PSC and frequency of event reporting of the staff's
perception than other regions.
There is a need for research to develop, implement, and test strategies to improve the safety culture
in hospitals and specialty units. A combination of qualitative and quantitative designs would be used to
investigate the many factors that underpin cultural values and the deeper social assumptions that underpin
this study's descriptive findings (Sorra and Dyer, 2010; Vlayen et al., 2015). Even though many studies
support evidence-based clinical practices that validate better quality care in controlled environments,
translating these findings into practice has proven difficult due to the many variables that influence
organizational culture and the multifactorial attributes (Woods et al., 2005; Burkhart et al., 2016). Secondary
data analysis of objective data from safety culture questionnaires and electronic health records allows for the
evaluation of quality indicators over time and identifying the impact that innovations may have, regardless
of organizational or patient-related variables.(Burkhart et al., 2016; Larrison et al., 2018).
Qualitative approaches involving observations, focus groups, and interviews should be initiated in
addition to quantitative studies (Leonard et al., 2012; Burkhart and Vlasses, 2017). Burkhart and Vlasses
(2017) evaluated nurse-led, patient-centered, interprofessional teams that collaborated to understand the
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needs of a previously underserved population. The photovoice method was used in this qualitative
participatory action research (PAR), which revealed deeper values and challenges of patient participants and
congruence between patient and provider perspectives. The PAR that assesses professionals'
perspectives on practice environments and how hospital leadership supports their efforts would
add to the body of knowledge in safety culture and healthcare system redesign (Burkhart &
Vlasses, 2017).
Due to the high risks and the effect of Covid-19, there are inherent stressors in a hospital
setting. Long work hours, intense physical and psychological activities and routines, coordinating
with various hospital staff, and serving as guardians of patients during treatment are all part of the job
description in hospitals. The numerous tasks can exacerbate the stress level. Nonetheless, the impact
of various types of job-related stress on employee perceptions of patient safety culture is unknown.
As a result, the impact of work-related stress (e.g., stress from interpersonal relationships, nursepatient relationships, work environment, and workload) must be investigated.
5.5 Conclusion
Patient safety is based on continuous learning because there is a significant need to report
and learn from errors, accidents, near misses, and adverse events in order to prevent them in the
future. As the healthcare system becomes complex, the traditional approach to patient safety,
which is based on establishing mortality committees and scrutinizing accidents, can no longer be
effective. Major health organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the
National Patient Safety Foundation (NPSF), the Joint Commission International (JCI), and the
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Institute for Health Care Improvement (IHI) are encouraged healthcare organizations to adopt a
safety culture as an effective strategy for long-term improvement (Elmontsri et al. 2017).
A growing body of evidence revealed that the rate of medical errors and adverse events
are linked to healthcare professionals' attitudes toward safety. In this regard, patient safety
culture, which is considered a component of organizational culture, refers to employees' shared
beliefs, attitudes, values, norms, and behavioral characteristics, which will influence staff
members' attitudes and behaviors regarding their organization's ongoing organization patient
safety performance. Over the last decade, frameworks, surveys, and assessment tools have been
developed to help organizations measure and understand what type of culture they have and
identify areas of strength and gaps so that factors that could help or hinder improvement efforts
can be identified.
The present research evaluated patient safety culture in U.S. hospitals and investigated
the effect of hospital and respondents' characteristics on perceiving patient safety culture. A total
of 67,010 respondents from the Agency for Health care Research and Quality (AHRQ) 2018
comparative database was analyzed using partial least squares structural equation modeling
(PLS-SEM). The results in this study showed that the perception of PSC positively influenced the
overall perception of patient safety and frequency of event reporting. Moreover, the results
revealed that hospital and respondents' characteristics which included the (Staff Position,
Teaching Status and Geographic Region), had varying influenceS on patient safety culture, on
the overall perception of patient safety and frequency of event reporting.
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To establish hospital safety cultures in the United States, all levels of the care team must
understand and work within common ethical frameworks to ensure that the best care is provided
consistently to all people at all levels of care. This research can inform initiatives to guide nursing and
interprofessional education, practice, policy, and research toward the goal of improving healthcare by
identifying gaps in hospital safety culture.
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APPENDIX A: HOSPITAL SURVEY ON PATIENT SAFETY CULTURE (HSPSC)
DIMENSIONS AND ITEMS/QUESTIONS
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Dimensions

HSPSC Items/Questions

Organizational Learning-Continuous Improvement

We are actively improving patient safety Mistakes
have led to positive changes here After we make
changes to improve patient safety, we evaluate their
effectiveness

Teamwork Within Hospital Units

People support one another in this unit
When a lot of work needs to be done quickly, we work
together as a team to get the work done
In this unit, people treat each other with respect
When one area in the unit gets busy, others help out

Hospital Management Support for Patient Safety

Hospital management provides a work climate that
promotes patient safety
The actions of hospital management show that patient
safety is a top priority
Hospital management seems interested in patient safety
only after an adverse event happens (R)

Nonpunitive Response to Error

Staff feel their mistakes are held against them (R)
When an event is reported, it feels like the person is
being written up, not the problem (R)
Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their
personnel file (R)

Staffing

We have enough staff to handle the workload Staff in
this unit work longer hours than is best for patient care
(R)
We use more agency/temporary staff than is best for
patient care (R)
We work in "crisis mode" trying to do too much, too
quickly (R)

Supervisor/Manager Expectations and Actions
Promoting Safety

My supervisor/manager says a good word when he/she
sees a job done according to established patient safety
procedures
My supervisor/manager seriously considers staff
suggestions for improving patient safety Whenever
pressure builds up, my supervisor/manager wants us to
work faster, even if it means taking shortcuts (R) My
supervisor/manager overlooks patient safety problems
that happen over and over (R)

Teamwork Across Hospital Units

Hospital units don’t coordinate with each other (R)
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There is good cooperation among hospital units that
need to work together (R)
It is often unpleasant to work with staff from other
hospital units
Hospital units work well together to provide the best
care for patients (R)
Hospital Handoffs and Transitions

Things “fall between the cracks” when transferring
patients from one unit to another (R)
Important patient care information is often lost during
shift changes (R)
Problems often occur in the exchange of information
across hospital units (R)
Shift changes are problematic for patients in this
hospital (R)

Feedback and Communication About Error

We are given feedback about changes put into place
based on event reports
We are informed about errors that happen in this unit
In this unit, we discuss ways to prevent errors from
happening again

Communication Openness

Staff will freely speak up if they see something that
may negatively affect patient care
Staff feel free to question the decisions or actions of
those with more authority
Staff are afraid to ask questions when something does
not seem right (R)

Frequency of Event Reporting

How often is a mistake reported that was corrected
before affecting patients?
When a mistake is made, but has no potential to harm
the patient, how often is this reported? When a mistake
is made that could harm the patient, but does not, how
often is this reported?

Overall Perceptions of Safety

It is just by chance that more serious mistakes don’t
happen around here (R)
Patient safety isn’t sacrificed for productivity We have
patient safety problems in this unit (R) Our procedures
and systems prevent errors

(R) denotes reverse coding; (Sorra & Nieva, 2004; Blegen et al.,2009)
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APPENDIX B: HOSPITAL SURVEY ON PATIENT SAFETY CULTURE: SAMPLE
SURVEY
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APPENDIX C: ARTICLES INCLUDED IN THE LITERATURE REVIEW
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Articles included in the literature review

Instrument/Country/Reference

Aim(s)

Strength(s)
•

HSPSC, Saudi Arabia,
(Alshammari et al., 2019)

Investigate the perceptions of
healthcare professionals toward PSC in
hospitals throughout the Hail region

•

Limitation(s)

Variety of healthcare professionals
(nurses, physicians, and
administrators/managers) considered for Only four hospitals considered for
collecting data.
data collection.
Response rate among participants was
99.22%

Finding(s)
•
•
•
•
•
•

HSPSC, Saudi Arabia,
(Aljabri, 2012)

Identify general strengths and
recognize areas of patient safety
improvements

•

Variety of clinical and medical staff
(physicians, nurses, technicians,
pharmacists, and others) considered.

Response rate among participants
was 61%.
Only two general hospitals
considered

•
•
•
•
•

HSPSC, Turkey,
(Güneş et al., 2016)

Explore and describe nurses’
perceptions of PSC

•
•

Only nurses in four hospitals (one
Response rate among participants 74%. university hospital and three
HSPSC Turkish version used.
general hospitals), and nurses
consiered for collecting data

•
•
•
•
•
•

•
HSPSC, Egypt,
(Abdelhai et al., 2012)

Assess PSC perceptions among
healthcare providers and identify
factors that may critically affect PSC

•

Variety of healthcare professionals
(doctors, nurses, and technicians)
considered
HSPSC Arabic version used.

•
No response rate reported

•
•
•
•
•

HSPSC, Saudi Arabia,
(Aboshaiqah and Baker, 2013)

Identify factors that nurses perceive as
contributing to the PSC

•

Response rate was 83%.

Only Nurses in one Tertiary care
hospital
considered for collecting data.

•
•

HSPSC, Egypt,
(Aboul-Fotouh et al., 2012)

Assess healthcare providers’
perceptions of PSC within the
organization and determine factors that
play a role in PSC

•

•

Variety of healthcare professionals
(physicians, nurses, pharmacists,
technicians, and staff) considered.

•
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Quality
Score

Healthcare professionals have a positive perception of patient safety.
Organizational learning was the strongest area in PSC.
Professionals with a greater number of employment years were more willing to
communicate.
Among respondents, 63.53% stated that they had never reported a case of patient
safety.
The low rate of reported cases was attributed to fear of the cases being recorded
in the respondent’s file.

32

Organizational learning/continuous improvement and teamwork within units
received positive outcomes at 79% and 77%, respectively.
Non-punitive responses to errors and staffing had low positive response rates at
22% and 31%, respectively, representing areas for improvement.
The overall percentage of positive responses among dimensions of patient safety
was 58%.

27

The mean positive response rate for the 12 PSC dimensions of the HSPSC survey
was 52%.
Within units and organizational learning/continuous improvement were reported.
Non-punitive responses to errors and frequency of event reporting were areas for
improvement.
Nurses who had worked for more than 10 years in their profession showed
significantly higher PSC scores in all dimensions.
Nurses working in ICUs had higher scores than those working in other units in
all patient safety dimensions.
50.2% of the nurses rated the level of patient safety as good or excellent.
Among nurses, 80.4% indicated that they had never reported an error.
The overall perception of patient safety was 51%.

27

An average of 52% was attained for positive responses for the 12 PSC
dimensions of the HSPSC survey.
Non-punitive responses to errors had 24.2% while frequency of event reporting
and staffing were 28.4% and 38.4%, respectively.
Poor teamwork across units was identified as having a low response of 48.8%.
Areas for improvement included organizational learning, handoffs and
transitions, communication, and support from management.
Patients started reporting errors after being educated, demonstrating the
accusatory culture.

27

Continuous organization learning and management support formed the best areas
for the support of patient safety.
Other variables such as reporting errors, staffing, and communication required
improvement for better patient safety.
Respondent variables such as gender, level of education, age, years of
experience, length of shifts, and Arabic versus non-Arabic language created a
variance in patient safety consideration.
Among the nurses interviewed, patient safety was rated as good or excellent.

28

Dimensions with the highest scores included continuous learning and teamwork,
reported at 78.2% and 58.1%, respectively.
Non-punitive responses to errors had the lowest score of 19.5%, representing a
dimension that requires improvement.

29

HSPSC, Iran,
(Moussavi et al., 2013)

Assess the PSC at Islamic Azad
University hospitals

•

Response rate was 69.1% HSPSC Arabic
version used.

•
•

Adverse event reporting and recording was reported at 33.4%.
The hospital is a training institution, exhibiting a bias for continuous learning and
low error reporting, as errors are recorded in files.

•

Variety of clinical and diagnostic staff
(physicians, nurses, midwives, assistants,
staff, and radiologists) considered.
Response rate was 87.5%. HSPSC
Persian version used.

•

Teamwork within units scored 48% while non-punitive error responses scored
12%.
Areas identified for improvement included staffing and non-punitive responses to
errors.
Among respondents, 35% had a positive view of patient safety.

24

Dimensions with the highest scores were teamwork within units, organizational
learning/continuous improvement, and supervisor/manager expectations and
actions promoting patient safety at 71%, 62%, and 56%, respectively.
Non-punitive response to errors, frequency of reporting, communication,
management support, and staffing had low scores at 17%, 35%, 36%, 37%, and
38%, respectively.
Among respondents, 53.2% had not reported any errors in the past year.
General patient safety was ranked as excellent or very good by 63.5% of the
respondents.

25

General patient safety was rated as very good by 60%, acceptable by 33%, and
poor by 7% of the respondents.
Composites that showed strength included continuous improvement, feedback,
teamwork within units, and feedback and communication about errors.
Staffing, under-reporting of errors, non-punitive response to errors, and
teamwork across hospital units had low scores.

31

Feedback and communication about errors had high scores, ranging from 40.7%–
71.3%.
Leadership, communication openness, error reporting, and teamwork across units
represented areas requiring improvement.

25

Continuous improvement, teamwork within units, management support for
patient safety, feedback and communication about errors, and
supervisor/manager expectations and actions promoting patient safety were
highly scored among the respondents.
General perception of patient safety was scored at 60.6% while frequency of
events reported was scored at 59.0%.

33

•
•

A score of 45% was recorded for overall perceptions of patient safety.
The frequency of reporting events was 57%.

30

•

Teamwork within units and organizational learning/continuous improvement
were strong areas while staffing and non-punitive responses to errors required
improvement.
A high level of correlation was observed among feedback, managerial support,
organizational learning, and improved patient safety.
Improvements in dimensions of patient safety from 2012 to 2015 indicated an
improvement in performance.
Overall perceptions of patient safety were reported at 59.5%.
The frequency of reporting events was 68.8%.

33

•

•
•
•

•
HSPSC, Palestine,
(Hamdan and Saleem, 2013)

Assess the prevalent PSC in Palestinian
public hospitals

•

HSPSC, Saudi Arabia,
(Alahmadi, 2010)

Evaluate the extent to which the
culture supports patient safety at
Saudi hospitals

•
HSPSC, Saudi Arabia,
(El-Sayed Desouky et al., 2019)

Evaluate the PSC in Saudi hospitals
and
improve patient safety and quality of
care by implementing safety systems
and creating a culture of safety
•

HSPSC, Kuwait,
(Ali et al., 2018)

Examine the association between the
predictors and outcomes of PSC

HSPSC, Saudi Arabia,
(Al-Awa et al., 2012)

Perform an unbiased assessment of the
impact of accreditation on PSC

HSPSC, Saudi Arabia,
(Alswat et al., 2017)

Reassess PSC in a large multi-site
healthcare
facility in Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, and compare it with an earlier
assessment conducted in 2012,
benchmarked against regional and
international studies

Variety of clinical and non-clinical
hospital staff (physicians, nurses,
paramedical and support services,
Response rate was 51.2%
hospital managers, and supervisors)
considered. HSPSC Arabic version used.

Variety of health professionals (nurses;
physicians/physicians in training;
pharmacists; dieticians; unit
assistants/clerks/secretaries; respiratory
therapists; physical, occupational, or
speech therapists; technicians [lab,
radiology] administration/management)
in 13 general hospitals (9 public and 4
private) considered.

•

Variety of health professionals
(physicians, registered nurses, other
clinical or non-clinical staff,
pharmacists, laboratory technicians,
dietary department staff, radiologists,
and administrative staff such as
managers and supervisors) considered.
The results comparied with U.S.

•

•
•

Variety of employees (physicians,
nurses, pharmacy and laboratory staff,
dietary and radiology staff, supervisors, Response rate was 60.5%
and hospital managers) in 16 public
hospitals considered
Response rate was 69.5%.
HSPSC Arabic version used

•
•

•

Variety of hospital workers (physicians;
nurses; pharmacists; dieticians; unit
assistants/clerks/secretaries; respiratory
therapists; physical, occupational, and Only one Tertiary hospital
speech therapists; technicians [e.g.,lab, considered
radiology], administration/management)
considered

•
•

•

Only nurses in one university
hospital
considered for collecting data

Only one Tertiary care teaching
hospital considered.
Response rate was 56.7%

•
•

•

•

•
•
•
•
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HSPSC, Iran,
(Bahrami et al., 2014)

HSPSC, Jordan,
(Khater et al., 2015)

Assess the safety culture in two
educational hospitals

•

•
•

Response rate was 88.8%.
HSPSC Persian version used.

•
•

Response rate was 82.2%.
21 hospitals (2 university hospitals, 4
private hospitals, and 15 governmental
hospitals) considered.
HSPSC Arabic version used.

Assess PSC in Jordanian hospitals
from nurses’ perspectives
•

Only nurses in two teaching
hospitals considered

Non-punitive response to errors, frequency of events reported, and staffing had
the lowest positive scores of patient safety dimensions.
Among nurses from Afshar and Firoozgar Hospitals, 29% reported positive
perceptions of patient safety.

29

A high positive response was reported for teamwork within units while
teamwork across units, handoffs and transitions, communication openness, and
non-punitive response to errors needed improvement.
Nurses in government hospitals had lower perceptions of patient safety compared
with nurses in university hospitals.
Overall perceptions of patient safety were reported at 60.07%.
Frequency of events reported was 69.15%.

34

Job satisfaction and perception of management were the top variables affecting
patient safety.
Variables such as age, nursing position, working hours, and work experience
created a variance in PSC perception.
Front-line clinicians had a less positive attitude towards patients when compared
with nurse managers.
The longer the working experience, the higher the likelihood of having a positive
attitude towards patient safety
Nurses who worked the minimum weekly hours and who were 35 years or older
had better attitudes towards all patient safety dimensions except for stress
recognition.

33

33

•
•

Feedback and communication about errors, continuous learning, and teamwork
within units received high positive scores.
Staffing, non-punitive response to errors, and management support attained low
positive scores among the respondents.
An increased number of years of experience combined with working in a
teaching hospital increased the perception of PSC.
The rate of positive perceptions of safety was 50.7% among respondents.
Frequency of events reported stood at 58.8%.

•
•
•
•
•
•

Organizational learning/continuous improvement had the highest positive score.
Non-punitive response to errors was poorly rated among respondents.
Response rates in Oman, Taiwan, the U.S., and Lebanon were similar.
The overall average positive response rate was 58%.
Overall perception of patient safety was 53%.
Frequency of event reporting was 65%.

33

•

Highly scored dimensions included teamwork within units and organizational
learning/continuous improvement.
Non-punitive response to errors and staffing were the lowest positively scored
dimensions.
Overall perception of safety was 56.56%.
Frequency of events reported was 42.85%.

29

Organizational learning/continuous improvement had the highest positive score.
Frequency of events reported, staffing, and non-punitive response to errors had
the lowest scores of PSC dimensions.
Overall perceptions of safety were 66.22% for the Afshar hospital and 59.5% for
the Firouzgar hospital
The frequency of events reported was 34.90% for the Afshar hospital and
50.17% for the Firouzgar hospital.

21

•
•

Only nurses considered

•
•
•
•
•

SAQ, Palestine,
(Elsous et al., 2017)

Assess the perception of nurses
regarding PSC and determine whether
it is significantly affected by the
nurses’ position, age, experience, and
working hours

•
•

Response rate was 91.9%.
SAQ Arabic version used

•
Only nurses in four public general
hospitals considered

•
•

•

HSPSC, Oman,
(Ammouri et al., 2015)

Investigate nurses’ perceptions of PSC
and identify the factors needed to
develop and maintain a culture of
safety among
nurses

•
•

•
HSPSC, Oman,
(Al-Mandhari et al., 2014)

Illustrate the PSC in Oman and
compare the average positive response
rates in PSC between Oman and the
U.S., Taiwan, and Lebanon

•
•

HSPSC, Iran,
(Davoodi et al., 2013)

Only nurses in four governmental
hospitals considered.
No Response rate reported.

Estimate the relation between PSC and
three characteristics of teaching
hospitals (number of beds, education
condition, and proficiency status)
•

Variety of health professionals (nurses,
physicians, technicians, pharmacists,
Only five secondary and tertiary
physiotherapists, and dieticians)
care hospitals considered.
considered.
The results compared with U.S., Taiwan, No Response rate reported.
and Lebanon
Variety of staff (nurses, physicians,
laboratory staff, radiology staff,
midwives, operation room staff, and
general managers without any specialty
in therapeutic procedures) in 25 hospitals
(11 teaching hospitals and 14 nonteaching hospitals) considered.
Response rate was 76.8%

•

•
•
•
•
•

HSPSC, Iran,
(Bahrami et al., 2013)

Assess nurses’
perceptions of PSC in these hospitals

•

Response rate was 83.7%

Only nurses in two teaching
hospitals
considered
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•
•

HSPSC, Saudi Arabia,
(El-Jardali et al., 2014)

Present findings of a baseline
assessment of PSC, compare results
with regional and
international studies, and explore the
association between PSC predictors
and outcomes, considering respondent
characteristics
and facility size

•

•
•

Variety of staff (physicians, nurses,
clinical and non-clinical staff, pharmacy
and laboratory staff, dietary and
radiology staff, supervisors, and hospital Only one tertiary care university
managers) considered.
teaching hospital considered
Response rate 85.7% reported.
The results compared with other studies
using HSPSC Arabic version

•

Teamwork within units and organizational learning/continuous improvement had
high positive responses.
Staffing, non-punitive response to errors, and communication openness required
improvement.
A high correlation was indicated between smaller facilities, events reported, and
patient safety levels.
Overall perception of safety was 65.3%.
Frequency of events reported was 59.4%.

34

30

•
•

High positive scores for hospital management support and manager/supervisor
expectations and actions supported an increase in patient safety.
Frequency of event reporting for medical errors had the lowest positive score.
Organizational learning/continuous improvement, hospital management support
for patient safety, teamwork within units, and supervisor/manager received high
positive scores.
Hospital handoffs and transitions, non-punitive response to errors, frequency of
events reported, and communication openness were poorly rated.
Overall perception of safety was 61%.
Frequency of events reported was 40%.

•
•
•
•

Organizational learning was reported as the strongest dimension.
Handoffs and transitions had the lowest score.
Overall perception of safety was 62.93%.
Frequency of event reporting was 55.63%.

21

•
•
•

Teamwork within units had the highest positive feedback.
Frequency of events reported had the lowest average.
Women nurses formed the majority of respondents, with five years or less in
terms of work experience in their respective hospital.
Overall perception of patient safety was 55%.
Frequency of events reported was 25%.

21

Organizational learning/continuous improvement, hospital management support
for patient safety, and teamwork within units were the strongest areas.
Non-punitive response to errors and staffing received low feedback.
Small hospitals and accredited hospitals received higher scores on several
composites.
Overall perception of safety was 72.5%.
Frequency of events reported was 67.9%.

31

Patient safety levels declined and number of events reported increased as
working hours increased
Among the 12 sub-dimensions of PSC, teamwork within units and staffing
received poor ratings

29

The U.S. had the highest overall positive perception of patient safety grade.
Continuous improvement in Japan and the reporting of near-miss events in
Taiwan received low scores compared with the other countries.
Overall perceptions of patient safety in Japan, the U.S., and Taiwan were 53%,
63%, and 52%, respectively.
Frequency of events reported in Japan, the U.S., and Taiwan was 68%, 61%, and
33%, respectively.

30

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

HSPSC, Turkey,
(Top and Tekingündüz, 2015)

Investigate nurses’ perceptions of PSC

•

•
HSPSC, Iran,
(Kiaei et al., 2016)

Evaluate the current status of PSC
among hospitals in three central Iran
provinces
•

HSPSC, Turkey,
(Ugurluoglu et al., 2012)

Assess health personnel perspectives of
PSC in a 900-bed university hospital in
Ankara, Turkey

•

HSPSC Turkish version used.

Only nurses in one public hospital
considered for collecting data

Variety of staff (doctors, nurses,
administrative staff, and paramedics) in
No Response rate reported
the teaching hospitals considered for
collecting data.

Variety of health professionals (doctors,
nurses, technicians, secretaries, and other Only one university hospital
considered.
health personnel) considered
Response rate was 43%
Using HSPSC Turkish version.

•

•
•
•

•
HSPSC, Lebanon,
(El-Jardali et al., 2010)

HSPSC, Japan and Taiwan,
(Wu et al., 2013)

Conduct a baseline assessment of PSC
in Lebanese hospitals

Clarify the impact of long nurse
working hours on PSC in Japan, the
U.S., and Chinese Taiwan using
HSPSC

•
•

•
•
•

HSPSC, Japan and Taiwan,
(Fujita et al., 2013)

Investigate the characteristics of PSC
in Japan, Taiwan, and the U.S.

12,250 staff (physicians, nurses, clinical
and non-clinical staff, and others) in 68
hospitals considered.
Response rate was 55.56%
The results compared with U.S.
HSPSC Arabic version used.

14 hospitals in Japan, 884 hospitals in
the U.S., 74 hospitals in Taiwan (acute
care hospitals) considered.
The results compared with U.S.

Only nurses considered for
collecting data.
Response rate was Japan = 4047
(58.1%)
U.S. = 106,710 (37.0%)
Taiwan = 5714 (56.3%)

Variety of health professionals (nurses;
patient care assistants/hospital aides/care
partners; physicians; pharmacists;
dieticians; unit
assistants/clerks/secretaries; respiratory
Response rate in U.S. = 35.2%
therapists; physical, occupational, or
speech therapists; technicians (EKG, lab,
radiology); administration/management)
in 14 hospitals in Japan, 884 hospitals in
the U.S., 74 hospitals in Taiwan (acute
care hospitals)
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•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

SAQ, India,
(Chakravarty et al., 2015)

HSPSC, Sweden,
(Danielsson et al., 2017)

Explore composite patient safety
climate, assess various dimensions of
patient safety climate in
three hospitals, and identify future
directions for developing a strong
safety climate
Investigate the PSC in all Swedish
hospitals; compare the culture among
managers, physicians, registered
nurses, and enrolled
nurses; and identify factors associated
with high overall patient safety

•

The results compared with U.S.

•

Variety of health professionals
(clinicians, postgraduates, residents,
nurses, and paramedical workers)
considered.
Response rate was 100%

•

•

•

HSPSC, Netherlands,
(Wagner et al., 2013)

Examine similarities and differences in
hospital
PSC in three countries: the
Netherlands, the U.S., and Taiwan

•

•
•
Only three tertiary care hospitals
considered

Only three work areas: general
Variety of staff (managers, registered
nurses, enrolled nurses, and physicians) wards, emergency care, and
psychiatry care considered.
considered
Response rate was 47.4%

Variety of staff (nursing staff, medical
staff, management and administrative
staff, other) in 45 hospitals in the
Netherlands, 622 in the U.S., and 74 in
Taiwan (non-teaching and teaching
hospitals) considered.
Comparing the results with U.S., and
Taiwan

U.S. Response rate was 52%

The study hospitals did not have disparities in the patient safety index score.
Different categories of medical workers reported different levels for the
perception of management and stress recognition and teamwork.
A high correlation exists for perception of management and teamwork with the
patient safety index score.

28

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Teamwork within units had the most positive feedback.
Management support for patient safety received the lowest score.
Managers had the highest score for patient safety.
Registered nurses had the lowest score for patient safety.
Emergency care units showed more patient safety than general wards.
Overall perception of patient safety was 58%.
Frequency of events reported was 54.4%.

30

•
•

Handoffs and transitions required improvement in all three countries.
Respondents in U.S. hospitals reported higher levels of PSC than the Taiwanese
and Dutch.
Differences in responses were evident in hospitals in each country.
Overall perceptions of patient safety in the Netherlands, Taiwan, and the U.S.
were 49%, 52%, and 64%, respectively.
Frequency of events reported in the Netherlands, Taiwan, and the U.S. were
36%, 31%, and 60%, respectively.

24

80% of respondents indicated there was no response to reported errors in their
wards.
For respondents that reported errors, an accusatory culture existed in the ward.
70% of respondents reported a lack of support.
Feedback from respondents indicated that error reporting and patient safety
standards were not favorable.

21

The AHRQ’s 12-factor model provides the best fit to the Japanese HSPSC data
for acute care hospital staff compared with two 11-factor models proposed in
previous studies.
The Japanese HSPSC had acceptable internal consistency for the subscales.

31

Organizational learning/continuous improvement and staffing had low positive
feedback.
Confirmatory factor analysis confirmed a good fit to the original U.S. model.
Overall perception of patient safety was 57%.

33

Organizational learning/continuous improvement and teamwork within units had
high positive scores.
Staffing and workload had low scores.
Patient safety overall perception was 81.3%.
Frequency of event reporting was 36.3%.

28

Organizational learning/continuous improvement and teamwork within units had
the highest scores.
Low response rates were evident in perceived trustworthiness of managers, nonpunitive response to errors, managers, organizational safety prioritization,
managers’ safety commitment, and nurses’ years of experience in their units,
which had strong correlations with PSC

30

•

•
•
•
•

HSPSC, Pakistan,
(Jafree et al., 2017)

Present descriptive statistics for patient
safety standards

•

HSPSC, Japan,
(Ito et al., 2011)

Examine the validity
and applicability of the HSPSC in
Japan and compare the factor structure
to the original U.S. study
•

HSPSC, Croatia,
(Brborović et al., 2013)

Determine whether all 12 dimensions
of the U.S. HSPSC are applicable,
valid, and reliable for Croatian
healthcare workers

•
•
•

HSPSC, Sri Lanka,
(Amarapathy et al., 2013)

Only two public hospitals
considered.
Response rate was 38.4%

•

Assess the current PSC in a tertiary
care hospital

Variety of healthcare workers (nurses,
administrative workers, physicians,
technicians, dieticians, pharmacists,
therapists, janitors, other) in 13 acute
care general hospitals (1 university
hospital and 12 teaching hospitals)
considered.
HSPSC Japanese version used.
Considering variety of healthcare
workers (doctors and nurses).
comparing the results with U.S

•
•
•

•
•

Only four Croatian hospitals
considered.
Response rate was 32.69%

Considering variety of healthcare
Considering only one tertiary care
workers (administrators, consultants,
postgraduate trainees, medical officers, hospital.
No Response rate reported
house officers, and nursing officers)

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

HSPSC, China,
(Feng et al., 2012)

Explore nurses’ perceptions of PSC
and factors associated with those
perceptions

•

Considering only nurses in one
university teaching hospital.
No Response ratereported
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•

HSPSC, China,
(Nie et al., 2013)

Explore the attitudes and perceptions
of PSC for healthcare workers in China
and compare the psychometric
properties of an adapted
translation of the HSPSC in Chinese
hospitals with those of the U.S.

•

•
•
•

HSPSC, Slovenia,
(Robida, 2013)

Study the psychometric properties of a
translated version of the HSPSC in a
Slovenian setting

•
•
•

HSPSC, Belgium,
(Hellings et al., 2010)

Describe a PSC improvement approach
in five Belgian hospitals
•
•

HSPSC, Norway,
(Olsen, 2018)

Explore organizational factors
influencing patient safety and safety
behavior among nurses and other
hospital staff

•
•
•

HSPSC, Taiwan,
(Chen and Li, 2010)

Assess the PSC in Taiwan and attempt
to provide an explanation for some of
the phenomena that
are unique in Taiwan

•
•
•

Considering variety of health
professionals (physicians [surgical
clinicians and internal clinicians] and
nurses in 32 hospitals.
Comparing the results with U.S.
HSPSC Chinese version used.

•

Overall percentage of positive responses regarding patient safety culture was
61.3%.

•
•

The staffing dimension had the lowest score.
Organizational learning/continuous development and teamwork within units had
the highest scores.
Overall perception of patient safety was 55%.

30

Units had a greater positive patient safety perception compared with hospital
level.
The dimensions of teamwork across units, hospital management support for
patient safety, staffing, and non-punitive response to errors required
improvement.
Overall perception of safety was 56%.
Frequency of events reported was 69%.

28

•
•
•
•

Hospital management support for patient safety needed the most improvement.
Progress was observed for supervisor expectations and actions promoting safety.
Teamwork within units had the highest scores.
Staffing, non-punitive response to errors, and hospital transfers and transitions
received the lowest scores and did not show signs of improvement.

31

•

Higher values on hospital-level dimensions positively influenced safety
leadership and safety climate at the unit level.
The organizational factors correlate with the dimensions and illustrate structural
relationships that are relevant for variations in the perception of patient safety
and safety behavior.

34

Staffing had the lowest positive feedback.
Teamwork within units had the highest score.
Statistical examination presented differences between the U.S. and Taiwan in the
dimensions of frequency of event reporting, feedback and communication about
errors, and communication openness.
Overall perception of safety was 65%.
Frequency of event reporting was 57%.

35

Overall, the survey items and dimensions are psychometrically sound at the
individual, unit, and hospital levels of analysis and can be used by researchers
and hospitals for assessing PSC.
A strong correlation existed between patient safety grade and overall perceptions
of patient safety and management support for patient safety.
Correlation between frequency of event reporting and non-punitive response to
errors was poor.

33

Staff perception of patient safety climate was positively correlated to
participative leadership, ease of reporting, and unit norms of openness.
Demographic factors such as education level and age influenced perceptions of
patient safety climate.

35

Patient and worker injury measures and workers’ safety behavior had a
significant influence on hospital safety climate scores.

27

•
•

Considering variety of health
professionals (clinical and non-clinical Considering only three acute
staff)
general hospitals.
Comparing the results with other studies Response rate was 55%
HSPSC Slovene version used.
3940 and 3626 staff (nurses, head nurses,
nurse assistants, physicians, head
physicians, junior physicians,
Five Belgian acute hospitals
pharmacists, pharmacy assistants, middle (three private hospitals
management, technicians, paramedical and one public hospital)
staff, other) considered.
Response rates were 77% and 68%.
Considering 3475 health professionals
[nurses (n = 750), other personnel (n =
Considering only one university
953)]
Studying PSC relationships with safety hospital.
Response rate was 49%
behavior.
HSPSC Norwegian version used.

•
•
•

•

•
•
•

Considering 1000 health professionals
(physicians, nurses, and non-clinical
staff) 42 teaching hospitals.
Response rate was 78.8%
Comparing the results with U.S.
HSPSC Chinese version used.

•
•
•

•
HSPSC, U.S.,
(Sorra and Dyer, 2010)

Examine the multilevel psychometric
properties of the survey

MSI-2006, Canada,
(Zaheer et al., 2015)

Examine in detail
how ease of
reporting, unit norms of openness, and
participative leadership influence frontline staff perceptions of PSC within
healthcare organizations

SHSQ, Scotland,
(Agnew and Flin , 2013)

Obtain a measure of hospital safety
climate from a sample of National
Health Service (NHS)

•

•
•
•
•
•

Considering variety of staff (clinical and
non-clinical) in 331 U.S. hospitals.
Examine the validity and reliability of Response rate was 55%
the instruments.

Considering variety of health
professionals (nurses, physicians, and
pharmacists) in 13 hospitals.
Response rate was 17%.
Studying PSC relationships with using
different outcomes.

•
•

•
•

Considering 8113 NHS clinical staff.
Considering only six acute
Examining the validity and reliability of hospitals in Scotland.
Response rate was 23%
the instruments.
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•

acute hospitals in Scotland and
determine whether these scores are
associated with worker safety
behaviors
and patient and worker injuries
HSPSC, Philippines,
(Ramos and Calidgid, 2018)

HSPSC, Italy,
(Bagnasco et al., 2011)

Assess PSC among nurses at a
government hospital

Determine the level of awareness
regarding PSC among health
professionals working at a hospital in
northern Italy

•

•

Response rate was 86.65%.

•

Respondents consisting of five
professional groups
(directors/coordinators, physicians,
Only one hospital in northern
nurses/midwives, physiotherapists, and Italy considered.
technicians).
HSPSC Italian version used.

•
•
•

HSPSC, South Korea
(Cho and Choi, 2018)

HSPSC, Finland,
(Turunen et al., 2013)

Investigate the relationships between
registered nurses’ perceptions of PSC
in their workplace and their patient
safety competency—attitudes, skills,
and knowledge

Explore and compare nurse managers’
s’ and registered nurses views on PSC
to discover whether there are
differences between their views

•

Studying PSC relationships with using
different outcomes.

•

Only nurses in one tertiary
government hospital considered

Response rate was 79.7%.
Studying PSC relationships with using
different outcomes their workplace and
their patient safety competency—
Considering only nurses in in one
attitudes, skills, and knowledge.
university hospital
Using HSPSC Korean version and the
Patient Safety Competency SelfEvaluation (PSCSE)

•
•

Generic safety climate items and patient-specific items had strong impacts on
safety outcome measures.
Overall perception of safety was 56%.
Frequency of incident reporting was 56%.

•
•
•
•

Organizational learning and teamwork within units received the highest scores.
Non-punitive response to errors had the lowest positive feedback.
Overall perception of safety was 50.78%.
Frequency of events reported was 54.12%.

29

•

Teamwork within units and organizational learning/continuous improvement
received the highest scores.
Non-punitive response to errors received the lowest score.
Overall perception of patient safety was 64%.
Frequency of event reporting was 59%.

22

A strong correlation existed between teamwork within units and overall safety
competency.
Attitudes had a strong correlation to teamwork across and within units, and
supervisor or manager expectations.
Skills had a strong correlation to learning and teamwork within units.
Knowledge had a strong correlation to organizational learning.

28

A lack of feedback was evidenced by reporting and communication errors.
Expectations and actions of nurse managers at the unit level supporting patient
safety had the best positive response from both groups of respondents.
Nurse managers at the unit level considered suggestions from staff on how to
improve patient safety.
Feedback from the survey indicated inadequate hospital-level management
support for patient safety.

27

Organizational learning/continuous improvement, teamwork within units, and
supervisor or officer-in-charge expectations received the highest positive
responses while handoffs and transitions, communication openness, and
frequency of event reporting received the lowest scores.
Overall general perception was 60.8%.
Frequency of events reported was 41.2%.
Overall general perception among doctors, nurses, and technical staff was 51.6%,
52.8%, and 66.1%, respectively.
Frequency of events reported among doctors, nurses, and technical staff was
31.5%, 36.7%, and 46%, respectively.

28

Frequency of event reporting, communication openness, staffing, and overall
perception of patient safety needed potential improvement.
Teamwork across units received a high level of positive feedback.
Physicians indicated low scores for the majority of the dimensions.
Overall perception of safety was 45.0%.
Frequency of event reporting was 43.0%.

30

Overall perception of patient safety was positive for most dimensions.
Hospital managers in both China and the U.S. reported a better patient safety
climate than other staff.
Scales of fear of shame and blame had the highest response for hospital workers
in China.
Fear of shame received the lowest feedback among hospital workers in the U.S.

26

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

HSPSC Finnish version used.

Considering only nurses in four
acute care hospitals.
Response rate was 17%

•
•
•

•
HSPSC, India,
(Rajalatchumi et al., 2018)

Assess the perceptions of PSC among
healthcare providers at a public sector
tertiary care hospital in South
India
•

Considering variety of health
professionals (doctors, nurses, other
technical staff, pharmacists, lab
technicians, dialysis technicians,
operation theater technicians, and
dressing technicians).
Response rate was 91.7%

Considering only one tertiary
government hospital

•
•
•
•
•

Use the HSPSC to survey PSC in a
county hospital in Beijing to determine
the strengths and weaknesses of PSC in
this hospital

•

HSPSC, China,
(Zhao et al., 2017)

•

PSCHO, China,
(Zhou et al., 2015)

Describe staff’s perceptions of PSC in
public hospitals and
determine how perceptions of PSC
differ between different types of
workers in the U.S. and
China

•

Considering variety of staff (physicians,
nurses, and allied health professionals). Considering only one county
hospital.
HSPSC Chinese version used.

•
•
•
•
•
•

Considering variety of staff (managers in
administrative offices and clinical
departments, non-management
physicians, non-management nurses, and
others, including medical technicians
and others with non-management

•
•
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positions) in six secondary, general
public hospitals
•
HSPSC, Portugal,
(Eiras et al., 2014)

Determine the validity
and reliability of the AHRQ Hospital
Survey on Patient Safety Culture
(HSPSC) Portuguese version

HSPSC, Jordan,
(Abualrub and Abu Alhijaa,
2014)

Examine the impact of patient safety
educational interventions among senior
nurses on their perceptions of safety
culture and the rate of reported adverse
events, pressure ulcers, and patient
falls

HSPSC, Jordan,
(Saleh et al., 2015)

Examine nurses’ perceptions of the
hospital safety culture in Jordan and
identify the relationships between
aspects of hospital safety culture and
selected safety outcomes

•
•

Considering variety of hospital staff.
HSPSC Portuguese version used.

Response rate was 21.8%

Non-punitive response to errors, management support for patient safety, and
staffing had the lowest positive scores.
Teamwork within units had the highest score.
Overall perception of patient safety was 54%.
Frequency of events reported was 40%.

24

Improvements identified by senior nurses included non-punitive response to
errors and frequency of event reporting.
A reduction in the rate of adverse effects was noted.
Pre-education perceptions of safety stood at 51.5% while the post-education
perception stood at 60.6%.
Frequency of event reporting was 54.2% pre-education and 64.3% posteducation.

34

•
•
•
•

Teamwork within units received the highest response
Staffing and non-punitive response to errors had the lowest scores
Overall perception of patient safety was 43.3%
Frequency of event reporting was 37%

30

•

No differences in positive percentage rates were found between nurses and
doctors across age, gender, or work experience.
Significant differences were noted between front-line staff and leaders.
Individuals within a given unit had varied perceptions compared to units within
the hospital.

26

Staffing, handoffs and transitions, and management support for patient safety
were noted as significant problem areas.
Overall, Dutch-speaking hospitals had more positive perceptions of PSC than
French-speaking hospitals.
Respondents working in rehabilitation, pediatrics, and psychiatry gave more
positive feedback on PSC.
Staffs working in the emergency department, multiple hospital units, and
operating theater had lower positive feedback.

30

Organization learning/continuous learning and teamwork within units had the
highest scores.
Communication openness and staffing had the lowest scores.
Overall patient safety perception was 76.3%.
Frequency of events reported was 56.1%.

25

Interitem consistency reliability was not less than 0.7 for 5 subscales; the least
reliability coefficients were demonstrated by the staffing subscale.
The intraclass correlation coefficients were within normal ranges.
Similar patterns of high and low scores across the subscales of the HSPSC were
noted and compared to the sample from Pacific region hospitals conveyed by the
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality and corresponded to the proportion
of items in each subscale that are reverse scored.
Most of the unit and hospital dimensions revealed a positive relationship with the
Safety Grade outcome measure.

32

•
•
•
•

SAQ, Denmark,
(Kristensen et al., 2015)

•

•

Considering only nurses in five
Jordanian hospitals.
Response rate was 61%

•

Considering variety of staff (doctors,
nurses, nursing assist- ants/similar,
physiotherapists, occupational therapists, Considering only five hospitals
administrative staff, and hospital porters)

Describe and analyze
the patient safety climate in 15 Danish
hospital units
•

HSPSC, Belgium,
(Vlayen et al., 2015)

Studying PSC relationships with using Considering only nurses in one
patient safety educational interventions specialized hospital.
Response rate was 57%

Measure differences in safety culture
perceptions within Belgian acute
hospitals and examine variability based
on language, work area, staff position,
and work experience
•
•

Considering variety of staff (nurses;
patient care assistants/hospital aides/care
partners; physicians; pharmacists;
dieticians; unit
assistants/clerks/secretaries; respiratory
therapists; physical, occupational, or
speech therapists; technicians [EKG, lab, Response rate was 51.7%
radiology], administration/management)
in 89 acute Dutch- and French-speaking
hospitals.
Studying PSC relationships with using
different outcomes
using HSPSC Belgian version

•
•
•

•
•

•
•
•
•

•
HSPSC, Algeria,
(Boughaba et al., 2019)

Measure safety culture
dimensions in order to improve and
promote healthcare in Algeria

•

Considering variety of staff (nursing
Considering only one General
assistants, nurses, doctors, administrative hospital.
staff, other)
No Response rate reported

•
•
•
•

•
HSPSC, U.S.,
(Blegen et al., 2009)

Analyze the psychometric properties of
the Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality Hospital Survey on Patient
Safety Culture (HSPSC)

•
•

Considering variety of staff (included
nurses, physicians, pharmacists, and
other hospital staff members)
Response rate was 96%.
Examining the validity and reliability of
the instruments.

Only three hospitals (an academic
teaching hospital, a managed care
organization hospital, and a
private not-for-profit community
hospital) considered
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•
•

•

Examine the reliability and predictive
validity of two patient safety culture
surveys- Safety Attitudes
Questionnaire (SAQ) and Hospital
HSPSC and SAQ, U.S.,
Survey on Patient Safety Culture
(Etchegaray and Thomas, 2012)
(HSPSC)-when administered to the
same participants. Additionally, to
determine the ability to convert
HSOPS scores to SAQ scores.

•
•
•
•

•
Variety of non-physician employees
considered.
Examining the validity and reliability of
Response rate was 54%.
the instruments
Only non-physician employees
using HSPSC and SAQ.
Considering intensive care units (ICUs) considered.
in 12 hospitals within a large hospital
system in the southern United States

•
•

•

HSPSC, U.S.,
(Mardon et al., 2010)

Examine relationships between the
Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality’s (AHRQ) Hospital Survey of
Patient Safety Culture and rates of inhospital complications and adverse
events as measured by the AHRQ
Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs)

•
•

•
56,480 staff from 179 hospitals
considered.
Studying PSC relationships with using
PSI data.

•
•

•
HSPSC, U.S.,
(Lee et al., 2016)

Analyze how different elements of
patient safety
culture is associated with clinical
handoffs and perceptions of patient
safety

•

•

885 hospitals considered for collecting
data

•

Investigate the existence of a patient
safety chain for
hospitals

•

371 hospitals considered

Response rate was 59.3%.

•

•

SAQ, U.S., UK, and NZ,
(Sexton et al., 2006)

Describe the survey’s background,
psychometric characteristics, provide
benchmarking data, discuss how the
survey can be used, and note emerging
areas of research

PSCHO, U.S.,
(Singer et al., 2007)

Describe the development of an
instrument for assessing workforce
perceptions of hospital safety culture
and to assess its reliability and validity

PSCHO, U.S.,
(Singer et al., 2009)

Examine the relationship between
measures of hospital safety climate
and hospital performance on selected
Patient Safety Indicators (PSIs).

34

Exploratory analysis done showed that hospitals which scored higher on patient
safety culture had fewer reported adverse events, after controlling for hospital
bed size, teaching status, and ownership.
There was a significant correlation between hospital bed size, teaching status,
and ownership and the PSI composite. Larger and private hospitals had higher
PSI rates.
Almost all tested relationships were aligning to the hypothesis (negative), and 7
of the 15 relationships were statistically significant and HSPSC composite
average (47%).
All significant relationships had standardized regression coefficients between
−0.15 and −0.41, denoting that hospitals with higher positive PSC scores
experienced less in-hospital complications/adverse events as measured by PSIs.

28

Positive patient safety perceptions were influenced by effective information
handoff, responsibility, and accountability.
There was positive correlation between feedback and communication of errors
and conveying of patient information.
Teamwork within units and the frequency of events documented had positive
correlation to the transference of personal responsibility when changing shifts.

35

•
•
•

HSPSC, U.S.,
(McFadden et al., 2009)

Frequency of event reporting, perception of general patient safety, and general
patient safety grade had a significant relationship with SAQ and HSPSC at
individual level, with correlations of r=0.41 to 0.65 for SAQ and from r=0.22 to
0.72 for HSOPS.
Neither SAQ nor HSPSC predicted the fourth HSOPS outcome, i.e., the number
of events reported within the last year.
Analyses on regression revealed that HSPSC safety culture dimensions had the
best ability to predict frequency of event reporting and general perceptions of
patient safety while SAQ and HSPSC dimensions predicted patient safety grade
only.

•
•

•
203 sites were considered.
Examining the validity and reliability of
the instruments.

•
•

•
•

100 Hospitals considered.
Examining the validity and reliability of response rate was 51%
the instruments

•
•

91 hospitals considered.
Examining the validity and reliability of
Response rate was 52%.
the instruments.
Studying PSC relationships with PSIs.

•
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•
•

•
•

TFL has a role in creating a PSC through the actual PSI execution.
TFL has an indirect relationship with the implementation of initiatives, and
ultimately improved PSO.
The characteristics of inspirational leaders are linked with the creation and
promotion of a safety culture, making safety a priority and investing resources to
PSI to realize maximal improvements in PSO.

26

A six-factor model used at both the clinical area and respondent nested within
clinical area levels generated attitudes.
The factors were: Teamwork Climate, Safety Climate, Perceptions of
Management, Job Satisfaction, Working Conditions, and Stress Recognition.
With a scale reliability of 0.9, provider attitudes varied significantly within and
among organizations.
Using SAQ to measure climate in clinical areas permits comparisons between
hospitals, patient care areas, and types of caregivers, and tracking of change over
time.

30

Nine constructs were acknowledged: three organizational factors, two unit
factors, three individual factors, and one additional factor.
Constructs showed significant convergent and discriminant validity in the MTA.
Cronbach’s a coefficient ranged from 0.50 to 0.89.

29

Hospitals showing better safety climate had lower relative incidence of PSIs.
Those with higher scores on safety climate dimensions determining interpersonal
beliefs regarding shame and blame.

31

PSCHO, U. S.,
(Hansen et al., 2011)

Define the relationship between
hospital patient safety climate (a
measure of hospitals’ organizational
culture as related to patient safety) and
hospitals’ rates of
rehospitalization within 30 days of
discharge

•
•
•

67 hospitals considered.
Examining the validity and reliability of
the instruments.
Response rate was 38.5 %
Studying PSC relationships with rates of
rehospitalization.

•

Frontline worker’s perceived lower risk of experiencing PSIs related to better
safety climate, however, senior managers did not agree on this.

•

There was a noteworthy positive correlation between lower safety climate and
higher rates of readmission among AMI (acute myocardial infarction) and HF
(heart failure) (p 0.05 for both models).
Frontline workers perceptions of safety climate were linked to readmission rates
(p 0.01), however, the management’s perceptions contradicted this.
The results demonstrate that hospital patient safety climate has a connection with
readmission outcomes patients with AMI and HF. The associations were specific
to management and leadership.

24

Frontline personnel’s safety climate perceptions were 4.8, percentage points (1.4
times) more problematic than senior managers’, and supervisors’ perceptions
were 3.1 percentage points (1.25 times) more problematic than senior managers’.
Discipline had an impact on the differences at management level: senior
managers had less differences than frontline workers. Additionally, the
differences were more pronounced for nurses than physicians and other
disciplines.

34

•
•

•
PSCHO, U.S.,
(Singer et al., 2008)

Determine whether frontline workers
and supervisors perceive a more
negative patient safety climate than
senior managers in their institutions.

•
•

92 US Hospitals considered.
Examining the validity and reliability of
the instruments.

•
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APPENDIX D: WESTAT® DE-IDENTIFIED DATA RELEASE FORM
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Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ)
SOPS® Database
De-Identified Data Research Abstract Form
Instructions
Please use this form to describe the research for which you request AHRQ Surveys on Patient Safety
Culture™ (SOPS®) de-identified data. Save this completed form with your last name in the file name
(e.g., “Smith SOPS De-identified Research Abstract.doc”) and submit to
SOPSResearchData@westat.com (Subject line: SOPS De-identified Data Request).
Notes: Because participating organizations (i.e., hospitals, medical offices, nursing homes, community
pharmacies, and ambulatory surgery centers) voluntarily submit data to the SOPS Database, the data do not
constitute a nationally representative sample. Replication of statistics published in the Surveys on Patient
Safety Culture Database Reports may not be possible due to post-hoc cleaning and because some sites did
not authorize the inclusion of their data in these de-identified files. Documentation of cleaning is provided
with the data files.

Date Requested
08/20/2020
Project Title [100 characters max.]
Exploring Relationships Between Patient Safety Culture Subdimensions, Respondent and Hospital
Characteristics
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to 1) evaluate the measurement structure of the 12 areas of patient safety
culture assessed in the SOPS Hospital Survey, and 2) examine the associations between respondent and
hospital characteristics and patient safety culture.
Hypotheses
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Hypothesis1: Patient Safety Culture subdimensions share in common a second order factor (overall
Patient Safety Culture).
Hypothesis2: Respondent Characteristics have a significant impact on Patient Safety Culture.
Hypothesis3: Hospital Characteristics have a significant impact on Patient Safety Culture.
Methodology [Specify SOPS measures to be used and proposed analyses]
In this research individual level of analysis will be used. The statistical analysis will comprise
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and covariance structural equation modeling (SEM). CFA will be
used to confirm the measurement structure of the 12 areas of patient safety culture, including the validity
and reliability of a second level factor (Patient Safety Culture). Next, SEM will be used to examine the
associations between respondent and hospital characteristics and Patient Safety Culture.
Measures:
All 12 dimensions of patient safety culture.
Hospital Characteristics: Bed size, Teaching status and Geographic region.
Respondent Characteristics: Work area/unit, Staff position, Interaction with patients, and Tenure in
current work area/unit

Expected Project Timeline
8/30/2020 to 8/30/2021
Expected Outcomes of the Research/How Results will be Presented
The respondent and hospital characteristics have a significant impact on Patient Safety Culture. The
results will be published in a peer-reviewed journal. This research is for PhD dissertation.
Funding Sources [Include grant or contract number.]
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N/A
Survey and Database Year(s) Needed for Analyses Outlined Above
Database
Hospital
Report Year
2012

Medical
Office

Ambulatory
Surgery
Center

Nursing
Home

Community
Pharmacy

☐

2013
2014

☐

☐
☐

2015
2016

☐

☐

☒

☐

☐

2017
2018

☐

2019
2020

☐

☐

☐

Contact Information
If Primary Contact is a student, please also provide your supervisor in Other Contact/Supervisor
Information below.

Primary Contact Information

Other Contact/Supervisor Information
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Name: Abdulmajeed Azyabi
Title: PhD student, IEMS Dept
Organization: The University of Central
Florida
Address 1: 13059 Lexington Summit St.
Address 2:
Phone: 4058358317
City, State, Zip: Orlando, Florida, 32828
Country: United State of America
Email: AYM37@KNIGHTS.UCF.EDU

Name: Dr. Waldemar Karwowski
Title: Professor and Chair, IEMS Dept.
Organization: University of Central Florida
Address 1: 12800 Pegasus Drive
Address 2:
Phone: 407 823 5759
City, State, Zip: Orlando, FL, 32816
Country: USA
Email: wkar@ucf.edu

If there are more individuals who will be working with the data on this project, please provide their
contact information as well.
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Saraç, Ç. (2011). Safety climate in acute hospitals (Doctoral dissertation, University of
Aberdeen).
Sarac, C., Flin, R., Mearns, K., & Jackson, J. (2010, September). Measuring hospital safety
culture: testing the HSPSC scale. In Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics
Society Annual Meeting (Vol. 54, No. 12, pp. 850-854). Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA:
SAGE Publications.
Sarac, C., Flin, R., Mearns, K., & Jackson, J. (2011). Hospital survey on patient safety culture:
psychometric analysis on a Scottish sample. BMJ Quality & Safety, 20(10), 842-848.
197

Sarstedt, M., Hair, J. F., Ringle, C. M., Thiele, K. O., & Gudergan, S. P. (2016). Estimation
issues with PLS and CBSEM: Where the bias lies! Journal of Business Research, 69(10),
3998-4010. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2016.06.007.
Schein, E. (1990). Organizational Culture, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School
of Management American Psychologist, 45, 109-119.
Schein, E. (1992). Organisational Culture and Leadership 2nd edition Jossey-Bass. San
Francisco, CA.
Schneider, E. C., Sarnak, D. O., Squires, D., & Shah, A. (2017). Mirror, Mirror 2017: nternationa
Comparison Ref ects F aws and Opportunities for Better US Hea th Care.
Scott, T., Mannion, R., Davies, H., & Marshall, M. (2003). The quantitative measurement of
organizational culture in health care: a review of the available instruments. Health
services research, 38(3), 923-945.
Sexton, J. B., Helmreich, R. L., Neilands, T. B., Rowan, K., Vella, K., Boyden, J., ... & Thomas,
E. J. (2006). The Safety Attitudes Questionnaire: psychometric properties, benchmarking
data, and emerging research. BMC health services research, 6(1), 1-10.
Shanmugapriya, S., & Subramanian, K. (2016). Developing a PLS path model to investigate the
factors influencing safety performance improvement in construction organizations. KSCE
Journal of Civil Engineering, 20(4), 1138-1150. Retrieved from
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12205-015-0442-9.
Shojania, K. G., & Thomas, E. J. (2013). Trends in adverse events over time: why are we not
improving?. BMJ quality & safety, 22(4), 273-277.
Siarkowski-Amer, K. (2013). Quality and safety for transformational nursing.

198

Singer, S. J., Falwell, A., Gaba, D. M., & Baker, L. C. (2008). Patient safety climate in US
hospitals: variation by management level. Medical care, 1149-1156.
Singer, S. J., Gaba, D. M., Falwell, A., Lin, S., Hayes, J., & Baker, L. (2009). Patient safety
climate in 92 US hospitals: differences by work area and discipline. Medical care, 23-31.
Singer, S. J., Gaba, D. M., Geppert, J. J., Sinaiko, A. D., Howard, S. K. S., & Park, K. C. (2003).
The culture of safety: results of an organization-wide survey in 15 California
hospitals. BMJ Quality & Safety, 12(2), 112-118.
Singer, S., Lin, S., Falwell, A., Gaba, D., & Baker, L. (2009). Relationship of safety climate and
safety performance in hospitals. Health services research, 44(2p1), 399-421.
Singer, S., Meterko, M., Baker, L., Gaba, D., Falwell, A., & Rosen, A. (2007). Workforce
perceptions of hospital safety culture: development and validation of the patient safety
climate in healthcare organizations survey. Health services research, 42(5), 1999-2021.
Singla, A. K., Kitch, B. T., Weissman, J. S., & Campbell, E. G. (2006). Assessing patient safety
culture: a review and synthesis of the measurement tools. Journal of Patient Safety, 2(3),
105-115.
Smits, M., Christiaans-Dingelhoff, I., Wagner, C., van der Wal, G., & Groenewegen, P. P.
(2008). The psychometric properties of the'Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture'in
Dutch hospitals. BMC health services research, 8(1), 1-9.
Smits, M., Wagner, C., Spreeuwenberg, P., Van Der Wal, G., & Groenewegen, P. P. (2009).
Measuring patient safety culture: an assessment of the clustering of responses at unit
level and hospital level. BMJ Quality & Safety, 18(4), 292-296.
Sorra, J. S., & Dyer, N. (2010). Multilevel psychometric properties of the AHRQ hospital survey
on patient safety culture. BMC health services research, 10(1), 1-13.
199

Sorra, J., & Nieva, V. F. (2004). Hospital survey on patient safety culture. Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality.
Sorra, J., Gray, L., Streagle, S., Famolaro, T., Yount, N., & Behm, J. (2016). AHRQ Hospital
survey on patient safety culture: User’s guide. Rockville, MD: Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality.
Sorra, J., Khanna, K., Dyer, N., Mardon, R., & Famolaro, T. (2012). Exploring relationships
between patient safety culture and patients’ assessments of hospital care. Journal of
patient safety, 8(3), 131-139.
Sureshchandar, G. S., Rajendran, C., & Anantharaman, R. N. (2001). A conceptual model for
total quality management in service organizations. Total quality management, 12(3), 343363.
Sutcliffe, K. M., Paine, L., & Pronovost, P. J. (2017). Re-examining high reliability: actively
organising for safety. BMJ quality & safety, 26(3), 248-251.
Tacconelli, E. (2010). Systematic reviews: CRD's guidance for undertaking reviews in health
care. The Lancet Infectious Diseases, 10(4), 226.
The Health Foundation. (2013). Safety culture: What is it and how do we monitor and measure
it? A summary of learning from a Health Foundation roundtable. Retrieved September
13, 2020, from
https://health.org.uk/sites/health/files/SafetyCultureWhatIsItAndHowDoWeMeasureIt.pd
f.
The Joint Commission. (2008). Behaviors that undermine a culture of safety. Sentinal Event
Alert, 40.

200

Thomas, E. J., Studdert, D. M., Runciman, W. B., Webb, R. K., Sexton, E. J., Wilson, R. M., ...
& Brennan, T. A. (2000). A comparison of iatrogenic injury studies in Australia and the
USA I: context, methods, casemix, population, patient and hospital
characteristics. International journal for quality in health care, 12(5), 371-378.
Thomas, L., & Galla, C. (2013). Building a culture of safety through team training and
engagement. BMJ quality & safety, 22(5), 425-434.
Tingle, J. (2011). Preventing adverse healthcare events: lessons from abroad. British Journal of
Nursing, 20(2), 116-117.
Top, M., & Tekingündüz, S. (2015). Patient safety culture in a Turkish public hospital: A study
of nurses’ perceptions about patient safety. Systemic Practice and Action
Research, 28(2), 87-110.
Townsend, R. C., & Bennis, W. (2007). Up the organization: How to stop the corporation from
stifling people and strangling profits (Vol. 144). John Wiley & Sons.
Trochim, W., & Donnelly, J. (2008). The Research Methods Knowledge Base. 3rd. Mason, OH:
Atomic Dog Publishing.
Trzesniewski, K. H., Donnellan, M., & Lucas, R. E. (2011). Secondary data analysis: An
introduction for psychologists. American Psychological Association.
Turunen, H., Partanen, P., Kvist, T., Miettinen, M., & Vehviläinen‐Julkunen, K. (2013). Patient
safety culture in acute care: A web‐based survey of nurse managers' and registered
nurses' views in four F innish hospitals. International Journal of Nursing Practice, 19(6),
609-617.
Ugurluoglu, O., Ugurluoglu, E., Payziner, P. D., & Ozatkan, Y. (2012). Patient safety culture:
sample of a university hospital in Turkey. Pak. J. Med. Sci, 28(3), 463-467.
201

Valentin, A., Schiffinger, M., Steyrer, J., Huber, C., & Strunk, G. (2013). Safety climate reduces
medication and dislodgement errors in routine intensive care practice. Intensive care
medicine, 39(3), 391-398.
Vandergoot, S., Sarris, A., Kirby, N., & Ward, H. (2018). Exploring undergraduate students’
attitudes towards interprofessional learning, motivation-to-learn, and perceived impact of
learning conflict resolution skills. Journal of interprofessional care, 32(2), 211-219.
Verbeke, W., Volgering, M., & Hessels, M. (1998). Exploring the conceptual expansion within
the field of organizational behaviour: Organizational climate and organizational
culture. Journal of Management Studies, 35(3), 303-329.
Vincent, C., Aylin, P., Franklin, B. D., Holmes, A., Iskander, S., Jacklin, A., & Moorthy, K.
(2008). Is health care getting safer?. Bmj, 337.
Vincent, C., Neale, G., & Woloshynowych, M. (2001). Adverse events in British hospitals:
preliminary retrospective record review. Bmj, 322(7285), 517-519.
Vincent, C., Taylor-Adams, S., & Stanhope, N. (1998). Framework for analysing risk and safety
in clinical medicine. Bmj, 316(7138), 1154-1157.
Vlayen, A., Hellings, J., Claes, N., Abdou, E. A., & Schrooten, W. (2015). Measuring safety
culture in Belgian psychiatric hospitals: validation of the Dutch and French translations
of the hospital survey on patient safety culture. Journal of Psychiatric Practice®, 21(2),
124-139.
Vlayen, A., Schrooten, W., Wami, W., Aerts, M., Barrado, L. G., Claes, N., & Hellings, J.
(2015). Variability of patient safety culture in Belgian acute hospitals. Journal of patient
safety, 11(2), 110-121.

202

Vogus, T. J., & Sutcliffe, K. M. (2007). The Safety Organizing Scale: development and
validation of a behavioral measure of safety culture in hospital nursing units. Medical
care, 46-54.
Wachter, R. M. (2013). Personal accountability in healthcare: searching for the right
balance. BMJ quality & safety, 22(2), 176-180.
Wagner, C., Smits, M., Sorra, J., & Huang, C. C. (2013). Assessing patient safety culture in
hospitals across countries. International Journal for Quality in Health Care, 25(3), 213221.
Waltz, C. F., Strickland, O. L., & Lenz, E. R. (2010). Measurement theories and
frameworks. Measurement in Nursing and Health Research. 4th ed. New York: Springer
Publishing Co, 49-90.
Waterson, P., Griffiths, P., Stride, C., Murphy, J., & Hignett, S. (2010). Psychometric properties
of the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture: findings from the UK. Quality and
Safety in Health Care, 19(5), e2-e2.
Weick, K. E., & Sutcliffe, K. M. (2011). Managing the unexpected: Resilient performance in an
age of uncertainty (Vol. 8). John Wiley & Sons.
Weick, K. E., Sutcliffe, K. M., & Obstfeld, D. (1999). Research in organizational
behavior. Organizing for high reliability: processes for collective mindfulness. Stamford,
CT: JAI Press, Inc, 81-123.
Weick, K. E., Sutcliffe, K. M., & Obstfeld, D. (2008). Organizing for high reliability: Processes
of collective mindfulness. Crisis management, 3 (1), 81–123.
Westat®. Homepage. (2020). Retrieved November 21, 2020 from http://www.westat.com.

203

Westrum, R. (2004). A typology of organisational cultures. BMJ Quality & Safety, 13(suppl 2),
ii22-ii27.
Williams, D. J., Olsen, S., Crichton, W., Witte, K., Flin, R., Ingram, J., ... & Cuthbertson, B. H.
(2008). Detection of adverse events in a Scottish hospital using a consensus-based
methodology. Scottish medical journal, 53(4), 26-30.
Wilpert, B., & Itoigawa, N. (Eds.). (2001). Safety culture in nuclear power operations. CRC
Press.
Wilson, R. M., Runciman, W. B., Gibberd, R. W., Harrison, B. T., Newby, L., & Hamilton, J. D.
(1995). The quality in Australian health care study. Medical journal of Australia, 163(9),
458-471.
Wong, K. K.-K. (2013). Partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM)
techniques using SmartPLS. Marketing Bulletin, 24(1), 1-32. Retrieved from
http://marketing-bulletin.massey.ac.nz/V24/MB_V24_T1_Wong.pdf.
Woods, D. D. (2010). Behind human error. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd..
Woods, D., Thomas, E., Holl, J., Altman, S., & Brennan, T. (2005). Adverse events and
preventable adverse events in children. Pediatrics, 115(1), 155-160.
World Health Organization. (1986). IAEA/ILO/UNEP/WHO Inter-Agency Consultants/Experts
Meeting on Co-operation in Assessment of Health and Environmental Risks of Energy
Systems and their Management, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, New York,
USA, 19-22 November 1985 (No. PEP/86.1). World Health Organization.
World Health Organization. (2009). WHO patient safety curriculum guide for medical schools.
World Health Organization. (2010). Framework for action on interprofessional education and
collaborative practice (No. WHO/HRH/HPN/10.3). World Health Organization.
204

World Health Organization. (2014). 10 Facts on Patient Safety [Online]. Retrieved August 10,
2020 from http://www.who.int/features/factfiles/patient_safety/en/.
World Health Organization. Dept. of Violence, Injury Prevention, World Health Organization.
Violence, Injury Prevention, & World Health Organization. (2009). Global status report
on road safety: time for action. World Health Organization.
Wreathall, J. (1995). Organizational culture, behavioral norms and safety.
Wu, Y., Fujita, S., Seto, K., Ito, S., Matsumoto, K., Huang, C. C., & Hasegawa, T. (2013). The
impact of nurse working hours on patient safety culture: a cross-national survey including
Japan, the United States and Chinese Taiwan using the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety
Culture. BMC health services research, 13(1), 1-7.
Xuanyue, M., Yanli, N., Hao, C., Pengli, J., & Mingming, Z. (2013). Literature review regarding
patient safety culture. Journal of Evidence‐Based Medicine, 6(1), 43-49.
Yule, S., Flin, R., Paterson-Brown, S., & Maran, N. (2006). Non-technical skills for surgeons in
the operating room: a review of the literature. Surgery, 139(2), 140-149.
Zaheer, S., Ginsburg, L., Chuang, Y. T., & Grace, S. L. (2015). Patient safety climate (PSC)
perceptions of frontline staff in acute care hospitals: examining the role of ease of
reporting, unit norms of openness, and participative leadership. Health care management
review, 40(1), 13-23.
Zeidel, M. L. (2011). Systematic quality improvement in medicine: everyone can do it. Rambam
Maimonides medical journal, 2(3).
Zhan, C., & Miller, M. R. (2003). Excess length of stay, charges, and mortality attributable to
medical injuries during hospitalization. Jama, 290(14), 1868-1874.

205

Zhao, X., Liu, W., Wang, Y., & Zhang, L. (2017). Survey and analysis of patient safety culture
in a county hospital. Family Medicine and Community Health, 5(4), 299-310.
Zhou, P., Bundorf, M. K., Gu, J., He, X., & Xue, D. (2015). Survey on patient safety climate in
public hospitals in China. BMC health services research, 15(1), 1-10.
Zohar, D. (1980). Safety climate in industrial organizations: theoretical and applied
implications. Journal of applied psychology, 65(1), 96.
Zohar, D. (2000). A group-level model of safety climate: testing the effect of group climate on
microaccidents in manufacturing jobs. Journal of applied psychology, 85(4), 587.
Zohar, D. (2010). Thirty years of safety climate research: Reflections and future
directions. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 42(5), 1517-1522.
Zohar, D., & Hofmann, D. A. Organizational Culture and Climate. The Oxford Handbook of
Organizational Psychology, Volume 1.
Zohar, D., & Luria, G. (2005). A multilevel model of safety climate: cross-level relationships
between organization and group-level climates. Journal of applied psychology, 90(4),
616.

206

